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Abstract 
‘Brexit and the City’ reviews both the principal issues affecting the City of London following 
the Referendum vote to leave the EU and the key proposals that have been made for the 
City’s future relationship with the EU. The latter are examined in the light of the European 
Commission’s negotiating strategy and also what is needed to achieve the best possible 
outcome for the City and the UK economy. 
The report concludes that Brexit is a golden opportunity for the City of London to escape 
the protectionist clutches of the EU in order to maintain its position as a World Financial 
Centre leading the new digital revolution of blockchain and fintech.  
But to make the best of Brexit, the City needs to address the following issues. First, it 
should recognise that its place is to service the real financial needs of businesses and 
individuals in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world and that this is best done outside 
the EU which, because of its protectionism, its excessive regulation and the folly of the 
euro, is destroying growth and innovation in the EU member states.  
Second, it should agree a ‘consistent and forward-looking Brexit strategy’ in order to 
secure a ‘bold, bright, buccaneering post-Brexit future’, as demanded by the Lord Mayor 
of London, Jeffrey Mountevans, at the City Banquet at Mansion House on 26 October 
2016.  
Third, it should build on the protections afforded by international law to counter the EU’s 
demands that providers of financial services to EU citizens and companies need to be 
physically located in the EU to do business. It is just as absurd to expect the City of London 
to move to Paris or Frankfurt after Brexit as it is to expect the French wine industry or the 
German car industry to move to the UK. There is more investment banking expertise on 
the Isle of Dogs than in the whole of continental Europe put together.  
Finally, it should aim to quickly recover the competitive edge that it has lost in recent 
years.  The WTO has estimated that the City’s share of China’s imports of financial 
services (mainly insurance) was 3% in 2015, unchanged since 2011. Over the same period, 
the US share increased from 11% to 28%. 
  
Implications for the City of leaving the European Union 
On 23 June 2016, the British people voted to leave the EU. This is due to take place on 29 
March 2019. The prime minister’s Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017 made it 
clear that this meant also leaving the single market, the customs union and the European 
Economic Area, membership of which means accepting freedom of movement. 
This has powerful implications for the City: 
• It is unlikely that business with the EU27 will be conducted via passports in future. 
• Instead, and depending on the degree of co-operation from the EU27, the City 
should plan its future operations using either:   
o a third-country enhanced equivalence model with guarantees about how 
equivalence will be granted and removed,  
o mutual recognition of financial regulations with mutual market access, or 
o a World Financial Centre model where the City ‘goes it alone’. 
• The City should make the most of the transitional or implementation period 
between 30 March 2019 and 31 December 2020 to secure existing commercial 
relationships and initiate new ones, now that it will no longer be a rule taker from 
Brussels. 
• The City should encourage the government to support the development of legally 
binding regulatory standards at a global level free from political interference. The 
aim would be to promote global consistency and cooperation between regulatory 
authorities. 
• The City should encourage the government to support the overseas expansion of 
UK financial services in the fastest growing regions of the global economy. 
• The City should encourage the government to introduce a flexible system of work 
permits for skilled workers that covers workers who are offered a job in the UK 
and who are located in any country in the world outside the UK. 
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1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom is due to leave the European Union on 29 March 2019.  In December 
2017, the key principles underlying the withdrawal terms and costs were agreed,1 with the 
withdrawal being implemented by 31 December 2020. However, Michel Barnier, the EU’s 
chief Brexit negotiator, has made it clear that the conclusion of a deal setting out the future 
trading relationships between the EU and the UK would take much longer than the two 
years allowed under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, even longer than the end 
of 2020.2  In the meantime, EU member states have been bidding for large chunks of the 
City of London’s business. And EU financial regulators are attempting to exercise significant 
influence over what business remains in London.3 The Square Mile risks becoming a 
wounded lioness with the vultures hovering overhead. 
There is an alternative vision of the future for the City of London and that is as a World 
Financial Centre outside the over-regulated protectionist European Union. Exiting the EU 
provides a golden opportunity for the UK financial services industry to again know its place 
in the world.4  And that is as a servant to the real economy – by oiling its wheels and helping 
to facilitate the economic transactions of individuals and companies in the UK and across 
the globe. In recent years, it has not performed this function at all well. Instead, it has been 
more interested in its own profits and bonuses than in meeting its customers’ real needs. 
This new vision is not helped by the reaction of various City lobby groups. Typical is the 
attitude expressed by Mark Boleat, chair of the policy and resources committee of the City 
of London Corporation: ‘As you’d imagine, firms have undertaken a significant amount of 
contingency planning ahead of official divorce proceedings. With the government remaining 
tight-lipped on negotiations, they have been planning for the worst while hoping for the 
best. They have to have plans in place for a worst case scenario – the UK with no special 
access to the single market or bilateral trade agreements in place, among other things. 
Some have already applied for licences outside the UK in case they need to move parts of 
their business, and most have prepared detailed plans for any necessary restructuring of 
their companies….[T]here’s a desire for firms to stay in London. Not for any sentimental 
                                                     
1 Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress 
during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the 
European Union, TF50 (2017) 19, 8 December 2017. 
2 Article 50 states that ‘the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with [the leaving] State, setting 
out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the 
Union’. This must be completed within two years of triggering Article 50 on 29 March 2017. 
3 Christine Largarde frequently said when she was French Finance Minister that she not only wanted the City to 
be regulated from Paris, she wanted to bring large chunks of it to Paris as well (see, e.g., evidence given by 
André Villeneuve, Chairman, International Regulatory Strategy Group, City of London, on 16 November 2010 to 
House of Commons Treasury Committee on Financial Regulation, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtreasy/430/10111603.htm). 
4 Michael E. Porter (1991) Know Your Place: How to Assess the Attractiveness of Your Industry and Your 
Company's Position in It, Inc. 13, no. 9, September. 
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reasons – facts and pragmatism in contingency planning reign supreme; emotional and 
historic ties count for very little’.5   
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Anthony Browne, then CEO of the British 
Bankers Association (BBA).6 In October 2016, he said that ‘London’s position as Europe’s 
financial capital should not be taken for granted’. He expected banks to start moving jobs 
from the UK ‘in the coming months’ and that international bank bosses were ‘planning for 
the worst case scenario’ with their hands ‘poised, quivering, over the relocate button’: 
‘many smaller banks plan to start relocations before Christmas – bigger banks are expected 
to start in the first quarter of next year’.7  He then demanded – presumably as an 
inducement to steady those quivering hands – that the bank levy and banking corporation 
tax surcharge should be phased out as soon as possible.8   
Fortunately, these dire warnings have been dismissed as ‘nonsense’ even by the banks 
themselves. UK retail banks hardly do any business in the EU, so as one said: ‘Brexit is a bit 
of a non-issue for us’. Santander said their Spanish owners were happy to have operations 
located outside the EU.  Further, the Dutch bank ING has moved all its traders from the 
continent to London and Wells Fargo announced a new £300million headquarters in 
London. Jacob Rees-Mogg MP said ‘The BBA has gone from being a lobbyist for British banks 
to a lobbyist for the European Union. It worships at the shrine of the EU and does not 
believe anything can work outside it. It is not doing a good job of representing the British 
financial industry’. Richard Tice, co-chairman of the pressure group Leave Means Leave, 
pointed out that ‘similar apocalyptic predictions were made when the UK took the sensible 
decision to not join the euro’.9 
There is, of course, a great deal at stake, so it is important to get it right. According to the 
Financial Times, banks that use the UK as a gateway to the EU employ more than 590,000 
people, have more than £7.5trn of assets and make annual profits of more than £50bn.10  In 
addition, passports will play a big role in the negotiations concerning the City. On the one 
hand, there are the passports of the 3.3 million non-UK EU citizens11 working in the UK: 
their future has been secured in the withdrawal agreement, but whether EU citizens coming 
to work in the UK after December 2020 will need work visas has yet to be determined.  On 
the other hand, there are the 5,500 outbound passports that UK financial services 
companies currently have to have to be able to provide their services across the EU, as well 
as the 8,000 inbound passports of the EU firms that operate in the UK.  
                                                     
5 Mark Boleat (2016) City firms are preparing for the worst from Brexit – but hoping for the best, City A.M., 19 
December. 
6 Subsequently renamed UK Finance. 
7 Tim Burke (2016) BBA chief: 'Banks planning for worst case Brexit scenario', Financial News, 20 October. 
8 Anthony Browne (2016) Why the Chancellor needs to cut banking taxes – and fast, CAPX, 20 October. 
9 Daniel Martin and Holly Black (2016) It's nonsense! Banks dismiss gloom-laden claim they'll quit the UK after 
Brexit, Daily Mail, 24 October. 
10 Laura Noonan, Patrick Jenkins and Harriet Agnew (2016) City’s special relationship with EU finance system 
revealed, Financial Times, 25 September. 
11 https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/354 
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What follows is a review of both the principal issues affecting the City of London following 
the Referendum vote to leave the EU and the key proposals for the City’s future relationship 
with the EU that have been made. The latter will be examined in the light of the EU 
Commission’s declared negotiating strategy. We will also consider what is needed to 
achieve the best possible outcome for the City and the UK economy. We begin by placing 
the City in an historical context. 
 
2. The City used to know its place 
The City of London is, of course, very important.  It is the headquarters of the UK’s financial 
(principally banking and asset management) and insurance sectors which contribute 8% to 
the UK’s total gross value added (GVA) – £126.9bn in 2014 – with 50% of this generated in 
London. These two sectors contribute around 75% of the UK’s trade surplus in services – 
£62bn in 2014 or around 3.5% of GDP.12  The figure rises to £71bn when the trade surplus 
for related professional services – legal services, accountancy and management consultancy 
– is included. This makes the UK the world’s biggest net exporter of financial services, 
accounting for 12% of the UK’s total exports.13 The City is home to 250 international banks 
and is responsible for 17% of all international bank lending – more than any other centre. 
Overall, the UK has the world’s fourth largest banking sector, the third largest insurance 
sector, and is second in the world for assets under management at £6.2trn.  In 2013-14, the 
banking sector alone paid £21.4bn in corporation tax, income tax, national insurance and 
the bank levy.14  Overall, UK financial services pay £71bn in tax (11.5% of all tax revenues)15 
and employ around 1.1m people. 
While we all prepared to recognise the importance of the City of London in both the 
domestic and global financial system, there was a time when the City of London knew its 
place in serving the real economy.  
At the beginning of the 16th Century, first in Amsterdam and then in London, banks began to 
accept deposits from customers for safekeeping in exchange for a fee. Shortly after, these 
banks began to offer the service of paying out to individuals carrying a written instruction 
from the depositor.  So began retail banking with its core products of current accounts and 
cheque books – truly magnificent financial innovations. Two centuries later, at the Five Bells 
tavern in Lombard Street, clerks would gather to exchange their banks' cheques and settle 
any difference in cash – marking the start of the key financial support services of clearing 
and settlement. In 1778, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) allowed one of its customers, a 
                                                     
12 The UK’s overall current account deficit is 5.5% of GDP. 
13 In 2014, the next exports of financial services in the UK were $95bn, compared with $36bn for the US, $24bn 
for Switzerland, $23bn for Luxembourg, $15bn for Singapore, and $13bn for Hong Kong. 
14 https://www.thecityuk.com/news/thecityuk-uk-trade-surplus-in-financial-services-highest-ever/; Gloria 
Tyler (2015) Financial Services: contribution to the UK economy, SN/EP/06193, House of Commons Library; 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06193/SN06193.pdf. 
15 George Parker and Martin Arnold (2106) Hammond and Davis promise City ‘smooth and orderly’ Brexit, 
Financial Times, 6 December. 
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merchant called William Hog, to take £1,000 more out of his account than he had in it, 
thereby inventing the overdraft.16 
In the 15th and 16th Centuries, a different kind of bank – which became known as a merchant 
bank and later an investment bank – emerged to help companies finance their working 
capital, by selling bills of exchange to other merchants and small investors. Later, in the 18th 
and 19th Centuries, these banks were joined by overseas banks – such as Barings, 
Rothschilds, Schroders, Hambros, Kleinwort and Morgan – to finance long-term loans to 
governments, via the sale of bonds.  
In the early 17th Century, merchant banks began to help companies raise long-term capital 
by issuing corporate stock. However, this was for government-chartered monopolies, such 
as the East India Company. The modern form of company share issuance did not begin until 
the incorporation of joint stock companies under the Limited Liability Act in 1856 and the 
Companies Act of 1862. To help promote initial placements, investors needed reassuring 
that they could subsequently sell their securities. Merchant banks therefore began to 
provide additional services, such as securities dealing, broking, investment advising, 
commercial banking, and currency trading – and in the process turned into modern 
‘universal banks’.17 The efficient operation of financial markets is supported by technology – 
an early example of which was the laying of a transatlantic cable in the mid-19th Century 
which enabled transactions between sterling and the dollar to be executed, giving rise to 
the slang name ‘cable’ for sterling.  
The first part of the 20th Century until the 1960s was not especially good for the City as a 
result of two wars, an intervening recession, debt, and post-war nationalisation (which 
meant fewer productive investment opportunities). However a renaissance started in 1963, 
when S G Warburg started the Eurobond market – now better known as the cross-border 
debt capital market – in London with the issue of a $15m bond with a 15-year maturity and 
an annual coupon of 5½% for Autostrade, the Italian motorway network.18 
The two other great financial activities are insurance and asset management. Property 
insurance began to develop after the Great Fire of London destroyed 13,000 houses in 1666. 
Nicholas Barbon started the first fire insurance company, the Insurance Office for Houses, 
behind the Royal Exchange in 1681. A formal insurance market began in Edward Lloyd's 
Coffee House in Tower Street in 1688. The place became popular with merchants and ship 
owners when Lloyd began providing first shipping news and then marine insurance – and 
this marked the beginning of the London (insurance) market, dominated by Lloyd's of 
London. This market deals mainly in general insurance.  Life insurance began following the 
development of the first life table by Edmund Halley in 1693. The first life policies were 
offered by the Amicable Society for a Perpetual Assurance Office, established in London in 
                                                     
16 Rosie Murray-West (2013) A 300-year history of British banking and the rise of current accounts, Daily 
Telegraph, 12 September. 
17 Caroline Fohlin (2014) A Brief History of Investment Banking from Medieval Times to the Present, Working 
Paper, Emory University;   
http://economics.emory.edu/home/documents/workingpapers/fohlin_14_16_paper.pdf 
18 http://www.icmagroup.org/About-ICMA/history/history-of-the-eurobond-market/ 
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1706. The world’s first mutual insurer, the Society for Equitable Assurances on Lives and 
Survivorship, was set up in 1762, offering age-based premiums derived using formal 
actuarial methods. 
The first asset management company was established in Scotland in 1873 to invest in North 
America.19 Asset management is a much more recent business which now divides itself into 
two broad categories, institutional and retail. Institutional asset management comprises 
traditional investment advisors and managers, hedge funds and private equity funds. This 
grew in the 20th Century, particularly after the Second World War, to service the medium- 
and long-term investment needs of insurance companies, pension funds, family offices and 
sovereign wealth funds. Institutional asset management companies have their origins in the 
insurance industry (e.g., Royal London Asset Management and Legal & General Investment 
Management), the banking industry (e.g., Schroders and UBS Asset Management) and as 
independent businesses (e.g., Aberdeen Asset Management, BlackRock and Hermes 
Investment Management).  Retail asset management typically involves collective investment 
schemes, such as unit trusts and exchange-traded funds.  
 
3. But then it began to behave very badly 
So far, so brilliant. So when did things start to go wrong? We would date this from the early 
1970s and two unrelated events – the introduction of financial derivatives and the UK’s 
joining of the European Union.   
The market in financial derivatives started following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates in 1973. This led to a period of unprecedented interest and 
exchange rate volatility and investment banks started selling derivatives to hedge this 
volatility. Initially, this example of financial innovation was a success and made a valuable 
contribution to the real economy. Over time, however, banks introduced more complex 
derivatives that their clients did not understand and whose only real purpose was to 
generate revenues for the banks and bonuses for the bankers.20  So began a journey that led 
to the widespread exploitation of both retail and corporate clients. And worse, there was 
outright fraud – which was considered to be a growth industry in the 1970s. According to Sir 
David Walker, a former executive director for finance and industry at the Bank of England, 
these developments ‘outstripped the ability of regulators to understand [them]’.21  
In the case of retail and small business customers, there were the scandals involving the 
mis-selling of endowment mortgages and annuities, interest rate swaps, and payment 
protection insurance (PPI). More recently there has been the poor treatment of fraud 
                                                     
19 Keith Skeoch (2014) UK can rule the world in asset management, Daily Telegraph, 16 August. 
20 Kevin Dowd and Martin Hutchinson (2010) Alchemists of Loss: How Modern Finance and Government 
Intervention Crashed the Financial System, Chichester: Wiley. 
21Iain Martin (2016) Crash Bang Wallop: The Inside Story of London’s Big Bang and a Financial Revolution that 
Changed the World, London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
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victims,22 the issue of excessive overdraft charges and, in particular, the unscrupulous 
treatment of borrowers by the RBS’s turnaround division, Global Restructuring Group.23 
Endowment mortgages cost the banks £1.9bn in compensation between 2002 and 2006, 
while interest rate swaps cost them £4.8bn between 2012 and 2015 – with 90% of the swap 
contracts failing to meet regulatory standards. The banking industry has had to pay out 
£37.3bn in compensation for PPI mis-selling to date.24  More than 200,000 retirees in poor 
health who should have been sold enhanced annuities were mis-sold standard annuities 
which paid out up to 50% less in the case of serious illnesses such as cancer or strokes – with 
typical compensation of £500 per annuitant, according to the Financial Conduct Authority.25  
Research by New City Agenda shows that banks and building societies have been charged 
£53bn in fines since 2000. RBS, for example, has paid out £6.4bn in fines and also paid 
£3.8bn in staff bonuses, but shareholders have received no dividend since 2008. Similarly, 
Lloyds Banking Group paid £14bn in fines and £2.1bn in staff, and only £500m in dividends 
between 2010 and 2014. Lord John McFall, one of the founders of New City Agenda, said: 
‘The profitability of UK retail banks has been imperilled by persistent misconduct and an 
aggressive sales based culture. This has made every citizen poorer through our pension 
funds and our ownership of the bailed-out banks…. [Shareholders] should be leading the 
campaign to change bank culture and raise professional standards and demand significant 
clawback of bonuses for accountable managers’.26 
In respect of corporate customers, there have been the scandals involving LIBOR-fixing and 
the manipulation of exchange rates. In 2012, banks were found guilty of setting LIBOR in 
order to make profits from their own trading activities and had to pay £14.5bn in fines. In 
2014, US and UK regulators found there was a ‘free-for-all culture’ on the trading floors of 
RBS, HSBC, Citibank, JP Morgan and UBS, and fined these banks £2.6bn for conspiring to 
manipulate foreign exchange rates. In 2012, Standard Chartered was accused of helping Iran 
hide $250bn of transactions and paid a $340m fine to the New York State Department of 
Financial Services, and a further $300m two years later after failing to improve its money 
laundering controls. In 2015, HSBC was accused of helping companies evade tax.27  
Yet all this pales into insignificance compared with the cost to the world economy of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) between 2008-11, originating in the US sub-prime mortgage 
market, but spreading across the globe. The UK was particularly badly affected with its crisis 
                                                     
22 A recent example is HSBC’s refusal to compensate a victim who transferred £8,500 into a HSBC account set 
up by an eBay fraudster, despite HSBC being made aware that this account was associated with criminal 
activity four days previously (Amelia Murray (2017) Take banks to court for abetting crime, fraud victims told, 
Daily Telegraph: Your Money, 14 January). 
23 RBS put viable businesses into financial distress by cutting off their credit, so it could profit from their 
difficulties by charging exorbitant turnaround fees and then used RBS’s property division, West Register, to 
purchase the businesses’ assets at greatly reduced values. This case was reviewed by Lawrence Tomlinson 
(2013) Banks’ Lending Practices: Treatment of businesses in distress, Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, 25 November;  http://lexlaw.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Tomlinson-Report.pdf 
24 This could rise by another £22bn according to the Financial Times. 
25 Katie Morley (2017) Pension firms agree payouts for 200,000 sick retiress, Daily Telegraph, 25 February. 
26 Emma Dunkley (2016) Ten biggest bank scandals have cost £53bn in fines, Financial Times, 11 April.  
27 Five other banking scandals since 2008; http://www.channel4.com/news/five-other-banking-scandals-since-
2008, 9 February 2015. 
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beginning a year earlier in 2007 with the collapse of Northern Rock building society. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that the 
median loss in potential output in 2014 for the 19 countries which experienced a banking 
crisis was 5.5% of GDP.28  If lower stock market valuations are also taken into account, the 
cost rises to $15trn or 20% of global GDP, according to some estimates.29 On top of this 
were the bailouts from taxpayers for an industry whose representatives openly declare that 
emotional and historic ties count for very little. 
But, it is not just the behaviour of banks and insurance companies, there is also the 
behaviour of investment managers over hidden costs. Recent studies have shown that 
hidden costs are at least as high as visible costs, if not much higher. These hidden costs 
include transactions costs (such bid-offer spreads) and market impact costs, which increase 
the more frequently a customer’s portfolio is turned over. The studies show that most 
active fund managers subtract value from (rather than add value to) their customers’ 
assets.30 
The situation was not helped by the introduction of the ‘Big Bang’ on 27 October 1986. On 
the positive side, Big Bang led to the ending of a number of restrictive practices in the City, 
such as fixed commissions and the requirement that the roles of broker and jobber should 
be kept separate. It also made it easier for outsiders to compete and enter on the basis of 
merit what had previously been a closed shop.31 However, there were ‘unintended 
consequences’, such as encouraging short-termism within the investment industry. Martin 
Gilbert, CEO of Aberdeen Asset Management, argues that Big Bang ‘probably accelerated a 
trend towards short-termism and certainly did not nurture a more long-term approach. 
Capital markets are far more short term in their thinking now than they were’.  Another 
unintended consequence was that, when the de-regulation went badly wrong, as it did 
spectacularly in the GFC, there was a massive increase in regulation. Mr Gilbert comments: 
‘The most influential forces in the City now are the regulators. That is rightly the case given 
what happened in the financial crisis. But it does reflect the fact that the City today is not 
the embodiment of free markets and low barriers that some people think of it as being after 
the Big Bang’.32  
 
                                                     
28 Patrice Ollivaud and David Turner (2014) The effect of the global financial crisis on OECD potential output, 
OECD Journal: Economic Studies, 2014: 41-60; https://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/The-effect-of-the-global-
financial-crisis-on-OECD-potential-output-OECD-Journal-Economic-Studies-2014.pdf. 
29Al Yoon (2012) Total Global Losses from Financial Crisis: $15 Trillion, Wall Street Journal, 1 October.  Based on 
global GDP in 2012 of $74 trillion; http://www.statista.com/statistics/268750/global-gross-domestic-product-
gdp. 
30 David Blake (2014) On the Disclosure of the Costs of Investment Management, Discussion Paper PI-1407, 
Pensions Institute, May. 
31 As Simon Nixon points out: ‘London was a backwater, a largely domestic capital market, dominated by 
domestic firms and presided over by an old-money elite sustained by fat, fixed commissions, elaborate barriers 
to entry and rampant insider trading’ (Simon Nixon (2016) No Quick Fix to City of London’s Brexit Conundrum, 
Wall Street Journal, 28 September). 
32 Tom Eckett (2016) Aberdeen's Gilbert – The unintended consequences of the 'Big Bang' 30 years on, 
Investment Week, 27 October. 
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4. Joining the European Union made matters worse 
1973 was also the year that the UK joined the EU. Despite the pretence of promoting 
competition in the single market, the EU is a fundamentally anti-competitive and 
protectionist organisation. The single market is the internal market of a customs union. The 
customs union imposes high external trade barriers that reduce effective competition from 
abroad. Within the single market, regulations are harmonised. In principle, this should 
encourage more competition, but the regulations favour large corporations, making it 
difficult for small new entrants to compete. 
This was confirmed by Daniel Hannan in the Oxford Union Brexit debate on 9 June 2016:33 
‘The biggest surprise to me as a newly elected MEP was the extent to which these giant 
corporations [such as Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Citibank and Morgan Stanley] wanted 
more regulation. I had innocently supposed, being elected as a Conservative, that being 
private enterprises, they would want freedom of action. I was disabused of that within a 
week of arriving. They love regulation because they can afford the compliance costs more 
easily than their smaller rivals. They have captured the Brussels machine and used it to raise 
barriers to entry. Very good news for the cartel of established multinationals. Very bad news 
for the innovator, the start-up, the entrepreneur’.  
On 12 October 2015, two articles in the financial trade press showed the striking contrast of 
views about the City’s future inside or outside the EU. The first reported a study by New City 
Initiative which shows that ten incoming EU regulations, such as the Alternative Investment 
Funds Markets Directive, the Financial Transaction Tax, OECD Common Reporting Standards, 
Solvency II and Basel III, are ‘stifling innovation at smaller firms and restricting 
competitiveness as their regulatory burden continues to grow’.34 The second reported that 
the City’s Remain camp believes ‘there is no doubt a Brexit would do considerable damage 
in the short term. According to the chief executive of one European bank, if the UK voted to 
exit, his bank would move thousands of staff out of the country within a year’.35 
How can both views be reconciled?  Very easily.  What became clearer by the day in the 
lead-up to the Referendum was that the arguments in the City about EU membership were 
really about size and competition. The large firms in the City welcome the kind of EU 
regulations that prevent new small companies competing against them.  This is being 
dressed up as being in the UK’s national interest. It is not. It is very much against the 
interests of the City’s customers who will see even lower investment returns as the large 
firms swallow up the small firms so they can no longer compete against them. And this anti-
competitive attitude explains why the EU economy is falling further and further behind in 
the world. As Daniel Hannan states: ‘The year we joined – 1973 – the 28 countries that now 
make up the EU were 36% of the world economy. Last year, it was 17% and falling’.   
                                                     
33 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJcuKfcxo9w 
34 Laura Dew (2015) Think-tank warns regulatory burden stifling fund management innovation, Investment 
Week, 12 October. 
35 David Wighton (2015) For Europhiles to keep shtum on Brexit is a high-risk play, Financial News, 12 October.  
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So we entered the Referendum with the City having a reputation for poor customer service 
as well as being more than happy to use EU regulations to restrict competitive entry into the 
industry.  
 
5. Following the Referendum, the City was only concerned about its own 
interests 
The Referendum result was a genuine shock to the City. How could the dumb voters of 
Britain dare to rain on the City’s parade! And how did the City respond? It threatened to 
pick up the ball and walk away, feeling thoroughly sorry for itself. 
Here are some reactions to the vote: 
• Asset managers have renewed their warnings that some UK jobs will have to 
move…following the UK's vote to leave the European Union.  
 
…Andrew Breach, a director of recruitment firm Page Executive’s financial services 
practice in London, said: ‘In terms of the direct impact on the City, there will 
undoubtedly be financial services firms that would have moved to London as a launch 
pad into Europe that will now move to [the likes of] Luxembourg, Frankfurt and Paris. 
There will be banks and funds that will move some of their teams to Europe’. 
 
Amin Rajan, chief executive of asset management consultancy and research house 
Create-Research, said ‘job cuts are inevitable, as are changes in the way funds are 
passported. Asset managers are wedged between a rock and a hard place. Over time, 
the centre of gravity will shift from London. It will lose its pre-eminence in the 
European fund industry. Dublin, Frankfurt, Luxembourg and Paris will be the main 
beneficiaries’. 
 
Saker Nusseibeh, chief executive of Hermes Investment Management, said he was 
concerned about London-based firms' ability to continue to attract the best talent: ‘[If 
freedom of movement ends] that would affect our ability to recruit because it makes 
it more difficult, and that’s true across the board for all the City. I think people 
[potential EU job applicants] will stop going to London and look elsewhere’.36  
 
• Britain’s largest fund managers face bigger risks from the UK leaving the EU than 
previously anticipated, with new data showing mainland European investors account 
for up to a fifth of their assets under management.  
 
… ‘The UK investment management [industry] wants access to the EU market, period. 
It is the overwhelming view from most of us that this is a good thing’, says Robyn 
                                                     
36 Mark Cobley and Andrew Pearce (2016) Fund managers predict job moves to Dublin and Luxembourg, 
Financial News, 27 June. 
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Grew, chief administrative officer of Man Group, the world’s largest listed hedge fund 
company. 
 
Ashmore, Man, Schroders and Aberdeen have the greatest reliance on mainland 
European clients, which account for 28%, 21%, 20% and 19% respectively of their 
total assets. 
 
… UK-based fund managers … run £1.2tn on behalf of mainland European investors. 
 
… The biggest risk for the asset management industry is the potential loss of the so-
called MiFID37 passport if Britain no longer has access to the single market. 
 
… This passport … enables asset management companies to register UCITS38 funds in 
Luxembourg or Dublin and sell them across the continent and internationally, while 
keeping the vast majority of their staff, including fund managers, marketing and 
sales teams, in London.  
 
To delegate investment management services back to the UK, fund companies need a 
MiFID licence — which also governs segregated mandates — from the UK regulator. 
 
If there is a hard version of Brexit, any MiFID licence that has been granted by the UK 
regulator will become void. 
 
… Asset managers with big staff bases in mainland Europe — such as Schroders, 
Fidelity International and Franklin Templeton, which employ 400, 820 and 1,000 staff 
on the continent respectively — are expected to face fewer obstacles in obtaining 
passporting rights from EU authorities. 
 
But fund companies with large EU client bases and low headcount in mainland 
Europe are expected to encounter more difficulties. This is potentially problematic for 
Henderson, Ashmore, Baillie Gifford, Man, LGIM, Jupiter and Vanguard. 
 
According to Owen Lysak, senior associate at Clifford Chance, the law firm, fund 
companies that want absolute certainty now about their ability to access mainland 
European clients in future will be ‘strongly looking at adding people in the EU’. 
 
He adds: ‘For asset managers, this is urgent. If you are an alternative investment 
fund manager and don’t have a presence elsewhere in the EU, you will have problems 
marketing into the EU [in the event of a hard Brexit]. If you manage Luxembourg-
based funds from the UK, you will potentially have a problem’. 
 
There are also question marks over whether regulators in Luxembourg and Ireland — 
where nearly half of Europe’s 30,000 UCITS funds are registered — will continue to 
                                                     
37 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive – see Appendix 5. 
38 Undertakings in Collective Investment in Transferable Securities – see Appendix 5. 
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tolerate asset management companies putting a handful of back-office staff in those 
locations and delegating investment management back to the UK. 
 
Iain Anderson, executive chairman of Cicero, the public policy firm, says: ‘An awful lot 
[of investment staff are] in London managing money that is routed through UCITS 
funds that are registered in Luxembourg and Dublin. The question is whether or not 
you can keep those managers in London, or whether some of the managers need to 
move to EU’. 
 
‘Asset managers [previously] put a lot of resources into Brussels — it has been the 
primary port of call for a lot of their lobbying efforts’, Mr Anderson says. ‘Now they 
are putting [those resources] into London to beef up their conversations with the 
government, and are looking to recruit public policy people in Berlin and Paris’.  
 
… ‘The worst-case scenario would mean getting no equivalence and UK firms would 
not be able to market funds across Europe. Potentially negotiations could go very 
badly indeed. But we don’t think they will, and the government will have a very 
strong position’, says Jorge Morley-Smith, director at the Investment Association.39 
 
• There is a ‘broad range’ of possible outcomes from the UK’s Brexit vote, the London 
Stock Exchange Group has said. It’s just that those possibilities all look like they could 
be pretty bad. 
 
‘In the longer term, a UK exit from the EU would diminish the UK’s ability to influence 
changes to EU regulation and may result in a divergence of regulatory frameworks 
which may have an impact on the operation of financial services markets in the UK 
and across the European Union’.40 
 
• At least 100,000 jobs across the country will be under threat if the European Union 
demands that euro-denominated clearing cannot take place in the UK 
following Brexit, the chief executive of the London Stock Exchange has warned. 
 
Xavier Rolet said that the [market for] clearing euro-denominated financial products 
… is huge, handling some $570bn of derivatives every day, and LSE is a key player 
because it controls LCH, which is the world’s biggest clearinghouse. 
 
‘We estimate, conservatively, that at a very minimum 100,000 jobs, in risk 
management, compliance, middle office, back-office support functions, by the way 
not just in London, up and down the country, are implicated in supporting 
this business and clearly could be at risk’, Mr Rolet told Bloomberg Television. 
 
                                                     
39 Madison Marriage (2016) Access to single market crucial for Britain’s big fund managers, Financial Times, 13 
October. 
40 Samuel Agini (2016) The LSE’s prophets of gloom, Financial News, 3 August. 
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The loss of the market would deal a blow to London’s status as a global financial hub. 
While European cities such as Frankfurt and Paris are eyeing the lucrative clearing 
market, Mr Rolet argued that the US would be the most likely destination and that 
‘there are very, very few financial centres around the world that could accommodate 
such a global business’.41 
 
• Morgan Stanley will be forced to move some employees and their families out of 
London as a result of the UK vote to leave the European Union, and resulting 
disruptions will be a headache for the firm, CEO James Gorman said. 
 
 ‘From our perspective, just narrowly from the financial sector and from our 
institution, there’s nothing good about Brexit’, Gorman said Tuesday in an interview 
with Bloomberg Editor-in-Chief John Micklethwait at Bloomberg LP’s The Year Ahead 
Summit. ‘Now we’re going to have to have our headquarters in Europe, in addition. 
We are probably going to have to have, with our legal entities there, more capital 
and liquidity trapped in those legal entities. None of this is good’.42 
 
• ‘Confidence in the financial sector, by those who know it best, fell off a cliff in 2016’, 
according to Financial News’ Job Satisfaction Survey for 2016. Only 14.2% of 
respondents believed the industry’s prospects were either positive or very positive; 
44% of those with more than 20 years’ experience said things were negative or very 
negative, compared with 31% of new arrivals to the industry who felt the same. 
Despite predicting gloom for the City, 77% said they were not concerned about their 
own futures, with another 8% claiming their company could not do without them.43  
• A survey conducted by PwC in November 2016 found that 70% of investment 
managers believed that they will not be able to sell their UCITS funds freely within the 
EU after Brexit, because they are unlikely to retain full ‘passporting’ rights. Some 85% 
of respondents thought it would be necessary to relocate some UK-based staff to the 
continent, with 7% saying their companies had already moved staff and 25% saying 
their companies had plans to do so.44 
• Jeremy Browne, a former minister of state in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
and now the special representative for the City to the EU, has also said that the UK 
would lock itself out of the single market if it insisted on controls on European 
immigration. He said: ‘The City still thinks that it will be such a soft version of Brexit. I 
am not at all sure that the Europeans will be willing to deliver something that easy 
and palatable to us. I can’t see any way that any politician could interpret the 
Referendum result in Britain as a mandate for no change whatsoever on European 
                                                     
41 Ben Martin (2016) At least 100,000 finance jobs face clearing threat following Brexit, warns LSE boss, Daily 
Telegraph, 23 September.  By November 2016, this figure had been revised down to ‘as many as 83,000 jobs’ 
(Latest clearing report: 83,000 jobs could go, Financial News, 14 November 2016). 
42 Hugh Son and Jordyn Holman (2016) Morgan Stanley CEO James Gorman Sees ‘Nothing Good About Brexit’, 
Bloomberg News, 25 October. 
43 Elizabeth Pfeuti (2016) Confidence in finance industry’s prospects nosedives, Financial News, 21 November. 
44 Chris Flood (2016) 70% of asset managers fear Brexit fund passport loss, FTfm, 5 December. 
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migration policies to Britain. So if the Europeans are telling the truth that being in the 
single market relies on absolute observance of the Four Freedoms,45 then it is not 
possible for us to be in the single market’.46 
The European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) is also ramping up the fear level by 
arguing that the outlook for European markets is worsening amid intensified political risks: 
‘The risk outlook has deteriorated following the result of the UK Referendum on EU 
membership. Market, liquidity, and contagion risks may rise going forward’.47 
Eighteen months after the Referendum, a study by Financial Times estimated that around 
4,600 financial sector jobs might be moved from the UK to the EU, which is just 6% of those 
working in the City and 0.6% of the total number working in UK financial services.48  
 
6. The City’s pre-Referendum scare-mongering was soon shown up for what 
it was 
The City’s forecasters predicted Armageddon if Britain voted to leave the EU. Here’s what 
they said before or just after the Referendum: 
• JP Morgan (3 June): Brexit is a terrible deal for the British economy and jobs 
• Goldman Sachs (26 June): We now expect the economy to enter a mild recession by 
early 2017. 
• Credit Suisse (January): If the UK votes to leave the EU, it is likely to entail and 
immediate and simultaneous economic and financial shock for the UK. 
Here’s what they said three months later: 
• JP Morgan (5 September): The rebound in August takes out the risk of recession. 
• Goldman Sachs (5 September): We now expect the UK economy to avoid even the 
technical recession that we had foreseen immediately after the Referendum. 
• Credit Suisse (6 September): The impact of the vote to leave the EU on the UK 
economy seems to be materially less negative than we expected.49 
The City’s forecasters’ predictions about a recession turned out to be wide of the mark.  
According to Matthew Lynn of MarketWatch, it is the reputation of these economic doom-
sayers that is suffering the most after the vote. He argues that they were so personally 
committed to the UK staying in the EU that they could not imagine anything other than 
                                                     
45 The EU’s Four Freedoms are the freedom of movement of capital, people, goods and services. 
46 Andrew Pearce (2016) City's EU rep - Get ready to be locked out of single market, Financial News, 4 August. 
47 Julia-Ambra Verlaine (2016) Outlook for European Markets Is Worsening, Watchdog Says, Wall Street 
Journal, 30 August. 
48 Laura Noonan (2017) Banks set to move fewer than 4,600 jobs over Brexit, Financial Times, 13 December. 
49 Reported in Hugo Duncan (2016) Wall Street banks eat their words on Brexit: Humiliating U-turn as they 
admit recession forecasts were wrong, Daily Mail, 7 September. 
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disaster if the country left.50 The US investment banks donated £1.25m to the Remain 
campaign.   
Angela Knight, then CEO of the BBA between 2007 and 2012, said: ‘I was amazed that the 
City was so amazed that the UK voted out.  I come from the North of England, my links are 
all the way through the North and the Midlands, and there was no way that anybody there 
was going to vote really in favour. Well, of course, they [the City] did, but the reality was 
that the view outside London was very different.  So for the financial services industry to 
suddenly wake up with this huge fright I thought was very, very surprising because it 
actually showed that there’d not been enough listening and we’d all been talking amongst 
ourselves’.51 
Further, the panicky reactions of the UK financial services industry and ESMA is not 
reciprocated on the continent if the results of the following survey are anything to go by. 
Universal-Investment, a Frankfurt-based investment company, conducted a poll of about 
100 institutional investors managing more than €400bn on the impact of Brexit on 
continental Europe’s capital markets. It found that 44% expected no impact, 19% thought 
the effect would be positive, while 37% thought it would be negative. Respondents were 
more concerned about the actions of the European Central Bank (ECB): 84% of respondents 
thought the ECB’s monetary policy would be the cause the next European financial crisis, 
compared with 66% in 2014.52  
7. The Treasury also got it badly wrong 
The City’s scare-mongering was supported, if not encouraged, by David Cameron, George 
Osborne and the Treasury. Mr Cameron had said a Brexit vote would put ‘a bomb under the 
economy’, while Mr Osborne said it would cause a ‘DIY recession’.53 The Treasury warned of 
a ‘massive capital outflow’ from the UK if the country voted to leave and an immediate 
recession. Yet in the month after the Referendum, overseas residents increased their 
holdings of sterling-denominated deposits in UK banks by £6.6bn.54  
A whole range of other monetary indicators – such as broad money growing at 7% – suggest 
that ‘the economy might be strengthening, not weakening’, according to Graeme Leach, 
CEO and chief economist at Macronomics Global. ‘There’s little or nothing in the wider 
                                                     
50 Reported in Bernard Goyder (2016) The big casualties of Brexit: Economic doomsayers, Financial News, 24 
August. 
51 Keynote debate: Could Brexit positively impact UK financial services?, Misys Connect Forum, 20 September 
2016; http://misys.kulu.net/view/XG1zcTzFEDU 
52 Samuel Agini (2016) Brexit repercussions for European capital markets? Nein (probably), Financial News, 24 
November. 
53 David Blake (2016) Measurement Without Theory: On the Extraordinary Abuse of Economic Models in the EU 
Referendum Debate, June; http://www.economistsforbrexit.co.uk/publications/ and  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2819954 
54 Tim Wallace (2016) Foreign investors pour into Britain, Daily Telegraph, 30 August; Mike Bird (2016) UK 
Treasury’s warning of bank outflows falls flat in post-Brexit data, Wall Street Journal, 31 August. 
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economic statistics to challenge this view either. Consumption, retail sales, consumer 
confidence, industrial output and manufacturing are showing a strong head of steam’.55 Joe 
Staton, head of market dynamics at GfK, said: ‘British consumers appear to have shrugged 
off Brexit fears about the economy as wages continue to grow faster than prices, rising 
employment boosts income, and low interest rates encourage people to spend rather than 
save’. 56   
Industrial output is at the highest level for 23 years57 and manufacturing exports are at their 
highest level for two years.58 A survey of manufacturers indicated Brexit was not perceived 
as a risk by 74% of those surveyed, with 29% believing there will be no impact and 45% 
saying it will have a positive impact.59 The service sector, which comprises 80% of the 
economy, grew by 0.8% in the third quarter of 2016, supporting the view that ‘there has 
been no sign of an immediate shock to the economy’ according to the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS).60 Even investor confidence is showing signs of recovery after initially falling 
following the Leave vote, according to Lloyds Private Bank’s Investor Sentiment Index. 
Within two months, it stood at the highest level of the year.61 Business investment 
increased by 0.9% between the second and third quarters of 2016 to £44.2bn.62 The trade 
deficit for goods and services narrowed by £1.6bn between July and September 2016 to 
£11bn, as a consequence of a 6.1% rise in goods exports – the ONS said the data indicated 
that net trade was on course to make a small positive contribution to UK economic growth 
of 0.5% in the third quarter.63 In his 2016 Autumn Statement, the chancellor Philip 
Hammond said that the UK was the fastest growing major economy, beating the rest of the 
EU, the US, Canada and Japan. The GDP growth rate was 1.9% in 2016, making it, along with 
                                                     
55 Graeme Leach (2016) ‘You can see Brexit everywhere but in the statistics’, City A.M., 1 September; Wiktor 
Szary (2016) U.K. Consumers Shrug Off Brexit Vote: Sentiment recovered in August after steep fall in 
Referendum’s aftermath, Wall Street Journal, 30 August; Szu Ping Chan (2016) Upbeat on EU confidence little 
changed after the vote, Daily Telegraph, 17 December. 
56 Bernard Goyder (2016) Consumer confidence bounces up: GfK’s barometer of public optimism shows 
shoppers shrugging off Brexit woes, Financial News, 30 September. 
57 Covers manufacturing and mining. Tim Wallace (2017) Manufacturing surge helps bolster economy, Daily 
Telegraph, 11 November. 
58 Phillip Inman, Sarah Butler and Sean Farrell (2016) UK economic indicators defy Brexit fears, Guardian, 24 
August; Britain’s economy is BOOMING: Brexit joy at GDP boost thanks to manufacturing surge, Daily Express, 
25 October 2017; Larry Elliott (2017) UK factory orders hit four-year high, Guardian, 1 December; Russell Lynch 
(2018) UK manufacturers bring New Year cheer as weak sterling gives exports shot in the arm, Evening 
Standard, 4 January. Exports are 7.7% higher than in 2015. 
59 RSA (2016) Future Impacts, November; http://www.imeche.org/news/news-article/brexit-is-not-seen-as-a-
threat-by-74-of-manufacturing-
businesses?utm_source=BrexitCentral+Mailing+List&utm_campaign=9f3ff42879-
Mailchimp+bulletin&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_23a30e67d9-9f3ff42879-18935675/ 
60 William Schomberg and David Milliken (2016) UK service firms defy Brexit, put BoE on spot over rates, 
Reuters, 30 September. By the third quarter of 2017, service sector confidence was at levels below those seen 
before the June 2016 Referendum, although there was an improvement in the balance of firms reporting 
improved sales abroad (Jasper Jolly (2017) Manufacturers receive ‘welcome’ boost but services outlook flat 
says British Chambers of Commerce, City A.M., 13 October). 
61 Victoria McKeever (2016) Investor sentiment ‘bounces back' post-Brexit: Investor sentiment index hits 2016 
high, Professional Adviser, 17 August. 
62 Nicholas Megaw (2016) Business investment holds up after Brexit vote, Financial Times, 25 November. 
63 Szu Ping Chan (2016) Trade to push up economic growth in UK, Daily Telegraph, 8 November.  
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Germany, the fastest growing economy in the G7 that year. The OECD forecast lower growth 
in 2017 (1.6%) and 2018 (1%), as a result of lower consumer spending,64 but noted that 
export prospects had been helped by a lower pound. Indeed, exports grew by 10% during 
2017.65 Business investment continued to grow in 2017. For example, it rose by 2.5% in the 
second quarter of 2017 (compared with the same quarter in 2016) to £45.7bn.66 GDP 
growth was 0.4% in the third quarter of 2017 or 1.7% pa; even productivity grew by 0.9% 
during this period, the biggest quarterly rise since 2011.67 A survey by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales in November 2017 found that profits and 
exports were both growing at the fastest rate since 2015 and that capital investment 
spending was at a two-year high. In the same month, EY’s Global Capital Confidence 
Barometer found that the UK was third most popular targets for acquisitions, behind the US 
and China, and ahead of Germany and Australia.68  
Not everything is rosy, of course. There has been a slowdown at the top end of the housing 
market, especially in London. This was another one of George Osborne’s predictions if the 
UK voted Leave.69 But this is not due to Brexit. Rather it is the result of the former 
chancellor’s decision in December 2014 to increase stamp duty on homes worth more than 
£937,500 from April 2016.70 Some investors in commercial real estate panicked after the 
Brexit vote and tried to sell their holdings leading to a suspension of trading in a number of 
open-ended real estate funds. However, within three months, the market had stabilised and 
investors are showing ‘no signs of abandoning the UK anytime soon’.71   
Small company shares also performed badly in the immediate aftermath of the Referendum. 
However, Harry Nimmo, manager of the Standard Life UK Smaller Companies Investment 
Trust, is confident about the future of this sector: ‘an unusual succession of high quality 
companies newly listing on the London Stock Exchange [is] leading me to the view that for 
smaller companies at least capitalism is alive and kicking and creating wealth and jobs 
within the United Kingdom and beyond where innovation and business development are 
being correctly rewarded’.72  This is confirmed both by the FTSE 250 index of mid-cap stocks 
reaching a new high in February 2017 and by a survey of small and medium-sized 
companies which found that they are increasingly optimistic about profit and revenue 
                                                     
64 The key explanation for lower consumer spending is the ‘squeeze [on] household disposable income’ caused 
by a combination of an increase in the cost of living and slowing wage growth (Miles Dilworth (2017) UK 
consumer spending falls to lowest levels in nearly four years, Independent, 9 July). 
65 Gemma Tetlow (2017) Weak pound boosts demand for UK manufactured goods: BoE survey suggests 
economy is less reliant on consumer spending for growth, Financial Times, 9 August; Anna Isaac (2017) OECD 
holds steady on growth forecast for UK, praising good export prospects, Daily Telegraph, 20 September. 
66 Gavin Jackson (2017) Why business investment rose after the vote for Brexit, Financial Times, 8 October. 
67 Tim Wallace and Anna Isaac (2018) UK defies the Brexit gloom with strong GDP growth, Daily Telegraph, 23 
December. 
68 Tim Wallace and Alan Tovey (2017) UK businesses are flourishing despite Brexit uncertainty, Daily Telegraph, 
6 November. 
69 House prices would fall by 18% (relatively). 
70 Hugo Duncan (2016) Stamp duty, NOT Brexit, hit top prices: George Osborne blamed for slowdown in the 
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growth in 2017.73 The same is true for London’s financial technology (fintech) startups 
which produce banking apps and high-tech tools for traders: ‘There’s been a few hundred 
years of finance history — trading, infrastructure, legal and everything else. That’s just not 
going to go away overnight’, according to Jeremy Sosabowski, CEO of AlgoDynamix, a 
financial software developer. Chris Gledhill, CEO of challenger bank Secco, went further and 
said: ‘We should take this opportunity to relaunch the UK as a startup in its own right. We 
can do all sorts of cheeky, awesome stuff’.74  
Lord Robert Kerslake, former head of the civil service, released a report in February 2017 in 
which he claimed that George Osborne’s ‘project fear’ forecasts about the economic risks of 
leaving the European Union have undermined public confidence in the Treasury and left it 
ill-equipped to influence Brexit.75 As one commentator said ‘anyone who predicted utter 
chaos following the Referendum was always going to look rather foolish. For now, we are 
still inside Europe, unemployment is still falling and wages are still rising, so what's not to 
like? The Referendum was, at best, a distraction from the overriding question of how we 
break out of the current cycle of monetary intervention and asset pump-priming’.76 Which 
brings us to the role of the Bank of England. 
8. The Bank of England overreacts 
On 4 August 2016, the Bank of England announced that it would cut the base interest rate 
to from 0.5% to 0.25% and extend its quantitative easing (QE) programme by £70bn. The 
purpose was to make Brexit a 'success', according to Bank of England governor, Mark 
Carney.  
The move was criticised by both Leave and Remain supporters. Jacob Rees-Mogg MP, a 
Brexit supporter, argued that the Bank acted too quickly in cutting interest rates and 
introducing a stimulus package before economic data about the impact of the vote was 
available.  Ros Altmann, the former pensions minister and Remain supporter, said it was a 
‘terrible decision’.77  
The move was also criticised by some City economists and financial advisers.  For example, 
Richard Jeffrey, CIO of Cazenove, said: ‘I feel the Bank of England's response was entirely 
inappropriate. It implied there are major problems which require drastic action when there 
is no evidence of that. I do not see how it can be argued it was a good idea. The Bank should 
have tried to normalise interest rates by edging them up as the economy was recovering. 
That way, if we needed to cut rates, it would have had a bigger impact because we would be 
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starting from 2% rather than 0.5%. The last five years of policy decisions have been very 
poor. The Bank has become too political and worried about public reaction’.78 
Peter Toogood, investment director at The Adviser Centre, added: ‘The authorities believe 
that they can manipulate the economy and the markets, but those of us of an old-fashioned 
disposition believe that this manipulation will eventually fail. Distorting gilt yields, and 
therefore forcing down borrowing costs, is yet again bringing forward future consumption 
and encouraging the adoption of even more debt. It's quite a party for now, but the 
hangover will be thumping’.79 
The move was also implicitly criticised by Mervyn King, Mark Carney’s predecessor as 
governor at the Bank between 2003 and 2013.  Speaking before the announcement he said: 
‘Central banks are approaching the limits of what they can do…I'm not sure that much more 
easing will achieve very much. It might achieve a little but it simply is not going to provide 
the ultimate solution’.80  
In fact, it could be worse. In trying to save the banking system, QE is destroying growth. 
Investment in the physical capital stock is needed to grow the real economy.  But the only 
long-run source of investment is long-run savings.  When nominal interest rates are zero 
and real interest rates are negative, savings will be very low and so, as a consequence, will 
real investment. While it is true that borrowing rates are also very low, very little of the 
borrowing seems to have gone into productive investment. A positive real rate of interest is 
needed to encourage adequate long-term savings.   
Andrew Sentance, a former member of the Monetary Policy Committee, argues that there is 
a strong case for building into the Bank of England’s remit the objective of a positive real 
interest rate, implying that the inflation rate target should be periodically adjusted in 
response to what is happening with nominal interest rates.81 Mr Sentance also believes that 
the UK should follow the lead of the US Federal Reserve and begin to raise interest rates 
gradually back to normal levels.82  Yet the Bank continues to warn about the UK's financial 
stability as a result of a slow-down in transactions in the commerical property sector 
following the Brexit vote and the ‘reliance of the market...on inflows on foreign capital [or 
what Mark Carney calls the kindness of strangers]’.83 
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The pound fell sharply following the Referendum and the Bank is concerned about the 
effect of this on inflation.  But according to Dr Gerard Lyons, former chief economic advisor 
to Boris Johnson: ‘The weaker pound was inevitable whatever the outcome of the 
Referendum. Sterling has been seen as one the world’s most overvalued currencies for 
some time….The outcome for the pound now depends on the economic 
fundamentals, policy and confidence. And having been in dealing rooms for 25 years, 
confidence is a key factor. Basically, this is not a currency crisis….A weaker pound was 
moving the economic fundamentals back into shape in an imbalanced economy and makes 
the UK attractive to invest in’.84  Roger Bootle and John Mills also agree that a lower 
exchange rate is good news for the UK. In their view, the pound has been stuck at too high a 
level for too long and the tendency of the currency to overshoot has trapped Britain in a 
chronic current account crisis, undermining competitiveness, damaging manufacturing and 
hitting productivity.85 Mervyn King also called the fall in sterling a ‘welcome change’. It 
would help the country to grow by making it easier to 'rebalance' the economy away from 
an excessive reliance on consumer spending in favour of exports: 'The UK economy has to 
be rebalanced one way or another, Remain or Leave. We need a level of the exchange rate 
much closer to the level we had in the middle of 2013. We are now in a better position to 
rebalance the UK economy’.86 He added: ‘During the Referendum campaign, someone said 
the real danger of Brexit is you'll end up with higher interest rates, lower house prices and a 
lower exchange rate, and I thought: dream on. Because that's what we've been trying to 
achieve for the past three years and now we have a chance of getting it. I don't think we 
should fear Brexit. It's not a bed of roses, but nor is it the end of the world’.87 
In January 2017, Andrew Haldane, chief economist at the Bank of England, admitted the 
Bank misjudged the impact of the Brexit vote on the UK economy. He said the Bank had not 
anticipated the resilience of consumer spending following the Referendum and economic 
forecasting models were too ‘narrow and fragile’.88 Also in January 2017, Mark Carney, told 
the Treasury select committee that the Bank no longer considers Brexit to be the largest 
domestic risk to the UK’s financial stability. Instead he was concerned about four domestic 
issues that could be ‘amplified’ by Brexit: mounting consumer credit, a weakened 
commercial real estate market, the current account deficit, and the fall in the value of 
sterling. He said he had changed his view because of the relatively benign financial 
environment since the EU Referendum.89 In February 2017, the Bank raised its GDP growth 
forecasts for the UK economy from 1.4% to 2% in 2017, from 1.5% to 1.6% for 2018 and 
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from 1.6% to 1.7% in 2019.90 In August 2017, the Bank lowered the 2017 forecast to 1.7%, 
due to slower growth in consumer spending, despite stronger exports and investments and 
a strengthening global recovery.91 
9. It does not take long for the EU’s deep-seated hostility to the UK and its 
anti-City prejudice to show its teeth 
British supporters of leaving the EU are perfectly happy to have an amicable and pragmatic 
relationship with the rest of the EU (EU27) based on a free trade. Typical is the view of Steve 
Baker MP, a leading Leave campaigner:  
The UK will leave the EU. We will be an independent country, passing our own laws 
and governing ourselves. We will be a Global Britain, always the most passionate, 
most consistent, most convincing advocate for free trade, promoting peace and 
prosperity around the world. We will seek a unique, reciprocal UK-EU arrangement of 
open trade in goods and services and cooperation on other matters, like counter-
terrorism…. The UK must be willing to rely on existing third-country arrangements 
with the EU so we can pursue opportunities for better regulation and global growth. 
Nevertheless, there are strong mutual incentives to agree regulatory equivalence and 
continued reciprocal market access as a transitional arrangement to a full free trade 
agreement. That agreement would have a comprehensive services schedule binding 
both parties to market access and national treatment subject only to each complying 
with globally-agreed standards…  
Take asset management. There is strong reciprocal interest here. At our exit date, we 
will be compliant with the UCITS V directive. While that regulation offers many 
opportunities for improvement, EU members can allow asset managers to delegate 
their functions to firms in third countries. Ireland permits delegation to managers in 
countries outside the EU, including Japan, Hong Kong, Australia and the USA. The 
bottom line is that it would not be feasible for the EU or its members to cut off 
delegation to the UK, especially against likely objections from Ireland and 
Luxembourg: operating as a third-country asset manager would be viable. However, 
if the UK is deemed equivalent in our withdrawal agreement – the logical 
consequence of our following EU law until we leave – then there is no reason we 
cannot continue asset management on the present basis as a transitional measure to 
a full bilateral free trade agreement.  
With limited opportunities for growth in Europe, we …have a transformational 
opportunity to pivot towards providing better-regulated UK products to savers and 
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investors in regions with deep and growing capital pools: that must be our strategic 
goal. In investment services and market infrastructure, the new MiFID II rules will 
take affect in January 2018, introducing a new regime for authorisation of third-
country firms. That provides a pathway to market access in addition to national and 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. There will be no legal obstacle to the 
Commission recognising the UK as equivalent under MiFID II and the alternative 
would be significant market disruption across the EEA.92 Through member-state 
authorisation, third-country agreements and equivalence recognition, viable options 
exist for deposit takers and insurers too. In every sector, there are strong reciprocal 
incentives to conclude bilateral arrangements of equivalence as a transition to a 
modern free-trade agreement. There is disadvantage to EU firms, for example, in 
failing to carry forward the preferential risk weightings of assets held in the UK…Once 
the pragmatism of commercial incentive supplants political grandstanding, we will 
find we can leave the EU swiftly and successfully into a world of more competitive 
regulation in which the City flourishes.93 
However, Philip Aldrick, writing in The Times, says that Europe is in no mood to grant our 
wish for an amicable divorce: ‘Britain just doesn't get it, officials in Brussels say. 
Westminster expects Brexit negotiations to be driven by logical economic outcomes that will 
deliver the best deal for all concerned. In Brussels, the sentiment is more abrasive. The 
negotiation will not be with a single homogenous entity but 27 member states, each with 
their pet agendas. Any of them can veto a proposal. Even assuming member states rally 
together, there will be one overriding diktat. "What I hear repeatedly is that the UK is 
approaching this on a transactional basis, but the EU is approaching it on an existential one", 
says one foreign apparatchik, "The consensus is you can't make the conditions of leaving too 
attractive".  Brussels is watching the Westminster cycle of leaks and backtracking with slack-
jawed astonishment. The prime minister's suggestion that the government would seek a 
transitional agreement once the two years of post-Article 50 talks conclude was welcomed 
as a beacon of sense amid the tawdry squabbling. Until she climbed down the following day. 
Does the UK have a death wish, they are asking’.94 
The Brexit decision not only affects the UK’s future relationship with the EU, other countries 
have an interest in the outcome.  In October 2016, it was announced that US companies 
were reviewing the future of around $600bn worth of UK investments due to concerns 
about restrictions on access to the EU single market. The US Chamber of Commerce said the 
UK would need ‘unfettered access’ to the single market for US companies to continue 
expansion plans. It also says that claims that low EU external tariffs mean the cost of leaving 
the single market will be insignificant are ‘nonsense: ultimately, these costs are likely to be 
borne by British workers and consumers’.95 
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There are issues concerning non-tariff barriers and other forms of discrimination.  While this 
mostly affects products and product standards under the CE — Conformité Européenne — 
mark, it can also affect the provision of services, e.g., the difficulties British professionals, 
such as architects, having their qualifications recognised on the continent. More 
significantly, there is a view developing, especially in the US, that the EU ‘is turning into an 
inward-looking club, using tax and monopoly investigations as form of backdoor 
protectionism to discriminate against companies from outside the bloc. So systematic has 
the harassment become that the US is now fighting back, accusing the Europeans or unfairly 
targeting its corporate giants’.  Once outside the EU, it is feared that the UK could be next 
on the target.96  
The posturing and grandstanding comments made by the EU’s leaders would appear to 
support this possibility.  Here are some examples: 
• Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, has stated that the EU 
must be ‘intransigent’ in denying British firms free access to the single market if the 
UK does not accept the free movement of people: ‘You can't have one foot in and 
one foot out. On this point, we need to be intransigent. I see the manoeuvring…It 
should be obvious that if the United Kingdom wants to have free access to the 
internal market all the rules and all the liberties... need to be fully respected’. Angela 
Merkel, the German chancellor, has told German industry leaders that they could 
not lobby for a sweetheart deal for Britain. François Hollande, then French president, 
said that Britain must pay a high price for Brexit to discourage others from following 
suit: ‘There must be a threat, there must be a risk, there must be a price, otherwise 
we will be in negotiations that will not end well and, inevitably, will have economic 
and human consequences’.97  
 
• Speaking at a meeting of EU heads of government in Brussels in October 2016, 
Angela Merkel said ‘As far as the practical terms are concerned, it is going to be 
rough going’, while François Hollande added ‘I say very firmly: if Mrs May wants a 
hard Brexit she will get a hard negotiation… Accepting free movement of people was 
a condition of securing access to the single market’.98 
 
• The then German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, has warned that the UK will 
be bound by tax rules that would restrict it from granting incentives to keep 
investors in the country and must continue paying EU contributions after Brexit: 
‘Until the UK’s exit is complete, Britain will certainly have to fulfil its commitments. 
Possibly there will be some commitments that last beyond the exit … even, in part, to 
2030 … Also we cannot grant any generous rebates’. He added that the UK should be 
prepared for financial services to move to the continent and wants London to lose its 
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euro clearing business. Further, the UK would not get special treatment on migration 
if it wanted to remain in the internal market, since freedom of movement was a core 
element of the internal market: ‘There is no à la carte menu. There is only the whole 
menu or none. Without membership of the internal market, without acceptance of 
the four basic freedoms of the internal market there can, of course, be no 
passporting, no free access for financial products or for financial actors’.99 
 
• Robert Fico, the prime minister of Slovakia and the EU’s rotating president at the 
time, wants to make the UK’s withdrawal from the EU as painful as possible. The 
main reason for this is that the UK might no longer be willing to absorb Slovakia’s 
surplus labour force following Brexit.100 Further, in September 2016, the Visegrad 
Group (comprising Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) announced 
that it would veto any agreement between the UK with the EU over the single 
market that did not include free migration of people.101  
 
• Jens Weidmann, president of the German central bank said that London’s position as 
a financial centre would be dealt a severe blow if the UK left the single market 
because banks would be denied the right to operate across the 27 remaining 
members of the EU. They would automatically be stripped of their ability to conduct 
business across the EU: ‘passporting rights are tied to the single market and would 
automatically cease to apply if Great Britain is long longer at least part of the 
European Economic Area’.102 
 
• Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister who also chairs the eurogroup of 19 
eurozone finance ministers, has warned that the City of London risks losing its role as 
the continent’s premier financial centre unless the UK agrees to fully apply EU 
regulations post-Brexit: ‘Being quite frank, we can’t allow the financial service centre 
for Europe and the eurozone to be outside Europe and the eurozone, and to go its 
own way in terms of rules and regulation requirements… We cannot allow a third 
country to have access, full passporting rights, to financial services markets in 
Europe, if at the same time we allow them to deviate in terms of capital standards, 
requirements, consumer protection etc… Even though I’m a great fan of the 
Brits . . . we have to take a firm stand on this. There is no alternative there’.103 
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• Even Enda Kenny, then prime minister of Ireland — a country whose road transport 
links to the European continent pass through the UK — said that the EU will not give 
in to British demands for full access to the bloc's single market unless London allows 
free movement of people: ‘Let me tell you that around the European Council table, 
that is an issue that will not be given in on’.104 Ireland has also put in a bid to host 
the European Banking Authority, currently located in London,105 but this eventually 
went to Paris. 
 
• Joseph Muscat, the prime minister of Malta and the EU’s rotating president when 
Article 50 was triggered said the UK ‘can’t have the cake and eat it’ and would be 
offered an inferior deal to full EU membership: ‘All of us have been pretty clear in 
our approach that we want a fair deal for the UK but that kind of fair deal can't 
translate itself into a superior deal’.106 Speaking to the BBC’s Katya Adler, he said EU 
leaders are not ‘bluffing’ when they say the UK will be left without access to the 
single market when it leaves the bloc if there is no free movement of people: ‘This is 
really and truly our position and I don't see it changing’. He argued that discussions 
on any ‘new relationship’ could be delayed until certain key issues had been 
resolved, such as the bill the UK must pay before leaving, establishing what will 
happen to the UK-Republic of Ireland border and working out interim arrangements 
on issues like security and international treaty obligations, such as environmental 
agreements. He also said that even when a deal is agreed between EU leaders and 
the UK, the European Parliament may decide to veto it in 2019.107 He repeated the 
point that the ‘UK will get an inferior deal to full membership of the EU’ in the 
European parliament on the day after Mrs May’s Lancaster House speech.108 
 
In December 2016, Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, made his first public 
statement on the exit negotiations once Article 50 is triggered  –  one that had the apparent 
approval of the remaining 27 EU leaders.109  He said: 
• Maintaining unity among the remaining 27 EU members was his overriding priority. 
• The Brexit deal would need to be negotiated in less than 18 months, giving time for it 
to be ratified by the remaining 27 EU members. A ‘new partnership’ would be 
discussed in broad terms and this will influence any transition terms agreed, but it 
was unlikely that a full trade deal would be completed within two years and there 
would be no early commitment to agree transition arrangements that would avoid a 
cliff-edge. There would be no pre-negotiations before Article 50 is triggered. 
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• The final deal would have to be ‘clear and ordered’, would be worse than EU 
membership and ‘cherry picking is not an option’. The separation terms would have 
to be agreed first, including outstanding commitments to the EU budget. The UK 
demand for a bespoke deal – such as a sector-by-sector deal covering say financial 
services and automobiles – would not be acceptable as it just another  example of 
Britain wanting to ‘have its cake and eat it’.  The four freedoms of the internal 
market were indivisible. The UK would have to accept both a continuation of both 
contributions to the EU budget and the decisions of the European Court of Justice.110 
This was enough to draw the ire of even the mild-mannered Andrew Tyrie, chair of the 
Treasury select committee: ‘Mr Barnier’s latest contribution is of just the type calculated to 
raise the political temperature at a time when he should be lowering it’.  
Downing Street’s response to all this rhetoric was to reiterate the desire for a pragmatic 
outcome: ‘This is a negotiation that will take place next year and the government will set 
out its negotiating strategy in the fullness of time. The aim of that negotiation is to get the 
best possible deal for Britain, for British companies to access and work with and within the 
single market and for European businesses to have the same access here’.111 
However, the view in Brussels is that ‘British negotiators are in a weak position and can be 
brought to heel when substantive talks begin’.  The UK side has already made a number of 
public concessions: the prime minister has told the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
that it accepts the need for transition arrangements, while David Davis, the Brexit secretary, 
has said that he would consider continued EU budget contributions in exchange for single 
market access.  This has helped to harden the EU’s red lines.112 
It is clear from the above that the comment made by a senior Bulgarian central banker in 
1992 is still true: the Brussels bureaucracy has the same aims and methods as the 
Comintern, but without the Comintern’s sensitivity to local needs.113 
10. The City’s current relationship with the EU 
Before assessing how Brexit will affect the City, it is important to look at the City of London’s 
current relationship with the EU. 
10.1 Facts and figures 
The UK’s financial services industry is not only very important to the UK economy, it is also 
extremely important to the EU economy. Around 40% of UK net financial services exports go 
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to the EU.114 The UK accounts for 40% of Europe’s assets under management (and 85% of 
hedge fund assets), 60% of its capital markets business, 78% of its foreign exchange trading, 
and 74% of its derivatives trading.115  The UK securities market is the biggest in Europe (Fig. 
1), the UK banking sector is the biggest source of cross-border lending to EU banks and 
corporates with more than more than £1.1tn of loans outstanding (Fig. 2), and the UK is by 
far the largest market in Europe for ‘alternative finance’ (Fig. 3).116 
Despite this, UK exports of financial and insurance services to the EU have been 
systematically falling as a share of total exports, from 38% in 2010 to 34% in 2013. And this 
was during the period when the single market was supposed to becoming more integrated.  
The rest of the world (ROW) accounts for around 60% of UK net financial services exports: 
key non-EU markets are the US (receiving 25% of UK net financial services exports), Japan, 
Switzerland, Russia, Canada, and Australia. The ROW accounts for around 80% of our 
insurance exports: key non-EU markets are the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, Turkey, China, 
Singapore, South Korea, South Africa and Mexico.117 
Figure 1: Securities markets in selected European states 
 
Sources: SIFMA, @joshdigga 
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Figure 2: Cross-border lending to banks and corporates in selected European states 
 
Source: BIS, @joshdigga 
 
Figure 3: The alternative finance market in selected European states 
 
Sources: European Commission, University of Cambridge, @joshdigga 
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10.2 Passports and equivalence 
A brief explanation of ‘passporting’ and ‘equivalence’ 
Being a member of the EU places the UK inside the coverage of the EU Treaties, conferring 
single market access rights, ‘passports’, and the assumption of regulatory ‘equivalence’: 
What are ‘passports’? 
• Being a member of the EEA and being bound by EU legislation confers the right to 
‘passport’ certain services across the EEA, either on a cross-border basis or through 
branches, without the need for additional local authorisations  
• This legislation limits the extent to which member states can impose additional regulatory 
requirements on businesses exercising their passport rights 
• These passports are not yet available to third-country firms (firms based in countries that 
are not within the EEA), although there is provision for third-country passports in the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) and the Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers Directive (AIFMD) 
What is ‘equivalence’? 
• Some recent EU legislation has included some ‘third-country regimes’ which allow non-
EEA firms to provide services into the EEA if their home country regulatory regime is 
‘equivalent’ to EU standards. Equivalence sometimes also requires reciprocity (for example, 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), Central Counterparty (CCP)118 
equivalence) 
• These regimes cover a more limited range of services and provide fewer additional rights 
than the existing passports for EU firms, and may also be subject to additional conditions 
• Unlike an EEA ‘passport’, the rights under these regimes can be withdrawn at any time if a 
home country deviates materially from EU standards 
EU legislation generally requires that the European Commission makes the determination of 
equivalence, but in some cases this may be left to member states or their national 
regulators 
Becoming a third country with respect to the EEA, means not having to accept the decisions 
of the European Court of Justice, and has significant regulatory consequence with regards 
both single market access ‘passporting’ rights and regulatory ‘equivalence’: 
Single market access ‘passporting’ rights 
• Once a third country, the UK will be outside the coverage of the EU Treaties and the 
                                                     
118 Clearing houses. 
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preferential terms conferred on its members with respect to accessing the EU single market 
• Businesses trading between the EEA and the UK lose their ‘passporting’ rights, the 
freedom of service and freedom of establishment, that are conferred by the EU Treaties and 
legislation 
Regulatory ‘equivalence’ 
• Becoming a third country removes the assumption of regulatory equivalence that is 
broadly embedded in EU financial services frameworks 
• Instead, UK-based entities will need to rely on ‘third-country regimes’ created under EU 
law which recognise equivalence for limited purposes 
• Equivalence must be requested, tested and affirmed, and is contingent on ongoing 
proximity to EU standards over time 
• Equivalence is not available with respect to the provision of all services, or the servicing of 
all client types 
Note: The basis for ‘passporting’ is the Treaty for rights for freedom of establishment and 
freedom of services. The ‘Single Market Directives’ are specific pieces of legislation which 
harmonise the approach of such free movement of services and establishment for specific 
types of firms, products and clients. There are two further freedoms conferred: freedom of 
movement of capital and freedom of movement of persons. Financial services firms use all 
four freedoms. 
Note: Asset managers can delegate portfolio management of a fund to countries other than 
that in which it is distributed or fund managed as per global norms. There are existing 
delegation provisions in key EU financial services legislation (for example, UCITS and 
AIFMD). Delegation is subject to a number of conditions. 
Source: Oliver Wyman (2016, p10) The Impact of the UK’s Exit from the EU on the UK-based Financial Services 
Sector, October (commissioned by TheCityUK). 
 
Table 1 shows the total number of passports issued by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
in September 2016: 5,500 UK-registered financial services firms have a total of 336,421 
passports in order to conduct business in the EEA,119 while around 8,000 EEA financial 
services firms have 23,532 passports for business in the UK. So there would appear to be a 
strong reciprocal interest here. Further, at the time of Brexit, the UK will be fully compliant 
                                                     
119 The European Economic Area comprises all the member states of the EU (so covers the single market) plus 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The UK is therefore currently a member of both the EU single market and 
the EEA. 
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with the UCITS V directive.  Fig. 4, however, shows that UK-based firms dominate 
passporting activity within the single market – they conduct 76% of it.120 
 
Table 1: Number of passports issued by the Financial Conduct Authority, September 
2016 
Directive Activity covered Outbound Inbound 
MiFID Investment services 2250  988 
AIFMD Alternative funds 212  45 
CRD IV  Commercial banking 102 552 
Payment Services Directive (PSD)  Wiring services 284 115 
Solvency II  Insurance 220 726 
Insurance Distribution Directive Insurance brokers  2758 5727 
Total  5476 8008 
Source: FCA 
  
Figure 4: The UK financial services market and passports 
 
The following is known about passporting arrangements within the EEA. 
Banking 
There are 91 UK-incorporated banks that use passporting — 60% of the total, but 95% in 
terms of assets and staff. UK banks, such as Lloyds, RBS and Barclays, do most of their 
business in the UK, so do not need a passport. Around 25% of the business of investment 
                                                     
120 Kim Kaivanto (2016) Why Britain should play the long game with its Brexit strategy, The Conversation, 21 
September; http://theconversation.com/why-britain-should-play-the-long-game-with-its-brexit-strategy-
65507 
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banks located in the UK relates to the EU in some way or another, according to John 
McFarlane, chair of both Barclays and The CityUK.121 
Insurance 
Life insurance companies make little use of passporting, because their markets operate 
around local products, local preferences and local regulations. Life insurers that operate in 
foreign markets do so using subsidiaries subject to the local regulation. Aviva, for example, 
has subsidiaries in France, Italy and Spain. Similarly, foreign insurers operating in the UK life 
market use subsidiaries.  
General (i.e, property and casualty) insurance companies operate in what is known as the 
London market, which is dominated by Lloyds. This market employs 34,000 people and 
contributes 20% of the City’s gross domestic product. The EEA accounts for between 10 and 
20% of premium income for some of these insurers and so passports are important. For 
example, Zurich passports into the UK from Dublin, while AIG passports from London into 
the rest of the EEA. These insurance companies could equally well use subsidiaries instead 
of passports: for example, Zurich has a UK-based subsidiary for its life insurance business. 
The subsidiary would need to be more than just be a post box. It would need to meet all the 
requirements of Solvency II, such as having local actuaries, underwriters, compliance staff 
and executives.122 
The most common passport, however, is for insurance intermediaries and this has been 
granted to 2,758 UK firms and to 5,727 EEA firms. 
Asset management 
There are 94 EU firms with asset management passports into the UK, managing 9% of the 
assets under management, while 32 UK companies passport to the EEA with 6% of assets 
held by European investors. UK-based asset managers manage £1.2trn of investments for 
clients based in the rest of the EEA. Around 5% of this is held in UK-domiciled UCITS retail 
funds and the managers require MiFID passports from the FCA. The passports allow the 
managers to register these funds in Luxembourg or Dublin, but sell into the rest of the EEA, 
while most staff – including fund managers, marketing and sales teams – are based in 
London, although they will also make use of an EEA-based depositary for custodial purposes 
and need appropriate oversight of fund managers located in the UK. Without such a 
passport, the asset managers would have to set up a MiFID company in the EEA.  
This would be an expensive and time-consuming exercise and apparently would require at a 
minimum 20-50 personnel experienced in risk, compliance and investment management 
functions. A MiFID licence can take months or even years to negotiate. However, many UK-
based asset managers currently have a UCITS-compliant management company with UCITS-
                                                     
121 Laura Noonan, Patrick Jenkins and Harriet Agnew (2016) City’s special relationship with EU finance system 
revealed, Financial Times, 25 September. This figure of 25% comes from the Oliver Wyman report discussed 
below. 
122 Oliver Ralph (2016) London’s insurers rush to cover the Brexit bases, Financial Times, 29 September. 
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compliant funds. EEA-based investment managers wanting to sell to UK retail investors 
could either set up UK funds or apply for their non-UK funds to be ‘recognised’ by the FCA 
under existing UK rules and would need to demonstrate equivalent consumer protection to 
the FCA requirements. 
Non-retail funds require a AIFMD123 passport to market into the EEA. Without this, UK funds 
could only be marketed in the EEA if country-specific rules (known as ‘national private 
placement regimes’) permit. The EU will consider offering an AIFMD third-country passport 
if it considers the third country’s regulatory regime is equivalent in terms of issues such as 
consumer protection, market disruption, competition, and the monitoring of systemic risk. 
This would allow third-country firms to market to professional investors across the EEA, 
subject to them obtaining authorisation in the EEA and fully complying with the AIFMD. The 
EU is considering offering such passports to Switzerland, Canada, Jersey, Guernsey, and 
Japan. 
Asset managers running institutional mandates also need a MiFID passport to access clients 
in the EEA. Without this passport, they can only manage individual mandates for EEA 
investors if this is permitted under country-specific rules. However, under MiFID II, which 
came into effect in January 2018, there will be an equivalence regime for non-EEA countries. 
If the UK is regarded by the EU as having equivalent prudential and conduct regulation, UK 
firms can acquire a third-country passport to provide investment services to professional 
investors across the EEA without a branch or subsidiary following registration with ESMA. 
The UK will need to provide an equivalent level of access to the UK for EEA firms.  The UK 
currently allows third-country investment managers to offer certain services to specific 
types of UK clients under its ‘overseas persons exclusion’ (as set out in the Financial Services 
and Markets Acts 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001). 
MiFID II does not grant third-country passports for distributing to retail investors. UK-based 
firms may need to set up EEA branches (if this is permitted in the relevant countries) or an 
EEA subsidiary (which could access retail clients across the EEA through a MiFID passport).  
10.3 The Oliver Wyman report: The Impact of the UK’s Exit from the EU on the UK-
based Financial Services Sector, October 2016 
In October 2016, Oliver Wyman released a report, commissioned by the lobby group 
TheCityUK, which attempted to estimate the costs to the City if the UK lost its passporting 
rights after Brexit.124 
The key information is contained in Table 2 which purports to show that 23% of the City’s 
total revenues comes from EU-related business: £40-£50bn out of a total of £190 -£205bn. 
The report conjectures that if the UK left the single market without any regulatory 
equivalence in a so-called 'hard' Brexit, the UK's financial sector would lose up to £20bn in 
revenue, leading to losses of 35,000 job and £5bn in tax revenue. There would be multiplier 
                                                     
123 Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive – see Appendix 5. 
124 Oliver Wyman (2016) The Impact of the UK’s Exit from the EU on the UK-based Financial Services Sector, 
October (commissioned by TheCityUK). 
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effects on the wider UK economy, causing total revenue to drop by another £18bn, another 
£5bn in lost tax revenue and a further 40,000 jobs.  If instead, the UK retained access to the 
EEA on similar terms (a ‘soft’ Brexit), so it could continue trading without the need for 
individual country licences, the City would lose 4,000 jobs and £2bn of revenues a year. 
Data from the ONS suggest that the 23% share of total revenues coming from EU-related 
business is a gross exaggeration. According to the Pink Book, EU exports/total exports = 
£27bn/£108bn = 25% and, according to the UK’s Input-Output tables, total exports/total 
revenues = £108bn/£200bn = 54%. Hence EU exports/total revenues = 25% of 54% = 13.5%. 
The Oliver Wyman report adds nearly another 10 percentage points to cover 'domestic 
activity related to the EU' such as trading in EU equities or clearing euro derivatives which 
should not be treated as EU export (i.e., cross-border) business at all. A more detailed 
analysis by Economists for Brexit brings the share down to as little as 9% – see Table 3. The 
table also shows that, under an extreme scenario of the UK losing 50% of its revenues due 
to a loss of passporting, the reduction in revenues would be £7.6bn or 4.4% of total 
revenues.125 
 
Table 2: UK financial services sector revenues in 2015 - EU-related business 
Sector Constituents Revenues 
(£bn) 
% of sector 
total 
revenues 
Banking Sales & trading, investment banking, retail & 
business banking, private banking & wealth 
management 
23-27 22 
Insurance & 
reinsurance 
Domestic retail & commercial, corporate & 
speciality, reinsurance  
3-5 10 
Asset 
management 
 5-6 26 
Market 
infrastructure 
& other 
Exchanges, clearing, inter-dealer broking, 
securities services,  technology, credit rating 
agencies, payment & data services 
9-12 26 
Total  40-50 23 
Note: International and wholesale business related to the EU includes: all EU client activities with financial 
services firms based in the UK, UK & Rest of World (ROW) client activity in EU/euro-linked products, UK and 
ROW activity occurring as a result of EU client activity (for example, portfolio delegation and risk management 
of trading positions) 
 
Source: Oliver Wyman (2016, Figure 3) The Impact of the UK’s Exit from the EU on the UK-based Financial 
Services Sector, October (commissioned by TheCityUK). 
                                                     
125 To put this into perspective, UK auto manufacturing industry revenue in 2015 was £72bn and 44% of UK 
manufactured cars were exported to the EU.   
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Table 3: The impact of passporting on financial services revenue 
 
 Revenue 3 EU-related revenue Pass-port cover-age 
EU-related revenue at risk due to 
loss of passporting 
Loss of revenue  under 
two passporting loss 
scenarios 
  
 £ bn % Oliver 
Wyman 4 
EfB assump £ bn % of 
tot. 
ind. 
rev. 
Comment 25% at risk 
revenue 
lost 
50% at risk 
revenue 
lost 
Sector £ bn % £ bn % £ bn % of 
tot. 
ind. 
rev. 
£ bn % of 
tot. 
ind. 
rev. 
Banking 109 64% 25 23% 12.9   13 
(Max) 
7.6% Represents the 
maximum amount 
at risk because 
passporting does 
not 
comprehensively 
cover all sub-
sectors of banking 
3.2 1.9% 6.4 3.8% 
  Sales/trading 30    4.5 15% Yes   1.1  2.3  
  
Investment 
banking 
11    2.2 20% Yes   0.6  1.1  
  
Retail & business 
banking 
62             
  
 
Retail (Say, 
60%)** 
37    0 0% No   Virtually no EU-
related business 
0.0  0.0  
  
 
Wholesale 25    5.0 20% Yes    1.2  2.5  
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(Say, 40%)** 
  
Private banking & 
wealth 
management 
6    1.2 20% Partial 
   0.3  0.6  
Insurance 40 23% 4 10% 4.0 10%  0.5 0.3% Only 13% of EU 
business is 
potentially 
vulnerable because 
87% of EU business 
is conducted via 
European 
subsidiaries as a 
consequence of no 
single market 
existing for 
insurance services 4.  
(Possibly none is 
vulnerable as 
passporting 
generally is not 
employed) 
0.13 0.1% 0.26 0.2% 
  
Domestic retail & 
commercial 
28  0    No       
  
Corporate & 
speciality 
9  3*    No       
  Reinsurance 3  1*    No       
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Asset management 22 13% 6 25% 5.5 25% Partial 
1.8 1.1% Two-thirds of EU 
assets managed in 
the UK are done so 
via delegation, in 
line with 
international 
norms, and 
therefore not 
directly reliant on 
the passport 4 
0.45 0.27
% 
0.91 0.53
% 
Total 171 100% 35 20% 22 13%  15 9%  3.8 2.2% 7.6 4.4% 
 
*    Inferred from discussion with Oliver Wyman 
** EfB Assumption 
Source: A brief on the City after Brexit, Written Submission to House of Commons International Trade Committee, Economists for Brexit, 16 December 
2016 
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10.4 The Open Europe report: How the UK’s financial services sector can continue 
thriving after Brexit, October 2016 
A report by Open Europe was also published in October 2016. It focuses on the issue of 
passports. Table 4 shows the degree of reliance of different financial services sectors on 
passports. It suggests, in particular, that CRD IV or UCITS V (covering retail investors) do not 
allow for equivalence or meaningful third-country access.126 
Table 4: Importance of EU passport by sector 
 
The report concludes: 
• The financial services passport is not a single thing. In reality, there are a series of 
sector-specific passports built upon dozens of financial regulations and principles. In 
some sectors, the passport is important to the business, but in other sectors it has 
much less value. The assertion that the success of the City of London is based on full 
and complete access to the EU single market in financial services is not borne out by 
our analysis. However, the loss of the passport could be damaging to some sectors if 
the government does not negotiate effective alternative arrangements with the EU. 
 
• The passport works best in banking (wholesale and investment). Around a fifth of the 
banking sector’s annual revenue is estimated to be tied to the passport. The passport 
in banking is also a two-way street, with a number of large EU banks making 
                                                     
126 CRD is the Capital Requirements Directive and UCITS is the Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities Directive – see Appendix 5. 
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significant proportions of the revenue in London via the passport. Deutsche Bank, for 
instance, gets 19% of its revenue in the UK. 
 
• Passporting works less well for asset managers, given that a number of technical 
barriers remain to marketing funds across the EU (e.g., supervisory and legal fees). 
Many of the larger funds already choose to operate European subsidiaries, rather 
than relying on a passport. A large chunk of EU clients’ assets are already kept in 
funds domiciled in Dublin and Luxembourg, with management delegated to the UK. 
Based on a recent industry survey by the Investment Association, we conclude that a 
maximum of around 7% of assets managed in the UK would be under direct threat 
from the loss of the passport. 
 
• Insurance is a global industry: 28% of insurance exports went to the EU in 2015, 
compared to 44% for financial services in general. There is no real single market in 
insurance in the EU. Up to 87% of insurers operating across borders in the EU do so 
via subsidiaries rather than branches (reliant on the passport). Lloyd’s of London is an 
important exception to this. The current regulations allow the pool of underwriters 
based in London to serve clients across the EU. However, even this only accounts for 
11% of the market’s gross written premium, £2.9 billion – with possibly as little as 
£800 million (3%) directly reliant on the passport. 
 
• If the current passporting system is lost, there are three broad alternatives: 
‘equivalence’, bespoke agreements and local arrangements. 
 
• In some cases, equivalence can offer access to the single market when a country is 
judged by the EU to have a broadly equivalent regulatory and supervisory regime. 
However, it is a partial solution. While some EU regulations offer passport-like rights 
for third countries (e.g. MiFIR127), others offer no equivalence at all (e.g. CRD IV). 
Granting equivalence is also a political decision, requiring a judgment from the 
European Commission, and can take several years. That being said, the UK starts 
from the basis of having the exact same regulations as the EU – something which 
should make equivalence easier to achieve. 
 
• Negotiating bespoke deals to keep passports based on certain EU regulations will be 
necessary where equivalence is not available. There is precedent for this, for example 
the EU has a bespoke agreement with Switzerland on the provision of direct 
insurance (not including life insurance) via branches. 
 
• Where the government does not succeed in negotiating cross-border access, financial 
firms will still be able set up local branches and subsidiaries if they wish to continue 
to provide services in certain member states. However, this may require significant 
investment in terms of capital, staff and infrastructure and may involve moving some 
of it from the UK. 
                                                     
127 Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation – see Appendix 5. 
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11. What does the City want? 
The City’s two key demands for the Brexit negotiations are access both to the single market 
and to Europe’s best labour talent. But differences emerge over other issues such as 
regulation. According to Alex McDonald, CEO of the Wholesale Markets Brokers’ 
Association: ‘The City is pretty aligned when it comes to the main issues. Passporting of 
permissions [under MiFID, AIFMD and UCITS], of capital and transactions between the two 
regions, and the work permit issue. They need access to labour. If you speak to the heads of 
the largest organisations, it’s all about talent and the people. As for the balance between 
passporting and deregulation, it is very one-sided on passporting’.128  
Anthony Browne added that the crucial point was to ‘retain Europe’s integrated financial 
market, not split it in two by building a wall along the channel. The only way to ensure that 
[outcome] is for banks based in the UK to retain full access to the single market in financial 
services and for European banks based in Europe to retain full access to the UK’s global 
financial centre and customers based here. In other words, we need to retain some version 
of passporting. The alternatives, such as [regulatory] equivalence, are poor shadows of 
genuine passporting. They only allow a much narrower range of services, provide much 
more limited rights at greater cost and can be withdrawn at short notice’.129 
11.1 Access to the single market via passports is the preferred option 
The main way in which UK-based financial services firms currently provide services in the 
single market is through ‘passporting’. As we have seen, this allows firms authorised in one 
member state to operate in any other member state without additional permission. ‘Third-
country firms’ – from countries such as the US, Switzerland and Japan – with a subsidiary in 
the UK can also use their UK passports to trade in the EU. 
The investment managers were very clear about the desirability of retaining passports. 
Aberdeen Asset Management’s Martin Gilbert said: ‘The only thing we want is the 
continuation of passporting of services. Just as we manage some of our Luxembourg-
domiciled funds out of Singapore, and some out of Philadelphia, we manage some out of 
London. That needs to continue; that’s the only thing we really want. It’s not so much the 
passporting of fund sales into Europe, it’s the passporting of services out of Europe and into 
the UK in order to be able to manage EU-domiciled funds. We think it’s pretty low-risk that 
the EU wouldn’t allow this; that would also kill US managers being able to manage 
Luxembourg funds, which they do at the moment, for example’.130 Insurance is regarded as 
less vulnerable to passports. Although Europe’s insurance industry is heavily concentrated in 
the UK, this high market share is due mainly to historical relationships, rather than to the UK 
                                                     
128 City of London talks tactics on Brexit negotiations, Financial News, 1 August 2016. This was the 
predominant view for the first six months after the Referendum vote. 
129 Tim Burke (2016) BBA chief: 'Banks planning for worst case Brexit scenario', Financial News, 20 October. 
130 City of London talks tactics on Brexit negotiations, Financial News, 1 August 2016. 
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being part of the EU. And, as previously mentioned, the insurance industry has traditionally 
used subsidiaries to access different member states.131 
The banks’ preferred method of accessing the single market is also via passporting. This 
includes the US and Swiss banks – 90% of the European staff of US banks are based in 
London. According to Tim Skeet, chairman of Britain for Europe, in the absence of 
passporting rights: ‘People servicing clients – origination and sales people – would have to 
be relocated within the EU… Clearing of euro transactions might have to move, a long-held 
hope of the European Central Bank. Traders might stay, although cut off from the primary 
market teams, the infrastructure of the capital markets would start to look bizarre. Likewise, 
elements of fund managers’ work might equally have to move. There are issues around the 
workability of the complex and much-delayed MiFID regulations that might render them 
unworkable with the UK outside the EU’.132 
In the absence of a deal that gives universal access to the single market, the key City trade 
groups – such as UK Finance and TheCityUK133 – have been lobbying for a tailor-made 
bilateral deal that allows all the different sectors of the City to trade with Europe. Chris 
Cummings, then CEO of TheCityUK, said it wanted ‘a bespoke solution for the UK…that 
protects our single-market access and makes sure we have supervisory equivalence’. The 
preferred model is similar to but more comprehensive than Switzerland’s current trading 
arrangement with the EU – the so-called ‘Swiss banking’ model. These trade groups have 
rejected the ‘Norway model’ – whereby Norway has access to the single market via its 
membership of the EEA, but has no influence on how regulations are set, and must accept 
both free movement of people and make budgetary contributions – as politically and 
practically impossible following the Referendum result.  
Anthony Browne said: ‘There needs to be a bilateral deal providing as full two-way market 
access as possible. Both sides have an interest in making this work, as it is not in the 
interests of the other EU countries to be cut off from their main financial centre, especially 
at a time they are all seeking to boost economic growth’.  He says that Swiss insurance 
companies have full two-way access to the single market via passporting in exchange for 
Switzerland keeping its insurance regulation at an ‘equivalent’ level to that of the EU. Swiss 
banks, however, do not benefit from any such trade deal and so they have to conduct most 
of their EU capital markets business through London-based subsidiaries. Since the UK is the 
                                                     
131 Simeon Djankov (2016) Why London won’t lose its crown as Europe’s financial capital, CAPX, 1 September;  
http://capx.co/why-london-wont-lose-its-crown-as-europes-financial-capital/ 
132 Tim Skeet (2016) Big parts of the City might vote with their feet, Financial News, 9 September. 
133 A new umbrella group representing large financial institutions, the European Financial Services Chairman’s 
Advisory Committee, chaired by Baroness Shriti Vadera who also chairs Santander UK, was set up within days 
of the Referendum. But in September 2016, this group was absorbed into TheCityUK after complaints from 
smaller institutions who said that their concerns would not be heard if the government dealt separately with 
the larger banks. One employee of an international bank involved in the talks said: ‘It was a complete dog's 
breakfast. There were a lot of egos involved. The groups weren't connected on content or policy. But it's now 
been reined in’. (Anjuli Davies, Andrew MacAskill and Huw Jones (2016) Britain's finance sector at odds over 
Brexit lobbying, Reuters, 3 October).  Another pressure group, the Financial Services Negotiating Forum, 
chaired by Daniel Hodson, former CEO of Liffe, and Anthony Belchambers, founder of the Futures and Options 
Association, was set up in September 2016. 
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EU’s biggest export market, these trade groups believe a ‘Swiss-plus’ deal that also covers 
banking activities –  such as cross-border lending and corporate deposit-taking – and asset 
management is feasible. 
This view is shared by Xavier Rolet of the London Stock Exchange: ‘European companies 
large and small as well as governments rely heavily on access to the UK financial services 
sector and [we will] look at the impact of the sector on the real economy. I do think that in a 
world where financial and business flows are deeply global and interconnected it is critical 
for passporting to be maintained and that requires some element of regulatory 
equivalency’.134 
If, however, there is a loss of passporting and no bi-lateral deal, investment banks are 
looking at four models to help them continue doing business in the EU after Brexit with as 
little disruption as possible to their UK operations: 
• The dream is the so-called introductory model, under which bank sales teams in the 
EU ‘introduce’ clients to the UK entity. But EU local regulators are unlikely to share 
enthusiasm for this model because it doesn’t give them much oversight of the banks. 
• A European branch model could see the re-activation of licenses with different 
European countries. Fully capitalised subsidiaries wouldn’t be required, with banks 
then able to ‘branch’ into specific countries. 
• In a back-to-back model, an EU entity would host a compliance team and a few 
traders. Deals would move across to a bigger entity in the UK or New York after 
being booked in the EU.  
• Or if all else fails there’s the full blown bank model, requiring significant capital, 
trading infrastructure, compliance and top management. The creation of ‘mini-me’ 
versions of their investment banks could be a costly approach for lenders already 
under pressure to cut costs.135 
The Open Europe report cited earlier also favours passporting where this is possible:136 
• The government’s primary objective, with regards to financial services, should be to 
try and keep the CRD IV passport in place to ensure that London can remain a centre 
of international banking. CRD IV does not allow for equivalence, or meaningful third 
party access, so this could be achieved through a specific bilateral agreement (similar 
to the EU-Swiss deal on insurance) or as a specific chapter of a comprehensive UK-EU 
free trade agreement. There will need to be deep cooperation on the supervision of 
the banking sector. The UK should pursue equivalence under MiFIR, which would 
allow many of the investment banking services provided via the passport (including 
those by foreign firms) to continue. 
                                                     
134 Reported in Martin Arnold and Caroline Binham (2016) UK financial sector targets Swiss-style deal for EU 
market access, Financial Times, 18 August. 
135 Samuel Agini (2016) Banks’ blueprints for Brexit, Financial News, 28 November. 
136 Open Europe (2016) How the UK’s financial services sector can continue thriving after Brexit, October. 
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•  The UK should seek to ensure that EU-domiciled funds can still be managed from the 
UK after Brexit. This can be done via so-called ‘delegation’ of portfolio management 
and may involve firms setting up some additional operations in the EU. Achieving 
equivalence under MiFIR would also give asset managers a chance to retain 
passport-like rights for some of the services they offer to professional investors. 
• The UK should also try and obtain equivalence under Solvency II to help smooth the 
transition for the insurance industry. A bespoke agreement will be important for 
Lloyd’s of London. Keeping asset managers, insurers and pension funds on board and 
invested in the UK will be vital. If they (the buy side) stay, the sell side (banks and 
other businesses) is also more likely maintain the bulk of their operations in London. 
• Given the fluid nature of the financial services sector, the government should aim to 
offer the industry maximum certainty about the prospects for future market access 
and possible transitional arrangements as early on as possible. It is essential to avoid 
a cliff-edge situation and give the industry enough time to adapt to whatever the 
new reality is. Based on our background conversations, if banks, for instance, were 
still unclear about what the future holds one year before the UK formally exits the EU, 
they would be forced to start making decisions – including over whether to shift part 
of their business elsewhere. Some firms may well start implementing their 
contingency plans even earlier than that. A transitional agreement to keep the 
existing reciprocal passport arrangements in place would allow the industry greater 
time to plan and the UK government to negotiate alternative arrangements with the 
EU.  
• The UK should push for ‘pre-emptive equivalence’ in areas where it seeks it. This 
would see the process of judging equivalence starting immediately while the UK is 
still inside the EU and during the Article 50 negotiations. There is some precedent for 
this under Solvency II – with equivalence being approved before the directive was 
fully in force. 
• The UK needs to convince the EU that keeping cross-Channel financial markets open 
is a mutual interest. Throughout the negotiating process, the UK should make it clear 
to its European partners that this is not a ‘zero-sum game’ and think creatively about 
how to ensure that the new trade arrangements benefit EU companies and 
governments. Fragmenting London’s financial services ecosystem would lead to 
higher costs for all concerned. Indeed, if business moves out of London, it is far from 
obvious that it would relocate in the EU. Financial hubs located outside of the EU 
would be just as, if not more, likely to reap the benefits. Furthermore, if certain 
business lines no longer look profitable from the UK they might just be discontinued 
altogether – a deadweight loss for the UK and EU economy and all consumers of 
financial services. 
• The UK should offer reciprocal access to its markets to EU firms, and maintain the 
current access offered to third countries (granted through EU equivalence at the 
moment). This will mean the UK would create and establish its own equivalence 
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system. The UK should also quickly seek to establish its baseline at the WTO and its 
commitment to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
• Domestic reform would help to ensure that London, and the UK more widely, remains 
an attractive place to for financial services to do business. In particular, the UK 
government should consider scrapping the bank levy and the corporation tax 
surcharge for banks. However, at the very least, it should consider faster reductions 
in the bank levy rate and slower introductions of the corporation tax surcharge. 
Key questions for each sector 
Fund management 
1. Will UK fund managers be able to get third-country passports under MiFID and AIFMD? 
2. Could some bespoke UK deal be struck on UCITS? 
3. Will firms still be able to hire EU nationals as easily, and will they want to come here? 
Investment banking 
1. Will the UK negotiate passporting rights for banks to continue selling services in the EU 
from a UK subsidiary? 
2. Will the UK remain in line with EU financial regulation such as the bankers bonus cap? 
3. What might the UK government be prepared to give up to ensure freedom of 
movement? 
Trading and technology 
1. What will happen to the implementation of post-crisis market structure regulation such 
as EMIR,137 MiFID II and CSDR138? 
2. Will London-based firms be allowed to clear euro-denominated assets? 
3. If the UK ended up outside of the EEA, would its regulation be deemed equivalent?  
 
11.2 Regulation and compliance costs 
The City does have differences in view when it comes to over regulation. The large banking 
and asset management businesses, especially those from the US and continental Europe, 
value access above all else and are prepared to accept existing EU regulations – presumably 
for reasons not unrelated to those outlined by Daniel Hannan above. Smaller firms and 
entrepreneurs want to reduce EU red tape and return London to the lighter-touch regime 
that allowed the City to flourish historically. Jon Moulton, of private equity company Better 
Capital, said: ‘creating a good lively and attractive and sensible regulatory regime in London 
is a big job and it’s an important job’, while Edi Truell, chairman of Disruptive Capital 
Finance, wants ‘a bonfire of controls throughout the economy’. 
                                                     
137 European Market Infrastructure Regulation – see Appendix 5. 
138 Central Securities Depositories Regulation – see Appendix 5. 
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Some commentators believe the UK financial regulators could ‘loosen up a little’ to 
compensate for any transfer of business and jobs to the EU and the associated loss of tax 
revenues: ‘Following the post-crisis avalanche of regulation and frenzy of bank-bashing, 
Chancellor George Osborne promised a “new settlement” with the City after the 2015 
general election. The hope is that delivery of the new settlement will now be speeded up… 
There have been some recent signs of flexibility. Some analysts believe the Bank of 
England’s decision to reduce the banks’ countercyclical capital buffers could be followed by 
other moves to stimulate lending in an effort to soften the economic impact of the Leave 
vote. The Bank also announced a relaxation of the Solvency II regime for insurers’.139 
However, there was more common agreement when it came to the issue of compliance 
costs. A survey of investment bankers published in November 2016 predicted that, while 
London would remain Europe’s financial centre, there would be an increase in compliance 
costs and both the UK and EU financial markets would be damaged. A particular concern 
was whether a transition period would be granted between the UK leaving the EU and any 
new business and regulatory regime being implemented. Without this, some firms may 
decide sooner rather than later to shift staff and business to another EU state. Others 
believed that there was a low chance of a transition period being agreed upfront, since it 
was in the EU’s interest to force banks to relocate staff long before the UK’s formal exit from 
the EU.140 
In anticipation of this, some companies were making contingency plans.  For example, in 
October 2016, M&G revealed plans to launch Luxembourg-based SICAVs141 and was seeking 
permission from the local regulator, although it was unlikely to move UK-based staff to 
Luxembourg. It said that ‘a Luxembourg retail SICAV platform will enable us to offer fund 
strategies to European retail investors if the UK loses financial services passporting rights’ 
and it estimates that 10% of its assets come from European investors.142  Similarly, Lloyd’s of 
London announced it would seek regulatory clearance for a subsidiary it would establish on 
the continent in 2017, which will be used to conduct business around the EU using 
passporting. It said the new subsidiary will cost tens of millions to set up, will need to be 
fully capitalised and will increase the market’s operating costs, notably in compliance and 
regulation.143 It later transpired that the subsidiary would be set up with no more than 50 
people, despite Lloyds warning in June 2016 that Brexit could lead to 34,000 commercial 
insurance jobs moving to the continent.144  
                                                     
139 David Wighton (2016) City hopes new order will ease rules to offset EU exit, Financial News, 8 July. 
140 Tim Burke (2016) City bankers back London but predict Brexit pain, Financial News, 2 November. 
141 A SICAV (Société d'investissement à Capital Variable) is a type of open-ended investment fund in which the 
amount of capital in the fund varies according to the number of investors. Shares in the fund are bought and 
sold based on the fund's current net asset value. (http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sicav.asp). 
142 Anna Fedorova (2016) M&G reveals plans to create Luxembourg hub post Brexit, Investment Week, 10 
October. 
143 Jonathan Ford and Caroline Binham (2016) Lloyd’s of London to establish EU base in the new year, Financial 
Times, 15 December. 
144 James Burton (2016) So much for an exodus! Lloyd's of London moves just 50 jobs to Europe - after warning 
34,000 could go overseas as a result of Brexit, Daily Mail, 16 December. 
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11.3 Access to talent 
London is particularly dependent on migrant workers, both skilled and unskilled.  Non-UK 
workers account for 25% of the capital's workforce, compared with just 8% in the rest of the 
country. In a report for the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), the Centre 
for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) estimated that there were 771,000 non-UK EU 
nationals working in London (40,000 work in the City145) and 160,000 of these would not be 
entitled to a visa under the current tier 2 visa rules. According to the CEBR, losing these 
workers would reduce London’s GDP by £7bn by 2020 – with a consequential loss of £2bn in 
direct tax revenues.146 
Michaël De Lathauwer, co-CEO of pension scheme fiduciary manager Cardano, reflected the 
views of many in the City when it came to access to talent: ‘I would say that at least the 
people who have the technical capabilities, who actually are in jobs, Europeans here in 
London, should be able to maintain [their right to work in the UK]. And secondly the ability 
to continue to attract people from European countries for very specific roles’. Lisa Rabbe, 
former EMEA head of public policy at Credit Suisse, said: ‘The worst case scenario would be 
some kind of acrimonious UK/EU negotiations that yielded some kind of tit-for-tat 
restrictions on EU and UK nationals being able to work in each other’s jurisdictions. I think 
that’s unlikely because I think both sides have so much to lose from that and I think that’s 
very clear to both sides’.147 Paul Manduca, co-head of the Brexit committee of the 
TheCityUK who also chairs insurance group Prudential, also anticipated that EU hiring would 
not be curtailed, citing comments from Philip Hammond that there was ‘no likelihood’ that 
post-Brexit immigration controls would apply to highly skilled EU workers.148 
Mahoney et al. (2016) argue that ‘in addressing concerns about immigration, the UK 
government will almost certainly seek to make provisions for skills in the financial services 
industry within its new so-called “points-based” system’.149 The government subsequently 
rejected the points-based system as too slow and hence unworkable.150 Others prefer a US-
style ‘green card’ system which gives a green card to those offered a job by a company.  
Carolyn Fairbairn, Director General of the CBI, has said the government risks hurting 
businesses if it implements a new immigration system that is too bureaucratic. David Davis, 
the Brexit secretary, accepts this: ‘As we take back control of immigration by ending free 
movement as it has operated before, let me also say this, we won’t do so in a way that it is 
                                                     
145 Approximately, 40,000 (11%) of the City’s 360,000 workers come from the rest of the EU (Harriet Agnew 
and Patrick Jenkins (2016) Big Bang II: After Brexit, what’s next for the City of London?, Financial Times, 1 
September). 
146 Hayley Kirton (2016) Getting immigration wrong post-Brexit could lose London £7bn by 2020, City A.M., 10 
November. 
147 City of London talks tactics on Brexit negotiations, Financial News, 1 August 2016. 
148 Patrick Jenkins and Jonathan Ford (2016) City of London lobby group wants ‘no change’ Brexit deal, 
Financial Times, 8 November. 
149 Daniel Mahoney, Tim Knox and Jon Moulton (2016) The City slickers are here to stay, Centre for Policy 
Studies Economic Bulletin Number 83, 7 September. 
150 Bernard Goyder (2016) The home office is looking into a work permit system, Financial News, 12 
September. 
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contrary to the national and economic interest. Because as the chancellor has said, Britain 
must win the global battle for talent. No-one wants to see labour shortages in key sectors. 
That wouldn’t be in anybody’s interest’.151 This view is supported by Daniel Hannan: ‘Philip 
Hammond is right to oppose restrictions on skilled migrants. As he says, the objections to 
immigration were never about “computer programmers, brain surgeons, bankers”. A poll 
commissioned by British Future shows that 88 per cent of voters want skilled workers to 
continue to come here. Indeed, the chancellor should go further, and actively ease 
restrictions on key industries, such as pharmaceuticals and financial services, thus stealing a 
march on our rivals’.152 
The LCCI has proposed that currently employed EU nationals should be issued with a 
‘London work visa’ after Brexit. This would also be used for all other international 
appointments. Colin Stanbridge, CEO of LCCI, said: ‘Immigration has underpinned London’s 
economic, social and cultural development over centuries, making it the great city it is 
today. CEBR's analysis reveals the significant contribution that migrant workers make to the 
modern London economy...Given their role and input it is vital to London's future that a 
degree of flexibility is applied if government amends the UK immigration system’.153 
Leaders of the UK’s fintech industries propose the following:154 
• The visas of skilled tech workers from strong tech nations (USA, India, 
Commonwealth, Eastern Europe) need to be preserved post-Brexit. 
• It is essential that British universities remain an attractive place to study for non-
British and British citizens alike. 
• To that end we would like the UK government to implement a “STEM155 Passport.” 
• Ensure the UK is open and welcoming toward skilled workers; is still able to recruit 
the best skills and entrepreneurial talent across Europe, with minimal barriers to 
movement; and that existing migrant workers are allowed to stay and continue to 
work in the UK. The UK professional developer population is currently the largest in 
Europe, at 745,000 out of 4.7 million (Atomico research) and is the No.1 destination 
for inbound tech talent (Balderton research). 
• The No. 1 concern for entrepreneurs post-Brexit is access to talent, in particular 
technical talent. Hiring through existing visa processes is timely and expensive. 
                                                     
151 Joe Watts (2016) Brexit: David Davis says free movement will not be axed in a way that damages the British 
economy, Independent, 2 December 2016. 
152 Daniel Hannan (2016) Brexit must open our economy to the world – not lock it away behind protectionist 
barriers, Daily Telegraph, 26 October. 
153 Hayley Kirton (2016) Getting immigration wrong post-Brexit could lose London £7bn by 2020, City A.M., 10 
November. 
154 Letter to Rt Hon Theresa May MP, signed by Bernard Liautaud, Brent Hoberman CBE, Dale Murray CBE, 
Edward Wray, Niklas Zennström, Richard Reed CBE, Sherry Coutu CBE, Sonali De Rycker and Kathryn Parsons, 
12 December 2016. 
155 Science, technology, engineering and mathematics. 
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Quotas on specific skills could severely limit the ability of new tech companies to 
grow, as well as limit the ability of British skilled students to learn alongside other 
global experts. 
• We must give STEM graduates from leading universities an instant qualifying visa to 
live and work in the UK, and end the uncertainty where they must leave and later re-
apply. 
• This would: 
o Ensure that fast-growing tech companies can continue to hire the best talent 
quickly. 
o Continue to make the UK’s universities highly attractive to study at for STEM 
subjects, as students will not fear being forced to instantly leave the country 
after graduation. The UK already has many of the world’s leading computer 
science institutions, including Oxford, Imperial, UCL, Edinburgh and 
Cambridge. 
o The government should look again at whether linking visa applications with 
the requirement to attain capital investment is the best way to retain skilled 
talent. 
o Plug a skill gap in STEM present in the UK while more investment is made into 
education in this space. 
o The government could create an ‘easy win’ with the promotion of a scheme to 
make awards to young brilliant engineers to relocate to the UK. This would 
send the right signals to the world and help to avoid any ‘brand damage’ 
done by recent government rhetoric around immigration. 
Jersey – with 103,000 residents – is an offshore financial centre that provides an extreme 
model: migrant workers need to be licensed for their first five years on the island and only 
those with 10 years’ residency can buy a house. Senator Paul Routier argues: ‘We use our 
mechanism of controlling people’s access to housing and to work to keep things in 
balance’.156 
Whatever solution is found for skilled workers, there remain issues concerning sectors of 
the economy that have historically relied on unskilled migrant labour. Charles Ind, managing 
partner at UK private equity firm Bowmark Capital, has the following concerns: ‘If the 
ultimate outcome is a less flexible and less fluid market for unskilled labour, that would 
obviously have an adverse impact on companies in many sectors of private equity 
investment – and in particular healthcare, especially social care, and the hospitality industry, 
                                                     
156 Gren Manuel (2016) Searching for an immigration model, UK officials look at Jersey, Financial News, 17 
November. 
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such as casual dining’. These sectors employ unskilled migrant workers and remain core 
targets for private equity investment.157 
William Hague, the former foreign secretary, proposes a system of work permits for any EU 
national who is offered a job in the UK, unless they have a criminal record or are on a terror 
watch list. In addition, ‘we will not help them look for work, we will not pay them out-of-
work benefits, we will not give them social housing and they will have to earn the right to 
any in-work benefits over time, but if they find work here they can come…That way, our 
economy will still be supported by the Europeans who help keep our restaurants, financial 
services and agriculture running, but we will have control over who comes here and what 
we give them. If the numbers in any one year were impossibly large, we could stop issuing 
such permits, but in practice this system would be one significant step short of the freedom 
of movement we have today, and we would expect the EU to give the same rights to British 
citizens in return’.158  
11.4 Supporting support services 
A particularly important support service to the UK financial services industry is the legal 
services sector. In December 2016, TheCityUK published a report called The Impact of Brexit 
on the UK-based Legal Services Sector.  The lobby group wants the government to safeguard 
legal services as a ‘vital asset for the UK’ in view of the widespread use of English law in 
commercial contracts and international dispute resolutions. The report states that 
approximately 25% of the 320 legal jurisdictions worldwide are founded on English common 
law principles and 4% of governing law in global corporate arbitrations is English law. It also 
states that the UK legal services industry contributed £25.7 billion to the UK economy in 
2015, employing 370,000 people, of whom around 20% work in the City. Miles Celic, the 
CEO of TheCityUK, said: ‘It is vital that the key challenges and opportunities for the sector 
are addressed in the Brexit negotiations and that its competitiveness is maintained and 
enhanced’. The report presents four recommendations that will help safeguard the sector’s 
competitiveness: promoting the ‘ongoing value and validity of… English law in its Brexit 
messaging’; articulating how cross-border civil litigation will be handled once the UK leaves 
the EU; maintaining the sector’s access to the free movement of professionals practising 
legal services; and engaging with industry bodies to assess and understand knock-on 
impacts of Brexit on the legal sector.159 
 
12. What do Remain politicians want? 
Andrew Tyrie MP, former chair of the Treasury select committee and a prominent Remain 
supporter, argues that the Brexit negotiations will present a ‘formidable challenge’ for the 
                                                     
157 Jessica Davies (2016) Brexit visa regime a threat to private equity favourites, Financial News, 20 October. 
158 William Hague (2016) How Theresa May can deliver the Goldilocks solution to Brexit: neither soft nor hard 
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UK, especially over the issues of freedom of movement and bank passporting. He believes 
that ‘In practice, the government is likely to conclude that it will need a negotiated 
settlement involving complex trade-offs between these various objectives’. At the same time, 
he believes that ‘A reality check is in order for the EU. The four freedoms of the single 
market are not inviolable and inextricably interdependent. Far from being “completed”, the 
single market in services remains, in places, an aspiration. Nor is freedom of movement for 
people as complete as it appears. Purism by EU negotiators on this point would not only be 
inconsistent with reality; it would also clash with other member states’ economic interests’. 
He believes that ‘A settled relationship with the EU will not be found within the two years 
specified under Article 50. As such, transitional arrangements may well be required to 
prevent a sudden reversion to WTO rules’. He is opposed to the WTO option:  
One proposal should probably be set aside from the start. This is that the government 
should rely entirely on its rights as a member of WTO, thereby avoiding protracted 
and difficult negotiations with the EU. Pursuing this option would leave goods 
exporters facing, on average, a tariff of 5.3%.  But this average conceals much higher 
rates on a number of areas of importance for the UK, such as the 9.8% tariff levied by 
the EU on imported motor vehicles. Perhaps more important, many UK exporters 
would face the requirement not only to conform to EU standards, as they do 
currently, but to prove that conformity, in some cases by sending samples to the EU 
for independent testing. For pharmaceuticals and medical devices, another key area 
of interest for the UK, the conformity assessment requirements, and restrictions on 
marketing, could be particularly onerous. 
… For services, the deficiencies of the WTO option are greater still. Reliance on WTO 
rules would substantially curtail the UK’s ability to conduct cross-border trade, and 
the rights of UK firms to establish a physical presence in the rest of the EU, with the 
level of access varying between member states. These barriers are significant and 
would be highly disruptive to the business of selling services into the EU, now and in 
the future. Many such businesses – including Vodafone, AXA, Centrica, EasyJet, 
Goldman Sachs, Lloyd’s of London, the London Stock Exchange and Santander – 
warned of this disruption before the Referendum…[and] chose to highlight the 
importance of ‘unrestricted access’ to the single market because they were worried 
about the effects on their businesses. 
Mr Tyrie’s preferred solution is to maintain passporting: 
Securing continued market access for services is perhaps the biggest priority for the 
negotiations. The UK has a £17.1 billion trade surplus with the EU in this sector. But 
negotiations will not be straightforward. For financial services, which account for a 
third of the UK’s services exports to the EU, the only ‘off-the-shelf’ arrangements to 
preserve the access currently enjoyed under the passporting regime would be 
through EEA membership. This would require the UK to conform to EU financial 
services regulation now and in the future, but with no formal say over its content or 
development. 
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On services, particularly financial services, the UK needs a deal that gives it both 
access and influence, possibly by building on the current approach used by the EEA, 
through the establishment of standing regulatory committees. Its size – 
preponderance in financial services – and pre-existing levels of integration with the 
EU, mean that it is much better equipped to obtain something than any other country 
to negotiate this. Nonetheless, maintaining passporting arrangements, while 
preserving the control necessary to run the world’s leading financial centre, will be 
one of the most challenging aspects of the negotiations.160 
 
13. What does the UK financial regulator want? 
Andrew Bailey, CEO of the Financial Conduct Authority, explained what the UK financial 
regulator wanted in a letter to Andrew Tyrie as chair of the Treasury Select Committee, 
dated 28 October 2016: 
In arriving at what is, at this stage, necessarily initial FCA thinking on an ‘optimal 
framework’, we are mindful of our statutory objectives and therefore seek an 
arrangement that maximises competition in the interests of consumers, while 
preserving and deepening market integrity and retaining high conduct standards and 
protecting consumers across all relevant financial markets.  The points I outline 
below are motivated with regard to those objectives. 
Given the scope, scale and nature of the UK’s financial services sector, a framework 
based upon five broad principles would help achieve this: 
1. Cross-border market access.  As is clear from the ‘passporting’ figures set out 
in my letter of 17 August,161 in particular with regard to wholesale and insurance 
business, UK and other EU firms operate cross-border into European and global 
markets as a matter of course.  Open markets are an important enabler of healthy 
competition, supporting FCA objectives. 
2. Support for the principle of consistent global standards where markets are 
also global.  With so many sectors of financial markets truly international in their 
cross-border activity, it is important that – where relevant – regulatory standards are 
globally consistent. This means in certain areas, particularly wholesale financial 
markets, having standards that are consistent across regions and jurisdictions in 
order to minimise the risks of regulatory arbitrage and fragmented markets.  It also 
means regulators working effectively together through international standard setting 
organisations as well as regionally. 
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3. Cooperation between regulatory authorities.  Where business is being done 
involving firms, customers and markets across different jurisdictions, close contact 
and collaboration between competent authorities is essential to ensure that 
regulatory standards and outcomes are met and enforced. The FCA benefits greatly 
from cooperation with regulators in Europe and more widely – we can share 
information, intelligence and best practice, and our interactions provide a platform 
for consistent and effective supervision. A robust framework which provides for 
continued cooperation will be fundamental in enabling us to meet our objectives. 
4. Influence over standards.  Where UK firms and consumers have access to 
cross-border markets, they are affected by the common standards governing these 
markets. In order to ensure that consumers are protected and markets are 
competitive and well-functioning, the UK authorities should have influence over the 
standards that structure these markets. 
5. Opportunity to recruit and maintain a skilled workforce.  The health of the 
UK’s financial sector relies, in part upon it being able to recruit and maintain the right 
people with the right mix of skills.  A diverse workforce with varied experience and 
the requisite expertise is a key ingredient in ensuring the UK’s markets and firms are 
well run and remain competitive, protecting consumers. 
Mr Bailey also explained the potential advantages for the UK outside the EU: 
Broadly speaking, countries outside the EU regulatory framework may find that they 
have greater flexibility to set rules that are specifically tailored to domestic markets 
and consumers – potentially of benefit in areas of financial services where there is 
little cross-border activity.  EU rules instead are by their very nature the product of a 
negotiation between member states and as such imply some degree of compromise 
between actors. Of course, even within the EU, individual member states are afforded 
some flexibility to tailor legislative implementation to their markets, for example 
where they are implementing directives, or where they benefit from specific 
derogations. 
This potential flexibility in the regulatory environment outside the EU is, for certain 
countries and certain products or services, also tempered by their need to adhere to 
shared international standards (for example those set by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision).  In addition, for those countries wishing to be determined as 
equivalent with the EU, their ability to set their own standards and diverge from 
elements of the EU framework can be limited yet further. 
Improving Global Standards 
Given the UK’s status as a world-leading financial centre, the FCA considers 
participating in global-level regulatory dialogue as in important responsibility.  We 
have a strong voice at a range of international authorities including the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), among others.  The 
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UK, like many other jurisdictions, is also subject to periodic assessments and peer 
reviews by global-level bodies including the International Monetary Fund and 
Financial Action Task Force, which use accepted international standards as the 
benchmark for their assessments. Our desire to remain actively involved in 
discussions to develop regulatory standards at global level is therefore not in 
question. 
Through our participation in various global level organisations, such as IOSCO, we are 
able to shape and develop global standards and contribute to efforts to promote 
global consistency and cooperation between regulatory authorities. Whilst the UK 
has a strong presence in these fora, the practicalities of developing and improving 
global standards are affected by the need for the various global bodies to build 
consensus among their memberships and ensure standard are applicable across a 
breadth of legal and regulatory regimes. 
Global standards are also not legally binding and can lack consequences in the form 
of sanctions or penalties for non-compliance.  Therefore building strong relationships 
with our overseas counterparts on a bilateral basis is also seen as an important 
component of the FCA’s ability to improve global standards and cooperation between 
regulatory regimes. 
 
In September 2017, Mr Bailey gave a speech on the benefits of free trade in financial 
services:162 
I strongly believe in free trade and open markets in financial services, particularly 
wholesale services. …  
The post-crisis reforms put us in a much better position to support open financial 
markets in which we can deal with the harm arising from externalities and 
spillovers. … 
Almost since Bretton-Woods there has been a debate on whether regional trade 
blocs stimulate or restrict trade, and likewise whether or not they are consistent with 
Most Favoured Nation provisions. … 
Today in the UK, we stand at a point where we have the basis for effective open 
financial markets and free trade supported by the regulatory reforms post-crisis, but 
a threat to achieving that outcome in the form of reactions to Brexit…. 
We know that EU withdrawal has potential risks for disruption to financial services 
for the UK, EU and even globally. Some of these financial stability effects arise due to 
so-called cliff edge risks. But by working closely together as authorities we can 
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minimise these risks and support a transition to a new relationship between the UK 
and the EU…. 
We all begin with the same shared objectives. The overall objective of regulatory 
standards in financial services is to support the delivery of financial stability, 
consumer protection and open, innovative financial markets which enable growth 
and prosperity.  
However, in my view there should be a strong preference to preserve cross-border 
operating where it is consistent with the overall standards. So what principles might 
we turn to when considering such an arrangement? 
Any agreement on market access must be clear and sustainable to provide 
confidence in its long term operation. Trade in financial services can only flourish 
when built on a stable base that firms and regulators can understand and rely upon. 
The Most Favoured Nation principle of non-discrimination should be at the core of 
any agreement. It should provide for equal treatment under its terms. It should not 
allow jurisdictions or firms to be discriminated against because of where they are 
based.  
And where market access is predicated on commonality of rules, this should be 
determined by taking a proportionate and outcomes-based approach, focusing on 
whether rules address the same risks while seeking to avoid market distortion or 
regulatory arbitrage. It should also take into account the extent to which rules are 
aligned with international standards. …[C]urrently international standards remain 
somewhat patchwork, but as they develop – and I hope they will – then they can 
increasingly be relied upon for the purposes of cross border trade. 
To help achieve this, we need to have cooperation. Regulators must work together to 
protect market functioning and integrity. Given the high degree of integration in 
financial markets, regulatory authorities should be able to share information without 
obstruction.  
 
14. The UK financial services industry’s advantages, vulnerabilities, threats 
and opportunities 
14.1 Advantages 
The UK has a number of very powerful advantages: 
• London is the most competitive city in the world for financial services, according to 
the Z/Yen Global Financial Centres Index, while its closest EU rivals – Zurich and 
54 
 
Frankfurt – rank 16th and 20th.163  London is also the world’s most global city, 
‘resilient, agile and great at adapting’, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Cities of 
Opportunity report.164 In 2017, London pulled further ahead of New York in second 
place over concerns about increasing US protectionism, although the lead fell back in 
2018.165  
 
• The UK’s financial regulations are either superior to those in the EU or set at a global 
level: 
o Higher UK regulatory standards lead EU regulation in several areas. Examples 
include Retail Distribution Review (RDR) implementation in 2013, tougher 
Bank of England stress tests in 2014 and ring fencing of retail banks from 
their commercial arms from 2019. 
o UK-based institutions could benefit from lower capital requirements set by 
the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA).  
o UK firms could potentially avoid burdensome EU legislation, such as the 
bonus cap, restrictive employment rights and proposals for a financial 
transaction tax, improving the City's competitive position with Asian and US 
financial centres.  
o Many financial and banking rules are set by global regulators, such as the 
Basel Committee and Financial Stability Board.166  
 
• The UK has the second lowest corporation tax regime in Europe after Ireland, with a 
19% rate from 1 April 2017 reducing to 18% in 2020, lower than any of the other G7 
countries.167 In 2018, Forbes voted the UK the best country to do business.168 
 
• The UK provides the strongest protection for creditors and shareholders in Europe. 
In terms of creditor protection, the UK ranks 19th in the world, France 79th and 
Germany 28th. In terms of shareholder protection, the UK ranks 4th in the world, 
after Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore, with France and Germany coming 29th 
and 49th, respectively, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business project.169 
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• The UK has Europe’s most flexible labour market, which is important for the financial 
services industry which hires and fires tens of thousands of people each year.170 
Further, the government is aware of the importance of being able to recruit skilled 
workers from overseas. Philip Hammond told a House of Lords committee: ‘We will 
use [control over free movement] in a sensible way that will facilitate the movement 
of highly-skilled people between financial institutions and businesses to support 
investment in the UK economy’.171 
 
• The UK is the second most innovative country in the world, according to the Global 
Innovation Index, particularly in financial services and the digital economy:172  
o London is a leading centre for Islamic finance and the premier western 
offshore centre for Renminbi trading173 
o EY rates the UK as the world’s leading fintech centre and the digitisation of 
banking represents a huge opportunity.174 A report by Gerard Lyons – a 
former economic adviser to Boris Johnson when he was Mayor of London – 
predicted that London will remain a market leader in fintech after Brexit and 
found that: 
 Investment into the City's fintech sector rose 37% in the first half of 
2017 compared to the previous year 
 31 out of Europe's top 50 fintech businesses are headquartered in 
London 
 London employs 71,000 software developers, more than any other 
European city and more than San Francisco. This figure is set to grow 
by a further 22% by 2025 
 Tech giants such as Amazon and Google are making investments in 
London.175 
• The UK ranks second behind the US in the Portland 30 Index of Global Soft Power.176 
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http://capx.co/why-london-wont-lose-its-crown-as-europes-financial-capital/  
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here to stay’, added Nigel Verdon, a serial fintech entrepreneur and founder of Digital Change Partners. John 
Barrass, deputy CEO of the Wealth Management Association, argues that the significance of the digitalisation 
of the financial services sector cannot be underestimated: ‘Nearly all our clients are private and the way in 
which they access the system is altering very dramatically over time because the younger generation of course 
is using mobile electronic access in a way that the older one didn't.  This is absolutely transforming a whole lot 
of things which are unconnected with borders and unconnected with Brexit, unconnected indeed with the way 
in which the single market works, and one of the problems for the European Commission has been how do you 
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Brexit positively impact UK financial services?, Misys Connect Forum, 20 September 2016; 
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• The UK has the best universities in Europe for economics and finance education. 
According to the Shanghai global ranking on economics education, six UK universities 
rank among the top 50, compared with only three in continental Europe (one in the 
Netherlands and two in France). Four of the top five European masters of finance 
programmes are based in London (the other one is Paris-based INSEAD).177 
 
• The UK has the advantage of the English language, the global language of finance, 
business, accounting and academia, which is spoken at a useful level by 1.75bn 
people and is set to rise to 2bn by 2020.178 
 
Another key advantage is that the UK financial services industry is in situ and it is hard if not 
impossible to move it in whole or in part.  There are a number of reasons for this:179 
• Scale. Financial services companies benefit from huge agglomeration economies 
from being physically located near each other in a whole range of ways, from 
recruiting workers from a highly skilled talent pool – of bankers, lawyers, compliance 
officers, etc – to having a more effective lobbying voice.  While this is possible in 
Paris or Frankfurt, the scale isn’t there. 
 
• Cost. Banks have spent the 30 years since the Big Bang in 1987 investing in the 
infrastructure of the financial services industry in London.  Not only does that include 
the buildings and the millions of miles of electronic cables,180 it also includes a 
conducive operating environment that comes from 30 years of political lobbying. All 
this would need to be replicated in a different European city. 
 
• Rule of law. The English legal system is the envy of the world. It gives banks the 
surety that contracts signed will be upheld and interpreted in certain ways. The 
regulatory framework, with its natural tendency to be light touch, is also admired, 
even if at times this has turned out to be problematic.  A survey by MLex found that 
65% of partners in London law firms believe that London will retain its title as a 
leading legal centre, which no other European city could hope to rival.181 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
176 Graeme Leach (2016) Five reasons the Anglosphere has real geopolitical teeth, City A.M., 15 December. 
177 http://www.shanghairanking.com/SubjectEcoBus2015.html. Universities UK, representing university vice-
chancellors, said they would continue to succeed after Brexit as long as they had the right government support 
(Neil Woolcock (2016) We’ll thrive after Brexit, say university chiefs, The Times, 9 December). 
178 British Council. 
179 James Quinn (2016) Four reasons why banks won't leave the City of London after Brexit, Daily Telegraph, 24 
October. 
180 The cost of moving ultra-high speed fibre-optic cables – which link London and New York’s foreign exchange 
centres – would simply be too expensive (Mark Boleat (2016) City firms are preparing for the worst from Brexit 
– but hoping for the best, City A.M., 19 December). 
181 Courtney Goldsmith (2016) London won't lose its status as leading finance and legal centre after Brexit, 
professionals say, City A.M., 21 December. 
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• Culture. The UK offers a business culture conducted in English, broadly similar to that 
operating in the US. London also has some of the best restaurants, theatres and art 
galleries in the world.  
These advantages are fully recognised by EU financial institutions based in London: ‘Plan A 
for banks is to stay in London and move as little as possible’, according to Deutsche Bank 
analyst Jochen Moebert.182 It is also recognised by entrepreneurs like Jim Mellon: ‘Clearly 
the finance sector is very important to the British economy, but I don't think it's going to go 
away because the infrastructure in the City of London is just so great, it's unparalleled’.183   
14.2 Vulnerabilities 
There are a number of areas in which the UK is vulnerable. 
The main vulnerability is over passporting which is currently linked to the single market and 
membership of at least the EEA. According to Mahoney et al. (2016): ‘While unlikely, it is not 
impossible that the loss of the passport system for UK financial institutions may trigger 
some migration of global firms’ EU headquarters. For example, it has been claimed that loss 
of passporting rights could see UK exports of financial services to the EU halve to around 
£10bn.184 This could be problematic in the short-term by exacerbating the UK’s record 
current account deficit. A rapid solution to continued passporting arrangements between 
the UK and the single market should therefore be a high priority in Brexit negotiations’.  
The Treasury is certainly aware of the importance of access: ‘We are actively engaged with 
the financial services sector and welcome its input as we prepare for the negotiations to exit 
the EU. Our position is absolutely clear, Britain remains open for business and we will work 
hard to get the best deal possible deal’.185 Philip Hammond said, following a meeting with 
City representatives in September 2016, that he ‘understands the scale of the potential 
impact leaving the EU could have for parts of the financial services industry. That is why I am 
determined to listen to what the industry has to say on key issues, like access to the single 
market…It is important Britain maintains its status as a great place for financial services and 
that is why the government stands ready to help the sector maximise the opportunities that 
leaving the EU presents’.186 There have even been suggestions that the government would 
be prepared to pay into the EU budget to get continued access to passporting.187 
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Another concern, as previously mentioned by a number of people and organisations, is over 
the loss of influence over setting regulatory standards for financial services in the EU. The 
BBA has warned that the ‘introduction of new regulatory barriers to business in markets 
that have up to now operated as a single market will increase costs, raise barriers to entry 
and reduce customer choice’.  
The Treasury select committee’s former chair, Andrew Tyrie, is concerned that: ‘None of the 
current off-the-shelf arrangements can preserve existing passporting arrangements, while 
giving the UK the influence and control it needs over financial services regulation as it 
develops’.188 
The City is vulnerable to fragmentation in the asset management industry. A Bank of 
England Financial Stability Report warns that: ‘If asset management were to fragment 
between the UK and Europe, material economies of scale and scope that are currently 
achieved by pooling of funds and their management would be reduced. Together, these 
effects could increase the reliance of both the UK and EU economies on their banking 
systems and reduce the diversification and resilience of finance. …There is no generally 
applicable institutional framework for cross-border provision of financial services outside 
the European Union. Globally, liberalisation of trade in services lags far behind liberalisation 
of trade in goods. So without a new bespoke agreement, UK firms could no longer provide 
services to EEA clients (and vice versa) in the same manner as they do today, or in some 
cases not at all. This creates two broad risks. First, services could be dislocated as clients and 
providers adjust. Second, the fragmentation of service provision could increase costs and 
risks’.189 
Euro trading is another potentially vulnerable area. This is a US$2 trillion-a-day market with 
London having a 70% market share compared with 11% in Paris and 7% in Frankfurt. The 
European Central Bank has tried to ban euro trading outside the eurozone, although the 
European Court of Justice has so far blocked this.190  A similar issue relates to euro clearing, 
i.e., the clearing of euro-denominated derivatives trades. Brussels wants to move euro 
clearing from London to the continent following Brexit and also wants the ECB to have ‘legal 
competence’ over ‘systematically important’ clearing houses located outside the EU.191 S&P 
Global Ratings said that such a move would impose a ‘massive extra burden of margin 
collateral’ on market participants and harm the chance of the euro becoming a global 
reserve currency.192 This concern is shared by Simon Kirby, former economic secretary to 
the Treasury, who argues that if clearing is ‘dismantled and redistributed’ across the EU, 
everyone would be worse off. Clearing contracts in one location offers significant capital 
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efficiencies by allowing similar positions to be offset against each other and lowering 
collateral costs.193 Xavier Rolet, CEO of the London Stock Exchange, in giving evidence to the 
Treasury select committee, went even further and warned of the ‘potentially systemic’ 
impact of moving clearing functions out of London if there is continued uncertainty over the 
final shape of Brexit after the Article 50 process is complete. He said it was essential ‘to find 
a way to buy ourselves a period of time of stability, of grandfathering, that needs to extend 
into several years’.194 The US is also opposed to the move. Christopher Giancarlo of the US 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission warns against the Balkanisation of European 
financial markets.195 
A further vulnerability, according to Mahoney et al. (2016), is that the EU’s most talented 
workers might be less interested in jobs in London. This risk particularly affects start-ups 
which might no longer consider London as a launching pad, preferring instead another EU 
financial centre. The concern is summed up by the members of Tech City UK’s Future Fifty 
tech programme, which helps some of the UK’s fastest growing digital companies to scale 
up: ‘We want to build businesses in an economy that is outward-looking and dynamic. With 
Brexit, must come great opportunities, but we must be careful to avoid potential pitfalls. As 
tech company founders we want to work with government to find solutions to the digital 
industries’ need for international talent. Only with a steady flow of international and home-
grown talent, British tech can continue to compete on the world’s stage’.196 
14.3 Threats 
European financial centres have used the opportunity of Brexit to compete for London’s 
financial services business. Immediately after the Referendum, the French prime minister, 
Manuel Valls, said: ‘We know that groups based in the City are planning to leave for Dublin, 
Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Paris. We are working on measures that could help strengthen 
our attractiveness. I think notably about taxation or the status of expatriates. To major 
international companies I say, ‘Welcome to Paris! Come invest in France!’’.197 Edouard-
François de Lencquesaing, CEO of the European Institute of Financial Regulation and an 
adviser to Paris Europlace – which lobbies for Paris as a financial centre – said Paris could 
support up to 25,000 additional personnel if firms had to move staff out of the City of 
London because of Brexit.198   
Frankfurt also believes it is well placed to benefit from a hard Brexit fallout, which could see 
a fifth of London's finance jobs shifted from the UK capital, according to a survey by the 
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Boston Consulting Group. Corporate banking and investment banking were the businesses 
found to be most likely to relocate staff, according to the survey, but securities services, 
transaction banking as well as asset management and wealth management were also 
expected to be affected. Hubertus Väth, managing director of Frankfurt Main Finance which 
promotes the city as a financial centre, has estimated that at least 10,000 employees from 
across the financial services sector could move from London to the German city over five 
years.199  
The Financial Times has reported that Germany is considering changing its labour laws to 
make Frankfurt a more attractive location for banks forced to move staff from London after 
Brexit. Currently, laying off staff is difficult and costly, with minimum statutory redundancy 
terms being twice as generous in Germany as in the UK. A redundancy payout for a banker 
earning $1.5m could typically be $150,000 in London, but up to $2.25m in Frankfurt. Given 
that banks hire and fire at short notice, this makes Frankfurt a much less attractive location. 
The proposed reform would place an upper salary limit on employee protections of 
€100,000 or €150,000, making redundancy terms less generous.200 Similarly, when Jamie 
Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan, warned the French president that France is unlikely to lure 
banking jobs away from London post-Brexit unless the nation overhauls its employment 
legislation, François Hollande assured Dimon that the next president would make the 
necessary changes.201  
Many commentators believe the threats from Paris and Frankfurt to take London’s business 
lack credibility. For example, the City of London corporation's Jeremy Browne said: ‘One of 
the problems the French have, is that it's quite hard to make a pitch saying we want to be 
the home of financial services when you have spent 20 years making a virtue of being 
rhetorically hostile to financial services’.202 Similarly, Paris has been making a big bid to 
attract UK fintech companies, but the red tape of just doing business there pushes up the 
costs, while the problem for Berlin, another contender, is that ‘people don’t start speaking 
German overnight’. 203 
Similarly, the Financial Times story about Germany was dismissed by Simon English writing 
in the Evening Standard:  
The Germans are coming. From yesterday’s FT, this headline: Frankfurt steps up bid 
to woo London banks after Brexit….Frankfurt is only the fifth-largest city in Germany 
with a population of less than 750,000. Compared with London, it is Toytown.204 
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There’s a book fair. A motor show. Otherwise, think of tumbleweed floating down 
streets made for bicycles.205 Every banker imagining that he is going to steal trade 
and take it to Frankfurt has got a rival scheming to keep it here and do it better. And 
moreover, to do it in English. The advantage of our language shouldn’t be 
underestimated. 
The City has spent 70 years building an infrastructure that is dedicated to banking. 
London is better at financial services than anywhere else in the world, and will 
remain so. We’ll forgive the few bankers who call this wrongly and end up taking 
what turns out to be a two-year holiday in Frankfurt before they return to find that 
promotion has passed them by. 
Some argue that the real beneficiary of the Brexit confusion will be New York, but you 
note that those saying so are all American. Folk who think the City of London will win 
this battle with Europe have one strong piece of evidence in their favour: they have 
always been right before. 
So here’s my prediction: in five years’ time, German and French banks will still be 
sending more people here than we are sending there. Bank on it.206 
Mahoney et al. (2016) also conclude that: ‘there is little prospect of London being dislodged 
as Europe’s leading international financial centre. The inherent advantages and large 
network of financial and professional services are hard to replicate elsewhere in Europe’.  
And as Bernard Jenkin MP points out ‘the UK financial services sector dwarfs that of the rest 
of the EU — Canary Wharf on its own is bigger than Frankfurt’.207 This view is confirmed by 
John Cryan, then CEO of Deutsche Bank, who said that the UK will retain the status of being 
Europe’s top financial hub over the next ten years.208   
According to the Financial Times: ‘No city in the future EU27 comes close to providing the 
scale and infrastructure required of a top-10 global financial centre. The European cities 
aspiring to absorb some of London’s business are fairly small. No less important, their 
inhabitants enjoy a way of life that many do not wish to see disturbed by having their city 
transformed into a teeming, expensive financial hub. Dublin is one example. In a joke that 
alludes to London’s Canary Wharf financial district, a docklands development in Dublin is 
labelled “Canary Dwarf”. …The arrival of thousands of investment bankers, asset managers 
and insurers fleeing London after Brexit would place intolerable strain on the city’s housing, 
education and other resources… Obstacles to turning some other European city into a 
financial centre equivalent to London look, for the foreseeable future, insurmountable’.209 
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Further, as Jes Staley, CEO of Barclays, says: ‘The users of capital find the providers of 
capital, not the other way around, and the providers of capital, by and large, are resident in 
London and New York. I don’t think London will lose its gravitational pull in terms of 
management of capital in any reasonable timeframe’.210 
On top of all this as Jim Mellon points out: ‘No one wants to go to Paris or Frankfurt or 
indeed to Dublin’.211 This view is confirmed by Christoph Rieche, who came from 
Switzerland in 2003 and started an alternative lender that supplies financing to small and 
medium-sized businesses: ‘London is probably the only place in the world where you can 
run a global operation because of the unique talent pool’. Another European financier said 
of Frankfurt: ‘It’s not a place where non-Germans could live very happily’, while his views of 
Paris are: ‘It’s a much more beautiful city than London but it’s a bloody hard place to do 
business’. He also warned against rash relocations: ‘I have some friends who moved [from 
London] to Geneva for tax reasons and now either they regret it or some are thinking of 
moving elsewhere’.212  
In July 2017, Morgan Stanley and Citigroup said they would move some staff to Frankfurt, 
following similar moves by Standard Chartered, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Nomura and 
Daiwa Securities.213 However, the Bank of England governor, Mark Carney, still predicted 
that the City would continue to thrive in a post-Brexit world doubling in size over the next 
quarter century as ‘we will keep our market share of cross-border capital flows’.214 
A potentially more serious threat comes from global, rather than EU, regulators: ‘Regulators 
around the world are increasingly forcing financial services companies to serve local markets 
through fully capitalised and staffed subsidiaries’.215 To illustrate the potential costs of this, 
it was reported in November 2016 that Goldman Sachs was considering relocating some of 
its businesses from the City to Frankfurt in order to gain access to the single market after 
Brexit. This, in turn, would require European Central Bank supervision and to qualify for this, 
GS was told it would have to increase the assets of its eurozone operations to €30bn.216 
A not unrelated issue is a potential retaliatory protectionist war between the US and the EU 
in which the UK could be caught up. The EU has plans to mirror the 2014 US ‘intermediate 
holding company’ rules that ringfence foreign bank capital. If adopted, US investment banks, 
such as Goldman Sachs, would have to put additional capital and liquidity into their EU 
subsidiaries to protect against another financial crisis and be separately wound up if 
required by the European regulator. Banks regard separately capitalised holding companies 
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and multiple pools of capital in different financial centres and overseen by different 
regulators as inefficient compared with a single pool set and monitored by their home 
regulator. The need for a separately capitalised holding company in Frankfurt, for instance, 
would make London less attractive as a headquarters for European operations. The 
proposed rule changes from Brussels would potentially affect London, once it was no longer 
an EU financial centre.217  
EU regulators are also trying to exercise influence over organisations that remain in London 
after Brexit.  For example, the European Commission has proposed granting the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) regulatory powers over both central 
counterparties or CCPs (i.e., clearing houses) and credit rating agencies based outside of the 
EU, which would include London-based organisations after March 2019.218  
Delegation is another issue over which ESMA is seeking to exercise more control. In July 
2017, ESMA issued guidance to EU national regulators on how to deal with fund manager 
relocations from the UK after Brexit. It said that national regulators dealing with 
‘authorisation’ requests should satisfy themselves that firms do not ‘perform substantially 
more portfolio management and/or risk management functions for the relevant funds in 
their original member states or third country on a delegation basis’. Under the 1985 Ucits 
Directive, fund managers are allowed to delegate certain functions for their EU funds – such 
as portfolio management and risk management – to organisations outside the EU. Peter 
Astleford at lawyer firm Dechert said: ‘US managers in particular will have a wary eye on this 
new manifestation of “Fortress Europe”. The implied and overt requirements for local 
substance, taken literally, show a new and potentially worrying sign for … managers’. Dan 
Waters, managing director of ICI Global – the trade body representing fund managers 
globally – said ‘any restrictions on delegation could impact fund managers globally… The 
language about delegation of portfolio management – and to third countries – is of huge 
concern.  Ucits would not exist in South America or Asia if portfolio management could not 
be delegated. Where is the evidence it is not working?’.219 Stephen Barclay, then City 
minister, said the government ‘strongly supports the global delegation model for portfolio 
management, in partnership with other countries that share our views on this issue. [It 
allowed UK asset managers] to sit at the heart of global investment allocation [and also 
benefitted Europe]. A restricted delegation model would cause fragmentation and prompt 
funds located in Europe [to] leave the continent for other financial centres, such as New 
York or Hong Kong’.220 
A final threat comes from another aspect of EU rules on ‘authorisation’ which it is claimed 
could lead to trillions of pounds worth of derivatives contracts between UK and EU 
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counterparties suddenly becoming illegal if there is ‘no deal’ in March 2019. However, this 
has been dismissed as scaremongering, since it ‘fails to reflect the true position in law. It 
fails to recognise the operation of public international law, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Each of these, in its own way, 
provides for the protection and continuation of contractual rights at the point of Brexit, deal 
or no deal’.221 
14.4 Opportunities 
Mahoney et al. (2016) argue that the single market is so incomplete in terms of services and 
is likely to remain so that it offers limited future benefits. While services comprise 70% of 
the EU’s economy (and 80% of the UK’s), they only account for 20% of intra-EU trade.222 
According to the ONS Pink Book, almost 60% of the UK’s exports in financial services are to 
outside the EU, a higher proportion than for non-financial exports.223  
Mahoney et al. (2016) argue that any EU business lost because of Brexit could, in due 
course, be replaced by ‘bilateral trade agreements with emerging financial centres, such as 
Hong Kong and Singapore, with which the UK has strong historical and cultural ties’. The 
urgency for beginning these negotiations as soon as possible is demonstrated by the EU’s 
complete inability to negotiate trade deals of its own, apart from some very small ones 
mostly with its former colonies. This was shown most starkly by the difficulties facing the EU 
in trying to conclude the €6bn a year Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) with Canada, as a result of Wallonia’s refusal to ratify the agreement in October 
2016. CETA removes 99% of customs duties between Canada and the EU, and Wallonia’s 
heavily subsidised farmers did not like the idea of cheaper Canadian imports. Chrystia 
Freeland, Canada’s trade minister, said: ‘it’s become evident for me…that the European 
Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very 
European values like Canada… I’ve worked very, very hard, but I think it’s impossible. We 
have decided to return home… it is emotional for me’.224 But this is not a one-off, it is 
standard behaviour on the EU side in trade negotiations. In April 2016, France asked the EU 
Commission to delay the restart of trade talks with Mercosur, the Latin American trading 
bloc which includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. Again, it was (French) farmers who did not want competition from 
cheaper Latin American producers.225 
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As James Skinner writes: ‘As an independent nation free from the EU, the UK can finalise its 
own trade deals across the world with countries that are already eager to do business, such 
as Australia, New Zealand and India. Canada has already expressed tremendous interest in 
beginning trade negotiations with the UK and, acting independently, we would not need to 
worry about small regions in the EU causing delays. There would be no need to rely on 27 
other member states agreeing to a deal that will provide significant economic benefits to 
businesses and its consumers, and most importantly, we would not have to wait multiple 
years for parliaments to debate and assess disputes from small populations on the continent 
who only serve their own self-interests’.226  In November 2016, Liam Fox, the international 
trade secretary, announced that the countries that have a free trade agreement (FTA) with 
the EU are willing to continue to deal with the UK on the same terms after Brexit.227 
Brexit also opens up the opportunity for the City to escape from the clutches of both the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)228 and EU regulators and hence enhance its competitive 
position relative to continental financial centres. Mahoney et al. (2016) offer the following 
examples:  
• The bankers’ bonus cap which limits bonuses to 100% of salary or 200% if 
shareholders agree and has had the perverse effect of increasing base pay thereby 
increasing the risk to banks in a market downturn. 
 
• The Working Time Directive which limits the number of hours a worker can work 
each week. 
 
• The proposed financial transactions tax (FTT) of 0.1% on share and bond transactions 
and 0.01% on derivatives which will reduce GDP by more than the tax revenue 
raised. 
 
• The Market Abuse Regulation,229 which is intended to stop insider trading but which 
requires directors with inside information to notify a Person Closely Associated in 
writing, including illiterate children. 
 
• AIFMD to regulate the hedge fund and private equity markets, but according to Jon 
Moulton: ‘I have never yet met an investor who thought it useful – let alone needed 
it’. 
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• More generally, ‘rolling back and simplifying regulation could provide a very big 
boost to the UK financial industry’. 
 
The UK will also avoid the EU’s plans for further financial regulation. The European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESA), the EU’s highest financial regulator, has used Brexit to tighten 
financial sector regulation. Gabriel Bernadino, the chairman, said: ‘We are considering the 
possibilities for further enhancing monitoring of financial industries, reinforcing adequate 
capital or risk buffers’.230 Valdis Dombrovskis, the European Commissioner for Financial 
Stability, Financial Services and the Capital Markets Union, wants to accelerate the EU’s 
move to capital market integration. He said that the ‘possibility of Britain exiting the single 
market just makes the case for Capital Markets Union CMU) stronger and more urgent’. He 
wants a second wave of capital market integration, in areas such as insolvency rules, retail 
banking and infrastructure investment. In particular, he is looking at easing up the Solvency 
II rules for insurers to make it easier for them to invest in infrastructure and wants to 
encourage institutional investors to make greener investments.231 In September 2017, the 
European Commission recommended that ESMA becomes an ‘investigatory hub’ for market 
abuse cases across the EU. Mr Dombrovskis said: ‘The EU needs to act as one player so that 
we can stay ahead of the curve. More integrated financial supervision will make the 
Economic and Monetary Union more resilient’.232  
Another example relates to pension funds. They use over-the-counter swaps bought from 
investment banks to hedge their interest rate and inflation risks. Under the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation, which comes into effect in August 2018, these swaps will 
have to pass through clearing houses which require daily collateral payments to be made in 
the form of variation margin payments. It has been estimated that the cumulative cost of 
these collateral payments will reduce EU pensioners’ retirement income every year by €3bn 
or by 3.1% in the Netherlands and 2.3% in the UK, the two countries with the largest 
pension funds in Europe. Brussels wants to give an exemption to pension funds from EMIR, 
but is being blocked by France which has no pension funds but which wants to use EMIR to 
target overseas clearing houses which are active in the EU as a way of forcing the clearing of 
euro-denominated securities to take place within the eurozone.233 Local government 
pension funds have also been caught up in MiFID II: they will lose their status as professional 
investors and be downgraded to retail investors by default, unless they can be ‘opted up’ to 
professional status again – but this will be a costly and complex exercise.234 Pension funds 
currently come under the IORP II Directive235 – which does not require them to hold costly 
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capital buffers – but the EU wants pension funds to come under the Solvency II Directive – 
which would require them to have capital buffers, since they would effectively become 
insurance companies. This is opposed by the UK and Holland, but is supported by French 
and German insurance companies which argue that pension funds have an unfair advantage 
in competing for pension business. 
Nigel Lawson, chancellor of the exchequer between 1983 and 1989, argues that the 
economic gains from leaving the EU will be substantial: 
If you chart the course of the EU economy as a whole, both before and after the 
advent of the so-called single market, it is clear that it has brought no discernible 
benefit.236  
Our starting point needs to be that we seek the best possible relationship with the 
peoples and governments of Europe, against whom we have no grievance and a 
multiplicity of mutual interests. So far as the single market is concerned, we must 
respect the EU doctrine that to remain a member in any shape or form we would 
have to accept the freedom of EU citizens, beyond those already here, to come and 
live and work in the UK. That is something the British people have, understandably, 
made clear is not on, so we must accept that we will be outside the so-called single 
market.  
That is scarcely a disaster. The rest of the world is outside the single market, and 
trades happily and profitably with the member nations of the EU. You do not need a 
trade agreement in order to trade. Unsurprisingly, even now, our trade with the rest 
of the world, with most of whom we have no trade agreement, is greater than, and 
growing faster than, our trade with the EU. We have always been, and remain, a full 
member of the World Trade Organisation in our own right. 
The banks may be concerned about exit from the single market, and there may 
indeed be some complications for them. But the position of London as one of the only 
two truly global financial centres in the world, and the only one in the European 
timezone, is unassailable. And they have far more to fear from being inside it, 
particularly from further European legislation on banking union and the financial 
transactions tax. 
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….Instead of wasting time on a futile and wholly misguided attempt to secure a trade 
agreement with the EU, the government needs to focus on how we propose to 
conduct ourselves as a self-governing nation outside the bloc. A whole range of issues 
need to be addressed, from the precise nature of our immigration controls (which 
need to be a single system applying to Europeans and non-Europeans alike) to how 
we will support our farmers following our exit from the Common Agricultural Policy. 
There are also some issues that will involve bilateral agreements with individual 
European countries, such as over security cooperation and (with the Irish Republic) 
over our land border with the EU. 
Above all, on the economic front, a study needs to be undertaken of the vast corpus 
of EU regulation to which we are presently subject, to decide which we wish to retain, 
which to amend (and how), and which to scrap altogether. 
There are other economic gains to be secured from Brexit, from not having to pay our 
net annual subscription of some £10bn and rising to our newfound ability to strike 
trade deals with the faster-growing countries of the world. But it is the benefit of 
intelligent deregulation, something that cannot be captured in any theoretical 
economic model but which we demonstrated in the 1980s, that offers the prospect of 
the greatest economic gain. And this is entirely in our own hands, and not a matter of 
negotiations with others. That is what we need to be focused on now.237 
Finally, many believe the City should be doing a lot more to both fight its corner in the EU 
market after Brexit and grow its business outside the EU.  For example, TheCityUK, says 
that: ‘Deepening ties with European companies, old friends like the United States and Japan, 
and new markets like China and India would help Britain preserve its global role in finance 
after leaving the EU’. Chris Cummings said the UK must make more of how much companies 
across Europe rely on Britain's financial services and allied professions like accounting and 
law to do business. The backing of these companies would be important in upcoming UK-EU 
trade talks to ensure continued access to the single market: ‘What I hear from major 
European corporates is they like to do business through London due to the depth of the 
talent pool and capital markets here. As major “buyers” of financial services still want to 
come to London, the “sellers” such as banks are staying put’. He called on the Treasury to 
strengthen its Financial Services Trade and Investment Board. Britain's new trading terms 
with the EU may not be known for several years. John McFarlane, TheCityUK’s chairman 
said: ‘We must now speak confidently and with one voice to policymakers to help inform 
them about the deal we want to see from the upcoming negotiations’.238 
Lord Howard Flight, co-founder of Guinness Flight Global Asset Management and former 
shadow chief secretary to the Treasury, goes further: ‘It is time people woke up in London to 
the opportunities outside of the EU. We’ve been lazy. Particularly the large investment 
banks have been satisfied with the business they could get out of Europe, and making plenty 
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of money out of it. Leaving the EU could wake up this country to the opportunities 
elsewhere where it’s had a lot of historic involvement [such as the Commonwealth 
countries]’.239 
15. Why what the City wants won’t work and is also unnecessary 
The City’s wish was to preserve passporting, but Barney Reynolds, a partner at lawyer 
Shearman & Sterling, believes that a grand bilateral deal between the UK and EU involving 
passporting is ‘completely unexecutable’.  This is because it would be the kind of 
‘sweetheart deal’ that the hardliners in the EU who want to punish the UK would reject, but 
more importantly, ‘you get back into the four freedoms, giving up sovereignty to the ECJ, 
…and harmonised application of identical rules effectively by the same people. It’s 
something I don't believe the UK is going to going to accept’.240   
Mr Reynolds identifies three main concerns in maintaining passports in a report entitled A 
Blueprint for Brexit:241  
• Rule-taking of burdensome EU regulations. In recent times, and in particular 
following the 2008 financial crisis, EU financial services legislation has become 
overly-prescriptive. A number of costly initiatives have been introduced which are 
seen by many as delivering few or no benefits to consumers or regulators. 
Maintaining the passport would require the UK to be a ‘rule-taker’ as regards these 
already inflexible and burdensome standards. The UK would also be required to 
adopt legislation that in the future would be made without the UK's moderating 
influence. EU laws are likely to become even more protectionist and problematic for 
the UK once the UK loses its place on the Council and in the European Parliament 
(EP). 
 
• Supranational bodies. Passporting would likely require the UK to sign up to the 
authority of EU supranational bodies such as the European Banking Association (EBA) 
and ESMA, and to be subject to interpretations issued by the ECJ. 
 
• Free movement and financial contributions. Continued access to the single market 
based on passporting is likely to involve at least some kind of commitment to free 
movement of people and payment towards the EU budget. 
Mr Reynolds pointed out that the prime minister has ruled out arrangements which do not 
involve controls over EU immigration and a return of sovereignty: ‘Let me be clear — we are 
not leaving the EU only to give up control of immigration again. And we are not leaving only 
to return to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice’. In any event, given the vote, 
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the UK should ensure it is able to regulate its own markets taking into account local 
conditions and needs, based on its traditionally key values of free and clean markets, 
systemic risk protection and consumer protection. The UK will face difficulty achieving these 
important goals if it maintains the passport. 
A whole range of individuals and organisations have said passports are unnecessary:  
• Barney Reynolds: ‘When I started in the City in the 1991, I was doing a lot of work 
around cross-border business.  We didn't have a passport and there was a very 
limited passport introduced in 1995. The proper passport was rolled out in 2007 
[when MiFID I came into force].  The idea that [the future of the City] is dependent 
on this new-fangled thing that’s only been in existence properly since 2007 is utterly 
absurd’.242 
 
• Angela Knight argues that there are two big mistakes the City could make now: ‘The 
first is try and recreate being part of the single market.  That isn’t what was voted 
for.  The people in the country are now much more gung-ho about Brexit actually 
than they were before the vote; [also] there is still very little sympathy for financial 
services industry….The second very big mistake [would be] if each part of the 
financial services industry [proposes] what it would like, runs off and tries to sell it 
both to the UK government and on into the European arena – because all that will 
[indicate is that] the Brits don’t know what the hell they want…So if ever there was a 
time for coherency, it’s now’.243 
 
• Financial News assembled a panel of entrepreneurs in September 2016. None of the 
entrepreneurs thought that their businesses would suffer if the UK were to lose 
passporting rights. Michael Spencer, CEO of Icap, said ‘Today, we can’t think of any 
business that we currently do that would be adversely impacted at the moment’. 
David Harding, CEO of asset manager Winton, agreed: ‘It won’t have any impact, as 
far as I can see, on my business from the raising funds end in Europe, or the investor 
end in Europe’. Anne Glover, CEO of Amadeus Capital Partners, while accepting this, 
had some concerns about private equity: ‘Frankly, I am not totally convinced that it 
makes a huge difference, as long as they don’t abolish the existing private placement 
regimes. We don’t want to go AIFMD simply because we don’t need custodians, we 
don’t need depositaries – that is just overkill for what we do. I think the private 
equity industry will be in more difficulty, because they will need to be approved as a 
third-country player and approvals under AIFMD [which would allow non-EU players 
to operate freely inside the EU] have been slow’.244 
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• Moody’s Investors Services accepts that the loss of passports would be ‘manageable’ 
for most banks and financial services firms: ‘The direct impact is likely to be modest. 
The greater impact would be felt through higher costs and diversion of management 
attention, as the companies concerned restructure, reducing profitability for a time. 
This is credit negative but manageable. And other critical factors such as capital and 
liquidity, which are largely determined by global standards, are unlikely to face 
material changes due to Brexit per se’.245   
 
• The Tax Incentivised Savings Association (TISA) told the Treasury that it would like 
the government to seek equivalence rather than full membership of the single 
market, since passporting, as well as the free movement of people, are not essential 
for its member firms, which include asset managers. TISA director general David 
Dalton-Brown says equivalence would be a ‘win-win opportunity’: ‘Many of the EU 
directives, like AIFMD and MiFID II, already embody the concept and through 
enabling legislation it can be added to others, such as UCITS’. Equivalence would 
‘facilitate the continuation of existing business’ and minimise impact on the financial 
services sector’s 113,000 UK jobs dependent on European Union trade. The 
government should task the FCA to start work immediately on a domestic-only 
version of the regulatory rulebook: ‘This should focus on cutting away most of the 
paperwork that consumers are expected to wade through to open a savings and 
investments account’. While freedom of movement is not essential for the industry, 
the government needs to streamline the visa process in order to get the best 
financial services professionals from Europe and around the globe ‘without delays or 
hindrance’.246 
 
• The Association of Investment Companies also told the Treasury that it does not 
want the government to pursue passporting if it means ending access on a country-
by-country basis. Instead, it wants a tailored UK regime which sheds ‘unhelpful’ EU 
regulation for products that are not actively marketed to European investors. 
Around 95% of investment company investors are from the UK. Ian Sayers, CEO of 
the AIC, says: ‘We are cautious about seeking a full passport for EU-wide access “at 
all costs”’. Unlike UCITS funds, investment companies currently do not have access 
to the full EU passport and instead access investors there on a country-by-country 
basis (via the national private placement regimes). This allows alternative investment 
fund managers to market products that cannot otherwise do so under the AIFMD 
domestic marketing or passporting regimes.247 
 
• David Wighton of Financial News also accepts that ‘Even the most diehard 
supporters of the current system admit that in many cases it would not be a big deal. 
Passports are convenient but many firms could without too much bother go back to 
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the way they did business in the 1990s, before passports were introduced, 
[although] some firms have structured their businesses entirely around 
passports,….[and] fear (rightly or wrongly) that without passports (or something like 
them) they will have to shift a fair chunk of their operations into other EU 
countries’.248 
 
• Even TheCityUK has given up hope of retaining passporting, in the light of the 
government showing little interest in the idea. Instead, Miles Celic is looking for a 
‘bespoke deal’, based on equivalence, which is tailored to the needs of the UK: ‘It 
would protect London as a market and those European customers using it. That’s an 
advantage not only for the UK, but for the EU too’.249 
 
Another problem with the UK retaining passporting as part of a FTA with the EU post-Brexit 
is that it could have implications for the other FTAs that the EU has signed’ such as the EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Chris Bryant from lawyers Berwin 
Leighton Paisner says that if the EU offers better terms to another country, such as the UK, 
it will then have to offer the same terms to Canada (with some exceptions). The EU might be 
unwilling to do this.250 
However, it’s more than just passporting. A ‘soft Brexit’ just will not work, according to 
Stanislas Yassukovich, the Euromarket pioneer who was Chairman of the Securities 
Association, Deputy Chairman of the Stock Exchange and Chairman of Merrill Lynch Europe, 
Middle East and Africa during and after Big Bang:   
“Soft Brexit” is a mirage. It has as much chance as the proverbial snowball in Hades. 
For the Masters of the EUniverse to grant concessions to even its most important 
member would pull the plug on the entire project. The stampede for concessions by 
the remaining members would be unstoppable. This has been made crystal clear by 
any number of leading Eurocrats. Yet the dream persists. At least the quest for the 
Holy Grail, an equally impossible mission, raised the moral tone of knighthood in the 
early Middle Ages. The quest for “soft Brexit” wastes time and money, delays the 
necessary reforms of affected economic sectors, and the onset of the clear benefits of 
leaving the EU. 
…[The EU is a customs union, but] a customs union does not stop non-members from 
accessing it. It only stops its members from forging trade ties with third countries. 
The US exports more to the EU than does the UK, and Japan is not far behind. 
And despite the fact that the expression “single market” is the most utilised in every 
discussion, the EU is only partially a single market. None exists in services – now the 
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largest sector of the British economy. The red herring about access for the City to a 
totally fictional single market in financial services is slowly drowning in a sea of truth. 
The only way the EU could stop its institutions from accessing the City’s wholesale 
markets post-Brexit would be by imposing exchange controls. And financial retailers 
have a relatively low cost option for marketing to continental savers/investors 
through Luxembourg subsidiaries – as do American asset managers. Under General 
Agreement on Trade in Services rules against non-tariff barriers, they can’t be 
blocked. So financial services are a non-issue. 
Even if it finally perceives this truth, through a fog of misleading statements by City 
lobbyists, the government will spend months trying to do a single market “deal” for 
physical exports, when the UK’s tariff exposure under WTO rules would be less than 
average fluctuations in exchange rates. In fact, taking into account its contribution to 
the EU budget, the UK’s average tariff in trading with the EU has been more than 
that suffered by the US – not a single market member. 
Does anyone really think that EU leaders are bluffing when they say absolutely no 
concessions on free movement? Can one imagine the implications for the highly 
restive eastern European members, if it gave in on this sacred principle? Forget the 
EU’s trade balance. Politics will always trump economics in Brussels. There can be no 
separation between practical proposals on trade issues and the simple and 
fundamental principle of free movement of people within the EU, regardless of how 
they achieved entrance in the first place. The issues are inextricably linked in the 
minds of Eurocrats now desperate to keep ‘le grand projet’ alive in the face of a 
hundred unkind economic and political cuts. 
The apparent concession for temporary suspension of uncontrolled immigration won 
by David Cameron was still entirely subject to EU discretion on its duration and 
conditions of implementation. It in no way returned border control to British 
jurisdiction. And in this context, there was never any reason to believe the UK would 
abandon its centuries-old tradition of importing needed skills from anywhere in the 
world. 
Now, by seeking to secure an impossible and relatively economically immaterial 
“deal” on so-called single market access, we are jeopardising the bespoke trade deals 
we could do in certain sectors once the UK becomes a fully independent country. The 
balance of economic and political advantage is overwhelmingly in favour of a clean 
break with the EU’s dilution of national sovereignty and its protectionist and limited 
single market. 
The Leave campaign successfully identified a national, gut feeling that “something 
was wrong” about a sacrifice of sovereignty on such matters as border control and 
the judicial system. Now the public’s resolve must be strengthened by an educational 
blitz on the true nature and limited scope of the much vaunted “single market”, on 
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the benefits of leaving it and its restrictions, and by a slaying of the false dragons 
being kept alive by Remainer misrepresentations.251 
Mr Yassukovich develops his ideas in a subsequent Financial Times article: 
There is confusion over the fate of the UK service economy after Brexit, particularly 
where the City of London is concerned. Misunderstandings threaten a proper 
discussion and, worse still, run the risk of wasting diplomatic capital in the Brexit 
negotiations.  
Commentators and even Treasury officials keep repeating the mantra that “the City 
must have access to the single market”. But there is effectively no single market in 
services in the EU, and certainly not in financial services. For example, a qualified 
German hairdresser must requalify to practice in France (and there are two different 
qualifications, domicile and shop), and an English solicitor cannot provide 
conveyance for a residential property sale in most EU countries.  
As there is no banking union, no unified capital market and no European stock 
exchange, the regulation of financial services, focused largely on investor protection, 
is at national not EU level. Every industrialised nation, including the US, has investor 
protection legislation which requires overseas providers to undergo some form of 
registration and authorisation. And these requirements are exempted from the 
restrictions on non-tariff barriers in the General Agreement on Trade in Services.  
The concept of “passporting” was designed to allow a financial institution authorised 
in one EU member state to apply for passports to market financial products in other 
member states without the need of further authorisation. It is open to firms in non-
member states to establish a presence in one EU state and apply for passports from 
there. Luxembourg tends to be the location of choice for obvious tax reasons. After 
Brexit, UK firms, which have shown little interest in penetrating retail markets on the 
continent, will remain free to set up subsidiaries in the EU to acquire relevant 
passports.  
In the absence of a single market, strongly resisted by EU members highly protective 
of their own regulatory regimes (including the UK), an attempt was made to 
introduce a single standard for retail products, resulting in the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive, roundly ignored by France and other EU countries, but strictly 
observed by the UK. It was hoped the passport system would introduce competition 
within the EU. But this has not happened and the core retail financial activities — 
residential mortgages, deposit and savings products and so on — remain almost 
entirely national, and highly protected.  
So the concern about “access” must refer to the City’s wholesale business, by far the 
most important component of its position as the world’s premier financial centre. But 
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wholesale financial services are purchased at source by professional clients, even 
those who do not maintain a presence themselves in the City, as so many do. EU 
institutions also buy wholesale services in the other financial centres of the world, 
such as New York, Dubai, Hong Kong and Tokyo.   
There is no passport requirement to have orders executed on the City’s exchanges, 
any more than for orders on those in New York, Chicago or Tokyo. The world’s banks 
do not need a passport to access London’s interbank market, which is global, or to 
buy or sell foreign currency, or to participate in capital market syndicates. Nor do 
companies need one to buy reinsurance at Lloyd’s, engage corporate finance and 
M&A advisers or procure a host of other City services delivered at source.  
So now a new threat is perceived by Brexit sceptics: that the EU may deny its 
institutions access to the City. Although, the EU cuts itself off from the world in many 
ways, it has yet to ban its citizens from contracting services outside its borders.  
…Access to the EU single market in financial services is not an issue — simply 
because, effectively, there isn’t one. As it did when the UK did not adopt the euro, the 
City should just get on with business as usual.252 
It took until January 2017 before the City abandoned the idea of passporting as being 
unworkable after Brexit.253 
16. What are the alternatives to what the City wants? 
In this section, we look at a number of alternatives to passporting that have been proposed. 
16.1 Enhanced equivalence model 
An alternative is the ‘third-country equivalence regime’ under the EU’s MiFID II legislation 
which came into force in January 2018. This covers the entirety of investment businesses, 
including banks doing their investment business.254  
Barney Reynolds proposes an ‘enhanced equivalence’ model which does not import the 
‘four freedoms’ or other concessions on sovereignty. This would involve the UK:255 
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• Removing the most unnecessarily onerous requirements of EU legislation, provided 
that their absence would not affect necessary equivalence determinations 
 
• Moving, so far as possible, while maintaining equivalence, away from the EU's 
process-focused approach to an approach based on outcomes 
 
• Re-drafting, so far as possible, while maintaining equivalence, laws in common law 
style, which would bring with it far greater certainty. This would also remove the 
additional, more hidden blanket of laws imported by implication into the EU regime 
by the so-called ‘purposive’ method of interpretation, in contrast with the more 
direct textual reading of the relevant provisions under the common law tradition 
 
• Moving away from poor ECJ decision-making in the financial services context. ECJ 
reasoning often operates less straightforwardly than judicial practice in the UK, and 
in any event is too condensed and insufficiently focused on fact-based analysis to 
provide the clarity that the common law brings with it, and removing laws designed 
to provide for the EU single market and for regulating competition within the EU. 
According to Mr Reynolds, there would only be two key issues to resolve during the Brexit 
negotiations: 
• Complete coverage of equivalence-based access. The EU should expand the 
availability of ‘equivalence’ regimes to cover certain ‘gaps’ in the current framework, 
which largely result from historic reasons. These include lending, primary insurance, 
insurance mediation, mortgage credit, settlement finality and other matters. 
Similarly, the UK should ensure that EU institutions can continue to access UK 
markets through the overseas person exclusion, expanded as necessary and by 
introducing a reciprocal equivalence regime for branches 
 
• The EU and UK should treat each other fairly in assessing whether their respective 
rules are equivalent. It should be recognised that ‘equivalent’ laws are not the same 
as ‘identical’ laws. The EU has not required third-country laws to be identical for 
equivalence determinations thus far, and a similar standard should be applied to the 
UK, without political interference. Even after making some of the changes discussed 
here, many of the UK's laws should be sufficiently similar to those of the EU on Brexit 
and thereafter that both the UK and the EU should be able to make reciprocal 
equivalence determinations, provided that they treat each other fairly and in a 
depoliticised manner. 
If the UK had equivalence-based access on this basis, then Mr Reynolds argues that this 
‘would allow for reciprocity and mutual benefit between the UK and the EU. Mutual access 
between the EU and UK would be premised on equivalence between the two jurisdictions, 
providing for strong, open relations between the EU and the UK and delivering the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Politeia, July; Barnabas Reynolds (2018) Enhanced Equivalence – A Win-Win Proposition, New Direction and 
Politeia, February. 
77 
 
advantages of access from the EU to the City, the main financial market in its time zones. 
Although a satisfactory resolution to the two issues… would deliver broad equivalence-
based access to the EU, the UK and EU could go further than this to reflect the historical, 
geographical and cultural importance of the relationship between the two. An additional 
agreement could be sought between the UK and EU on a procedural framework for 
establishing, maintaining and withdrawing equivalence for the future. That would give 
certainty to both parties and to financial markets participants across Europe….Institutions 
from a number of other countries enjoy this status under various pieces of existing EU 
legislation, including companies incorporated in the US, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Canada, Mexico and others. Given the UK's close political, geographical and economic ties to 
the EU, it is likely that an equivalence regime will be even more successful and mutually 
beneficial than it is in other jurisdictions’. 
The EU, despite its protectionist inclinations: has signed the Maastricht Treaty with its 
commitment to free capital movement; participates in the Bank for International 
Settlements, the central bankers club, which aims to ensure that financial markets remain 
open and non-discriminatory by requiring the same rules to be applied everywhere; and 
should recognise that companies in the EU will not be able to raise the capital they need 
without being able to access the City. On top of this, the US government is adamant that 
equivalence should mean what it says.256 
Mr Reynolds is therefore reasonably confident that the EU will accept the enhanced 
equivalence model if they are being rational: ‘All the existing equivalence based laws are 
invoked by the UK and we have basically a coverage of maybe 80%-85% of the financial 
markets…I think they're going to give it to us because … if they don’t, it hurts them more 
than it hurt us.  There are all sorts of reasons behind that, it hurts their branches in London, 
it hurts their access to liquidity, it hurts their access to capital funding, it just basically 
imposes costs on them. … I think it is even more likely [that] they’ll plug the gaps in the 
equivalence regimes, most of them historical anomalies. The fact that Capital Requirements 
Directive IV hasn’t got an equivalence regime is not some deliberate measure in my view. I 
think it’s because MiFID II had it and this was introduced subsequently, so that’s unfinished 
business with CRD IV.  [Similarly] with various of the other holes. The one question mark is 
over primary insurance. I think that wasn’t considered in Solvency II because there's no one 
in our time zone capable of offering retail insurance or primary insurance to the EU markets. 
It wasn’t really relevant, it is relevant now.  I don’t see why the EU wouldn't wish to have 
access to cheap products subject to equivalent standards… [Nevertheless], equivalence is 
not a “must” at any cost. The UK needs to have flexibility in redrafting its laws to be in line 
with international standards while still being deemed “equivalent”’.257 
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Some in the EU show signs of not being rational. For example, the French Finance Minister, 
Bruno Le Maire, says that the EU will not enter into a financial services deal with the UK 
because it will conflict with the EU’s requirements for financial stability and effective 
supervision. But, as Barney Reynolds argues:  
This ignores the fact that the EU already has negotiated equivalence-based 
arrangements with the US for the most systemically risky portion of the market, 
clearing houses, and has similar arrangements in place with many financial sectors 
across the world covering a whole patchwork of financial services provision. It has 
not previously been suggested that financial stability is at risk, and indeed several US 
clearing houses operated with EU customers throughout the 2007-8 crisis without 
hiccup. 
As for supervision after Brexit, under the equivalence concept this would be, as is 
current practice, conducted in the recognised country, in this case the UK. Given the 
UK has some of the best regulators in the world, with decades of proven experience 
and expertise (and upon whom the entire EU system already places huge reliance), 
raising that topic in the context of whether to rely on equivalence is clearly spurious. 
In fact Enhanced Equivalence allows the markets to be run far more safely, avoiding 
the tensions between the global markets located in the UK and the more specific 
markets across the EU27.  
Indeed it was partly the EU’s passport regime operating in the run-up to the 2007-8 
crisis, through the attempted harmonisation of rules across the EU, which led to 
dangerous regulatory arbitrage and then the credit crisis. The UK was, as a result of 
belonging to that system, held back in its supervision by having to operate within a 
structure in which some EU member state regulators were openly offering not to 
apply certain key (and expensive) rules in return for business being located there. 
After the financial crisis the EU has sought to address this problem by federalising 
control over supervision, but largely through prescriptive rulemaking, which has 
introduced new risk into regulation. The fact is that one size cannot fit all in 
regulation or supervision, particularly between the UK’s global financial markets and 
the very different markets in the EU27.  
A new arrangement of Enhanced Equivalence, where the UK achieves the same 
internationally recognised outcomes through its world-class regulatory system is 
intrinsically a far safer way of proceeding and reflects the approach the EU is already 
rightly comfortable with for the US and elsewhere. 
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The EU maintains that it will not outsource the writing, interpretation or enforcement 
of its regulations to an outside party. Maybe so, but in fact no such outsourcing 
would be required under the Enhanced Equivalence arrangements proposed here. 
The EU would continue to set its own requirements and could change them when it 
likes. Where the UK standards meet the same high level outcomes, by whatever 
means, there would be mutual recognition. Where those outcomes are not met, there 
would be a proportionate forfeiture of access after the point has been properly 
checked procedurally, if necessary by an independent arbitral body. 
Brussels is also concerned to ensure the UK is not overly competitive. But this politics 
of punishment would never be accepted by the UK. More importantly, it would 
damage the prosperity of the EU27’s citizens and could not for that reason be put 
forward in good faith by those who are democratically accountable. The whole world 
is competitive. The EU27 cannot reject that or seek to cushion competition within the 
EU timezones with the UK alone. You don’t win a race by tugging at the shorts of the 
next runner – at least not over any sustainable period. A competitive City of London is 
essential to provide low-cost growth capital to EU businesses and to finance 
consumers’ lives. 
Some work is needed to achieve the best arrangements under Enhanced Equivalence. 
The EU’s existing equivalence regime would need some tweaks. The current regime, 
with its one-way, unilateral equivalence determinations, does not go far enough to 
avoid uncertainty and therefore potential harm. Many institutions have made clear 
that on that basis they would feel forced to establish infrastructure in the EU27, 
which is where the costs charged back to EU citizens start escalating. The markets 
and commentators have made clear that the global markets will remain in the City of 
London, so the fragmentation merely leads to significant cost being pushed onto 
EU27 citizens…. 
This is a pivotal moment for the EU. The efficacy and accountability of its core 
institutions is being tested before the curious eyes of the world, wondering what the 
true nature of the emerging EU will be. If this test is failed, EU citizens are likely to 
wonder why their aspirations for economic growth and opportunity have been 
dashed to satisfy a bureaucratic ideal. In order to minimise the risk of such an 
outcome, UK citizens will want to see that their leaders have reached out to the EU27 
publics in some way and have not blindly persevered in negotiating with institutions 
which might be structurally incapable of reaching a win-win outcome.258 
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Others have also proposed the third-country route. For example, Mahoney et al. (2016) 
argue that in a post-Brexit world, the UK could establish third-country status in many areas: 
‘A recent measure by ESMA, for example, could provide a blueprint for UK financial service 
firms. ESMA’s passporting rules now mean that asset managers in some countries outside 
the EU can continue offering services to investors across Europe, replacing the previous 
system of country-by-country private placement authorisation. It should be noted, however, 
that third-country arrangements do not exist in some areas such as payment systems 
providers, which could prove to be more problematic’. 
Similarly, Simon Currie, private investment funds partner at lawyers Morgan Lewis, also 
agrees that the third-country regimes legislation provides a route for firms located in non-
member states – in particular, in asset management – to access the single market: 
Third-country regimes are a feature of a number of EU legislative acts, most notably 
the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive and the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Regulation and could serve to substantially mitigate the effect on UK 
fund managers and investment firms of a UK withdrawal from the EU. In broad 
terms, these regimes permit access to the EU market on the basis of an assessment 
of the suitability or equivalence of the regulatory regime in the country where the 
third-country firm is based.  
Subject to this assessment, in the case of the AIFMD, a fund manager from outside 
the EU could opt into the regulatory regime under the directive in order to market its 
funds (whether or not established in the EU) to EU investors and to manage EU funds, 
either on a cross-border basis or via the establishment of branches in the EU.  
The application of the AIFMD third-country regime to a particular country is 
dependent upon ESMA advising the EU Commission that there are no significant 
obstacles to doing so. Thus, the manager would benefit from passporting rights and 
would not need to establish a presence in the EU in order to do so. This extended 
passport is a hybrid in the sense that, unlike passporting for EU firms, the regulatory 
authorisation of the third-country firm in its home territory would not be sufficient, 
and it would be necessary for the firm to be authorised and supervised in relation to 
activities undertaken within the EU by an EU regulator.  
So a UK fund manager, following a UK exit from the EU and an extension of the 
AIFMD third-country regime to the UK, would need to be authorised in an EU country 
as well as being authorised in the UK by the Financial Conduct Authority in order to 
conduct cross-border business. This dual regulation would inevitably impose an 
additional burden, but should otherwise enable UK firms to market and manage 
funds across the EU in a very similar way to that presently applying. It ought to be an 
attractive alternative to establishing a separate affiliate in the EU.     
Similarly MiFIR, [which came] into effect in January 2018, entitles third-country 
investment firms to provide investment services to professional clients across the EU 
upon registration with ESMA. Although somewhat more limited in its scope, this also 
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has the potential to ameliorate, at least in part, the adverse impact of a UK exit from 
the EU on the ability of UK investment firms to conduct cross-border business. 
The application of the AIFMD third-country regime to a particular country is 
dependent upon ESMA advising the EU Commission that there are no significant 
obstacles to doing so. No acceptance by the country in question of free movement of 
people is required. ESMA has already advised the Commission that the AIFMD 
passport can be extended to fund managers in Guernsey, Jersey and Switzerland 
(although the Commission has not yet acted upon this advice).   
An extension of the MiFIR regime to a country requires the Commission first to have 
determined that the legal and supervisory regime in the relevant country is 
equivalent to that under applicable European standards but, again, does not impose 
any acceptance of free movement principles. 
Since the UK has implemented the AIFMD and will have implemented the recast 
MiFIR regime prior to any Brexit taking effect, it should be technically 
straightforward for the Commission to permit UK fund managers and investment 
firms to take advantage of these third-country rights following a Brexit. 
No doubt political issues will complicate the process, but ensuring that UK firms are 
able to use these rights ought to be an important component of any exit 
negotiations.259  
In December 2017, the Bank of England’s Prudential Regulatory Authority proposed 
permitting EEA branches to convert to third-country branches.260  There are 77 branches of 
‘incoming’ EU and other European Economic Area (EEA) banks operating in the UK that are 
authorised to take deposits and they lend more than £1trn (or 15 per cent of all loans) to UK 
residents. The PRA argues that a third-country regime is permissible where there is good 
regulatory cooperation with the host country.  This is particularly useful for systemically 
important wholesale banks, since the PRA can influence supervisory outcomes for the whole 
group, including the UK branch, via the existing college system or by bilateral engagement 
combined with prompt information exchange. It still allows the PRA to impose extra 
governance requirements under the senior managers’ regime, restrict the branch’s business 
model or impose additional liquidity requirements.   
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The proposal has been described as sensible and pragmatic by Simon Hills, Director of 
Prudential Policy at UK Finance.261 He suggests it would be helpful if the EU adopted a 
similar approach to UK banks, since these ‘outgoing’ banks are important for EU-based 
buyers of financial services: for every €1 spent by a UK buyer with an EU-based financial 
services company, EU-based buyers spend more than €6 purchasing financial services from 
UK-based companies. UK Finance supports an ambitious EU-UK free trade agreement for 
financial services which would involve ‘a variable approach depending on the likely levels of 
supervisory concern, a symmetrical approach based on mutual acceptance of regulatory and 
supervisory cooperation and reciprocity, and the need for an adaptable cross-border 
financial services framework that can respond to technological developments or other 
changes. Its application to the supply of outgoing financial services would ensure that EU 
companies could continue to use London’s international financial services centre to meet 
their financing and risk management needs’. UK Finance believes the same approach could 
be applied to all regulatory cooperation in global financial services, not just with the EU. This 
is because it is important that international standards, such as the Basel framework for 
prudential banking regulation, are applied in a harmonised way based on transparent 
implementation and mutual trust between supervisors around the world.262 
16.2 Mutual recognition  
Another option which would achieve a similar result as enhanced equivalence is ‘mutual 
recognition’ through ‘mutual market access’, a new concept proposed by the International 
Regulatory Strategy Group (IRSG) which is affiliated to TheCityUK.263 This assumes that 
financial services regulation and supervision in the UK and EU would remain aligned in the 
future. This would be achieved by having post-Brexit rule setting in the two jurisdictions 
jointly monitored by a Forum for Regulatory Alignment.  
However, Barney Reynolds is concerned ‘with inventing a new concept [on account of] its 
potential to open a Pandora’s box of new negotiating points. That could ultimately lead to a 
weaker solution or an attempt by the EU to restrict the UK’s approach to tax, competition 
and other areas of policy, which has long been a concern for the French’.264 Nevertheless, 
this option appears to be gathering increasing support in the UK, including from the prime 
minister in her Mansion House speech on 2 March 2018,265 the chancellor Philip Hammond, 
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the secretary of state for leaving the EU David Davis, and the Bank of England governor 
Mark Carney. 
On the other hand, Lord John Kerr, the former British Ambassador to the EU who drafted 
Article 50, didn’t see this option working all, believing instead that only the equivalence 
option will be offered on the grounds that ‘the City needed to prepare for a deal that would 
ultimately hurt London’s standing as a global financial centre’, since equivalence can be 
withdrawn at short notice and is open to manipulation for political purposes. The rationale 
for this view is the EU’s negotiating guidelines for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU which 
referenced an aim to use improved equivalence mechanisms for future financial services 
trade between the EU and UK.266 
16.3 Special hybrid (Swiss insurance model) 
The former trade minister, Mark Garnier, has suggested that the UK might seek ‘a special 
hybrid’, a bilateral arrangement that was better than equivalence but different from a 
passport.267 It would be similar to the EU-Swiss deal on insurance. However, Mr Garnier 
conceded that ‘It is entirely possible that we will just have to adopt the rules of the EU as 
they come down with regards to financial regulation. A new arrangement along these lines 
would depend on creating the right dialogue to craft a system that works for both the UK 
and the EU’.268 
Two variations on this model have been proposed by the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA) in a working paper entitled European Capital Market Integration Post-
Brexit released in October 2016. The first would be a ‘bespoke bilateral agreement’ with the 
EU that gives it access to the single market through a recognition of equivalence between 
UK and EU financial services regulation. But the paper recognises that gaining equivalence 
could be a drawn-out task and could be revoked later by the EU: ‘It is not clear to what 
extent a bilateral agreement between the UK and the EU27 would preserve capital market 
integration between London and financial centres in the EU27: for example, whether banks 
would have to maintain two separate balance sheets, one for the UK and one for the EU27, 
which would be more expensive – in terms of capital and liquidity – than the single balance 
sheet they need within the EU at present’.  
The second would be a ‘separate sectoral agreement’ with the result that ‘the City of 
London – as a European financial asset – would in practice remain “in”, while the UK as a 
whole would come “out” of the EU’. However, the report recognises that there are ‘few 
precedents for the bilateral negotiation of financial services’, so if the agreement takes 
                                                                                                                                                                     
16 February 2018; Tim Wallace (2018) Hopes grow of a bespoke Brexit deal for the City, Daily Telegraph, 17 
February. 
266 Lucy McNulty (2018) Article 50 Author tells the City to forget about planning for a bespoke Brexit, Financial 
News, 9 April. 
267 Alex Barker and Jim Brunsden (2016) EU reconsiders financial market access rules, Financial Times, 6 
November. 
268 Timothy Ross (2016) Banks likely to lose passporting with Brexit, official says, Bloomberg News, 26 October. 
84 
 
longer than two years to negotiate, an interim agreement would need to be put in place to 
avoid a cliff edge whereby the regulatory regime changes overnight.269   
A similar proposal has been made by Geoff Raby and Andrew Stoler who argue that the UK 
should just participate in the Capital Markets Union. The CMU project aims to reduce 
fragmentation in financial markets, diversify financing services, strengthen cross-border 
capital flows, and improve access to finance for business. It is particularly concerned about 
the removal of regulatory barriers, rather than an attempt to promote further integration 
among member states under a single market supervisor. The UK has traditionally been the 
EU’s strongest supporter of CMU.270 
Another suggestion for limited participation is for the UK to participate in the Trade in 
Services Agreement (TiSA). TiSA is currently being negotiated between the EU and key WTO 
members, which together account for 70% of total world trade in services. The UK is a 
member of the WTO and the EU has services schedules which are specific to member states. 
For example, some member states are unwilling to allow foreign competition in some 
service sectors and have corresponding TiSA carve outs; by contrast the UK places no 
restrictions on foreign providers of services to the UK.271 
16.4 Dual regulatory regime (Channel Islands model) 
Some have proposed a dual regulatory regime such as that operating in Jersey which, as one 
of the Channel Islands, is not formally in either the UK or the EU.  It has much lighter 
regulation than the EU, but offers an equivalent regulatory regime for firms that want to 
access the single market. Dominic Johnson, CEO of Somerset Capital Management and chair 
of lobby group New City Initiative, said: ‘It would be ideal to have a dual funds regime in the 
same way as Jersey; this would be perfect. This would allow companies to participate in the 
EU market if they wanted to’.272  
The dual regulatory system would operate as follows: 
• EU equivalence – UK companies providing wholesale investment services — principal 
and agency broking/dealing, custody services, fund management outside the scope 
of the AIFMD, and investment advice —  to corporates, financial institutions, 
insurers, funds (including pension funds), fund managers, governments and 
sophisticated investors in the EU would comply with EU regulations in respect of 
prudential and conduct of business requirements when operating in the EU. They 
would only need to set up branches rather than subsidiaries to do this. 
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• UK and ROW – the UK would then establish a regulatory framework that is best 
suited for UK companies operating outside the EU. 
16.5 Multi-layered approach (Country-by-country model) 
The Association of Investment Companies supports a multi-layered approach to fund 
regulation once the UK leaves the EU. European rules would only be imposed if the funds 
were marketed within the EU. There would be separate rules for funds marketed in the UK 
and globally, funds accessing the EU on a country-by-country basis, and those selling into 
Europe on a passport basis. Investment trusts currently do not have access to a full EU 
passport, unlike UCITS funds, but does have country-by-country access.  
CEO Ian Sayers supports the layered approach because: ‘It would maintain strong regulatory 
standards for investors but also reduce unnecessary compliance burdens. It would maximise 
the UK's ability to reduce costs, enhance competition and support investment in the UK 
economy. Where funds actively seek EU investors, EU rules would be overlaid. The rules 
allowing investment companies to market into individual EU countries work well and can be 
used to target additional demand effectively. It is unlikely that the additional compliance 
costs that come with a full passport would outweigh the benefits of any extra marginal 
demand. Even UCITS, which have had a full EU passport for many years, have limited cross-
border distribution in practice’.273 
16.6 Establish a fully capitalised subsidiary (Swiss banking model) 
In this model, firms operate through subsidiaries without passporting rights. Such firms also 
use distribution or servicing hubs within the EU, such as Luxembourg or Dublin. These take 
advantage of local knowledge and expertise, or deal with indirect obstacles to trade within 
the single market for services, such as tax.274 Swiss banks run their European investment 
banking businesses, via London subsidiaries, which is why this is also known as the ‘Swiss 
banking’ model.  
While this is a fail-safe solution guaranteeing access, it is expensive. As Simon Gleeson, a 
regulatory partner at Clifford Chance, points out: ‘If there is no compromise between the UK 
and the EU on financial services, both global and EU banks will have a choice between 
committing more capital to new subsidiaries to retain existing business, thereby reducing 
return on equity, or simply forgoing those revenue streams, thereby also reducing profits. In 
an environment where low levels of bank returns are acknowledged as a key threat to 
stability, that is not good’.275 Further, there will be certain business areas that are 
unprofitable, such as retail banking business (deposit-taking and lending) in other EU states: 
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the markets are very competitive and the City’s share in these markets is negligible, so this 
model will not be appropriate in this case.276  
16.7 The World Financial Centre model 
Barney Reynolds recognises that the enhanced equivalence model might not be achievable 
for various reasons: plugging the gaps in existing equivalence regimes is not politically 
acceptable, equivalence determinations are not forthcoming, the equivalence-based 
approach is unattractive for certain areas, such as the regulation of alternative investment 
funds, or the EU requires such a high degree of conformity with EU laws in order to be 
deemed equivalent that the UK is in practice unable to make the significant and meaningful 
changes to its rules that the UK is likely to wish to make. 
Under these circumstances, Mr Reynolds believes ‘The UK should be ready to adopt the “go 
it alone” [World] Financial Centre model. That would give the country freedom to design a 
more attractive regulatory framework, freed of the EU’s restrictive policy and process-
driven approach, based on global standards. Not only would such a model attract business 
and liquidity to the UK, which would be operating as an entirely free-market financial 
centre, it would liberate financial services from the burden and increasing uncertainty of EU 
regulation. Some business may be attracted from the EU itself to the UK. But more 
importantly, businesses from around the world, when comparing the UK to the EU (or 
indeed the UK to other jurisdictions, such as New York), would see a market-friendly 
regulatory framework, enabling them to flourish, providing for free and clean markets, 
systemic risk protection and consumer protection….It would be possible for almost all parts 
of the financial sector in the UK to carry on providing services to EU and global customers 
without interruption. By building upon the UK’s natural advantages, of time-zone, English 
law and language, and an established financial ecosystem and talent pool, the UK can create 
a highly competitive (and indeed enhanced) environment for the City outside the EU’.277   
Under the World Financial Centre model, the UK would reconsider its entire regulatory 
framework. This would involve the following changes which go further than the enhanced 
equivalence model:278 
• Removing not only those particularly burdensome rules that could not be removed 
under the enhanced equivalence model, but also scrutinising and tailoring its 
regulatory requirements across the board 
 
• A complete shift from the EU's process-focused approach to a more tailored 
approach based on outcomes 
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• A comprehensive scrutiny and, as appropriate, a re-draft of laws in common-law 
style. The benefits of the common-law style, as previously noted, are an increase in 
certainty and the removal of the additional, more hidden blanket of laws which are 
imported by implication into the EU regime by the so-called ‘purposive’ method of 
interpretation rather than by a more direct reading of the relevant law, and 
 
• A complete shift from poor ECJ decision-making in the financial services context, 
with reasoning that operates sometimes by omission and in any event is too 
condensed and insufficiently focused on fact-based analysis to provide the clarity 
that the common law brings with it. 
According to Mr Reynolds: 
The effect would be the development of an attractive, market-friendly regulatory 
framework, allowing banks and financial institutions to improve returns on equity, 
free from unnecessarily burdensome EU regulation. This world is not to be feared. It 
allows the UK to regain the prominence it enjoyed under the global regulatory 
framework of the early 1990s and before, reinforced with a modern understanding of 
the importance of systemic risk mitigation and consumer protection and enhanced by 
a more radical re-think for which Brexit provides an opportunity. Systemic risk 
regulation is an area in which the UK has rightly taken the lead in formulating at an 
international level and which must find a place in post-Brexit laws. 
The [World] Financial Centre model recognises that it is not only that EU regulation 
goes beyond global standards and best practices (which it does), but that it does so in 
untargeted and inappropriate ways, driven by social policy and other extraneous 
interests. This has led not simply to more regulation, but to worse regulation. It has 
also created an incentive for some member states to disregard important regulatory 
requirements, creating informal regulatory arbitrage within the EU (which was one of 
the main underlying causes of the 2008 financial crisis). In rebalancing the UK's 
regulatory framework, it must be recognised that it is not simply a matter of "more" 
or "less" regulation, but rather better regulation to which the UK should aspire. 
By building on the UK's reputation as an attractive, market-friendly, well-respected 
place to do business, the incentive (far from moving business from the UK to the EU) 
would be for banks to continue to be established in the UK, and have their most 
significant customers come to the City to transact business. This should be welcomed, 
and the UK should facilitate customer access wherever possible, for example, by 
structuring its tax laws to allow UK affiliates of EU companies to be established with 
tax transparency. This would allow businesses that currently are cross-border to be 
conducted through UK affiliates of EU counterparties and up-streamed to the EU 
parent without incurring an undue tax burden. 
This more radical solution may prove better than the enhanced equivalence model, 
depending on what the EU seeks for equivalence and how protectionist EU laws 
become going forward. Further, in some existing areas of law, such as AIFMD or 
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Solvency II, it could well be that the [World] Financial Centre model is preferable for 
the UK regardless of any equivalence offer. 
…Unburdened from the shackles of European social policy, the UK could rethink its 
regulatory framework entirely and move to better, more targeted regulation. This 
approach is not entirely new. In some ways, it winds the clock back to the situation 
before the passport came in partially in 1995 and more fully in 2007….[We could] 
revive an obligation by regulators to consider the competitiveness of the UK’s 
financial sector. This was killed off after the crisis, when the light-touch approach of 
the old City regulator, the Financial Services Authority, was widely criticised. Instead, 
[we] would strip the watchdog of its newly inherited antitrust powers, which were 
part of the post-crisis reforms of tackling “too-big-to-fail” institutions and improving 
competition among financial firms.  
Mr Reynolds proposes a number of ways that financial services firms would be able to 
continue doing business in the EU even without single market access via passporting or an 
enhanced equivalence regime, by making maximum use of international law protections 
from any cliff edge: 
• Making use of ‘reverse solicitation exemptions’ or ‘overseas persons exemptions’279 
which allow financial institutions to provide certain cross-border services to a client 
(such as securities trading, advising on or managing investments, or taking deposits 
from non-retail customers) without being registered or authorised in that client’s 
member state, provided that the services are provided on the initiative of the client. 
• Making use of the existing EU laws that allowed cross-border dealings — ‘including 
multiple on-the-ground visits’ — without a local branch or licence. If needed, firms 
could set up an EU subsidiary to do business with clients in the bloc, while shifting 
the business back to the UK headquarters via ‘back-to-back’ trading 
arrangements.280 
• Making use of human rights legislation. The right to property protects rights under 
contracts between UK and EU27 businesses that exist prior to Brexit. It arises both in 
the European Convention on Human Rights, to which the UK and every EU27 state 
will remain a party and in the EU’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights. These 
property rights protect contracts which have an economic value on Brexit.281 
A particular attraction of the go-it-alone model is that the ‘legal options for future UK-EU 
relations…are secondary to political considerations, which will determine the depth of 
cooperation permitted at EU level and between regulators, as well as the regulatory 
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benchmarks for market access. Berlin, Paris and Brussels are determined to ensure Britain 
does not receive a better deal outside the bloc. As a result, senior EU officials say it is almost 
impossible to imagine Britain retaining similar access privileges in different legal form after 
Brexit’.282  
Others, such as Edi Truell, go even further than Mr Reynolds and argue that the City was so 
economically important to the EU that it could negotiate ‘equivalence’ status for new lighter 
touch UK regulations: ‘London is the pre-eminent financial centre in Europe. We need to be 
more self-confident. We should say, if you want to trade with us, these are our rules – 
instead of worrying about access to the EU market’.283 
These views are echoed by Richard Tice – co-chair of Leave Means Leaves, which was 
launched in September 2016 – who believes that the City will get a £12bn a year windfall 
once it is liberated from ‘burdensome’ and ‘highly expensive’ EU regulations, equivalent to 
2-3% of the financial sector's annual costs.  According to Mr Tice, ‘being able to cut 
unnecessary regulation and bring back legal jurisdiction to the UK opens up a whole host of 
opportunity. The EU, on the other hand, faces a very difficult struggle ahead. It is essential 
that they secure a deal with the UK on financial reciprocity or they will see capital move 
from Frankfurt, Paris, Madrid to London’.284 
The long-term projections of Professor Patrick Minford, chair of Economists for Free Trade, 
suggest even bigger benefits from leaving the EU. According to Professor Minford’s model, 
UK financial services will grow by an additional 10% in the next decade if there’s a clean 
break from the EU. He said: ‘City bosses appear to be on a relentless and misguided 
campaign to try and pressure government into staying in the single market, in spite of there 
not being a true single market in financial services. That seems astonishing to us when our 
projections show how much better off over the long-term the industry will be out of the EU 
and outside the single market, as the UK exploits its natural strengths in the service sector. 
London is the financial capital of the world and free from the shackles of this regime, it will 
undoubtedly thrive, growing by £20bn over the next ten years’.285 
 
In May 2018, the Institute of Economic Affairs issued a report on the financial services 
regulations that would be needed to support the World Financial Centre model.286 The 
report argues that financial services regulations must: not restrict growth in financial 
services, not encourage regulatory arbitrage, not prevent sections of the economy from 
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accessing capital or other financial products, help to develop safe but competitive markets, 
and facilitate the growth of new and small businesses. 
 
With these aims in mind, the report makes the following proposals: 
 
• Develop a strong domestic regime in line with global standards and best practices. 
The UK should reshape its own regime by removing any unnecessary processes and 
focusing instead on proportionality of the regulatory outcomes in a transparent and 
cooperative manner. 
 
• Pursue WTO disciplines with renewed urgency. The WTO understanding on financial 
services should be developed with the goal of liberalisation of market access. The 
WTO Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of non-discrimination should be at the 
core of any agreement on international financial services. 
 
• Form an alliance with other major financial markets, such as Switzerland, Hong Kong 
and Singapore to enable further and deeper integration opportunities. A UK regime 
of multilateral mutual recognition (MMR) would allow the UK to strengthen its 
involvement in global regulation formation and dispute resolution. 
 
• Form an alliance with UK-linked international financial centres. The UK should make 
comprehensive bilateral agreements based on mutual recognition with the Crown 
Dependencies and the Overseas Territories that have established adequate 
regulatory standards in key financial service sectors such as banking, asset 
management, insurance and reinsurance. 
 
• Introduce regulation to encourage innovation. Domestic SMEs and fintech 
companies should have proportionate regimes of regulation and taxation to ensure 
good conditions for new entrants and dynamic high growth firms. 
 
• Establish regulatory coherence agreement between the UK and the EU27. Such 
cooperation should include shared cost benefit analyses in regulatory promulgation 
with regard to a range of factors, including impacts on trade and competition. 
 
• Allow EU27 headquartered banks with UK branches to continue post-Brexit provided 
that their home regulators continue to cooperate with the UK authorities, and 
expedite conversion from branches to subsidiaries if desired. This provides certainty 
for EU banks trading in the UK, ensures market stability and would be a show of 
good faith that the UK will not restrict EU27 access to financial services. 
 
Commenting on the report, Shanker Singham, Director of the International Trade and 
Competition Unit at the IEA and a co-author of the report, said: ‘Now is the time for the UK 
to promote more competitive regulation in global standard setting organisations and to 
challenge global rules with anticompetitive effects. Financial regulation is already based on 
international standards in many key areas. Outside the EU, the UK will have the advantage 
of greater agility in decision making, entering into regulatory recognition arrangements with 
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third countries and implementing appropriate regulations. If these tracks are initiated, the 
future for UK financial services should be very bright’. 
 
17. How feasible are these alternatives? 
Barney Reynolds believes any options involving a major bilateral deal for the UK are neither 
feasible nor desirable, whether for the EU or the UK: ‘From the UK's perspective, any such 
deal is likely to involve significant concessions on sovereignty issues, free movement of 
persons and budget contributions, which are politically undesirable. From the EU's 
perspective, there is no appetite to "reward" the UK for leaving the EU by granting it special 
privileges and the EU is keen not to set an attractive precedent, which might incentivise 
other member states to consider their position’.287 
Instead Mr Reynolds wants a solution that focuses on the UK, because ‘what used to happen 
and will happen if they're protectionist …. is the customers come to us. When I started, 
CEOs used to fly in from Europe to do business here during the day to work out what they 
wanted to do with their customers and so on, and deal through affiliates here. We’ll move 
back to that.  It imposes an additional cost on them if they wish to go down that route, we 
just make ourselves very attractive, but the centre of gravity, the magnetic pull is here.  The 
dog is here, as it were, with the tails, little wisps, into Europe.  You can’t pull on those wisps 
and pull the whole bulldog over the Channel.  It doesn't work, it’s not possible’.288 
He likes the equivalence regime:289 ‘The equivalence regimes are far, far broader than many 
people have acknowledged so far, and that the equivalence package on offer would get the 
sector to almost the same place [as passporting]. Equivalence comes with sovereignty, and 
sovereignty comes with doing things our own way. [You] can take whole buckets of EU law 
out of our system on the basis that they're not relevant to equivalency. An awful lot of the 
laws are not relevant’.  In addition, ‘enhanced equivalence, being based on existing EU legal 
concepts, is fully compatible with EU values and its red lines. It takes the existing EU 
equivalence concept, fills in the gaps and makes it mutual and binding. It supports a 
sovereign-to-sovereign relationship already in existence in EU law and in application with 
numerous countries around the world, including the US, Canada, Mexico and Singapore’.290 
However, a number of commentators have argued that equivalence will be a poor 
substitute for passporting. For example, Anthony Browne says: ‘Passporting has 
underpinned the growth of London as Europe’s financial centre, and helped financial 
services become our biggest export market by far. The UK exports over £20bn of financial 
services a year to the EU27, much of it underpinned by passporting rights. The nine different 
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passporting regimes in EU law allow financial services companies in one country to establish 
a branch in another country without having to be separately authorised or regulated. It also 
allows financial service companies to sell directly to customers across other EU countries. 
The alternatives such as equivalence are poor shadows of genuine passports. They only 
allow a much narrower range of services, offer more limited rights at greater cost and, 
crucially, can be withdrawn at short notice. The equivalence regime also takes many years 
to secure and put in place and is subject to political whim… Downplaying the importance of 
passporting goes against the golden rule of negotiations. We should aim high at the outset 
rather than narrowing our horizons…  We want to retain Europe’s integrated financial 
market, not split it in two by building a wall along the channel’.291 
Other potential problems with equivalence are: 
• It only applies to specific activities, mainly in wholesale rather than retail finance 
• It could also constrain the UK’s ability to alter financial regulations in the future. If 
the UK adopted a lighter regulatory framework to encourage more global financial 
institutions to locate in the UK, the EU might retaliate by saying that this regime is no 
longer equivalent.292  For example, would the EU make equivalence conditional on 
the UK abiding by EU rules on banker bonuses? And what if the EU decided to 
tighten those rules further? Would the UK follow?293 
• Banks are unlikely to rely on equivalence for long-term business planning. According 
to Simon Gleeson, a partner at Clifford Chance, ‘the difference between a passport 
and equivalence is similar to the difference between offering someone citizenship or 
a temporary right to remain: one allows a person to build a life in a country; the 
other encourages them to seek long-term security elsewhere’. 294  
• The European Commission decides whether UK laws are equivalent to those in the 
EU and can be subject to political pressure.  It can take years to make this decision 
(as in the case of US firms that clear derivatives transactions) and can revoke its 
decisions at any time with 30 days’ notice. In November 2016, the EU announced it 
would reconsider the equivalence regime in the light of Brexit, raising questions 
about whether the City would be able to fall back on equivalence if the UK lost 
passporting rights. It wanted to make the approval process more rigorous for 
systemically important institutions.  
According to the Financial Times:  
‘Any move to tighten the access regime would signal that Brussels will let Britain take 
nothing for granted in negotiations to leave the EU. It would also be a blow to the US and 
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more than a dozen jurisdictions, who fear approval for their pending applications will be 
waylaid by Brexit politics.  One senior EU official said equivalence “is not automatic and 
is not a right” and was bound to be reconsidered in light of Brexit. Another official noted 
that the patchy criteria needed to be clarified. The aim would be to create a more 
transparent process and recognise that deep financial interaction, such as with the US or 
UK, requires deeper equivalence checks. 
…British ministers have admitted that the uncertainty around equivalence — and the fact 
that rights can be abruptly withdrawn — means it “wouldn’t necessarily work” for 
international banks in London. 
...However, EU officials note any permanent “hybrid” arrangement would only be 
possible in a full trade deal, completed years after the UK has left the union. For this 
reason the existing equivalence regime would be an important basis for any transition 
arrangements, which banks see as vital for an orderly exit. Mark Carney, Bank of England 
governor, has described equivalence as the “way forward” in global financial regulation. 
….EU officials recently cited Brexit when telling a number of jurisdictions not to expect an 
imminent equivalence decision from AIFMD, the EU law to regulate hedge funds and 
private equity groups. Around a dozen jurisdictions — including the US and Switzerland 
— have already been cleared by ESMA as meeting EU standards but the commission has 
delayed signing off the access rights. 
…Cross-border rights secured through equivalence are typically better than those 
granted by a national regulator, but weaker than a full “passport” to offer services 
across the EU. Existing rules open gateways for EU firms to use market infrastructure in a 
non-EU country, reduce restrictions on data transfers, or ease regulatory requirements 
for branches of non-EU firms.  
However a wide range of financial activities and regulations include no “equivalence” 
provisions. These include banking activities such as lending and deposit taking, 
payments, custody, and private wealth management.  
Richard Reid, a research fellow in finance, banking and regulation at the University of 
Dundee, said he doubted there would be any appetite in Brussels to make the 
equivalence regime “less strict”.  
“Even before the Brexit vote, the last financial crisis had fostered an environment of 
more intrusive regulation,” he said. “Now, with some in the UK arguing that perhaps one 
way forward for its financial services industry is to benefit from being freed from 
unwarranted EU legislation, it may be unrealistic to think that gaining EU equivalence 
recognition will be straightforward”’.295 
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Some lawyers have also pointed out that there could be practical difficulties with Barney 
Reynold’s proposal to use ‘reverse solicitation exemptions’ to retain staff in London, a 
proposal that also has the support of Jacob Rees-Mogg MP,  a former member of the 
Treasury select committee: ‘It is in everybody's interest if we maintain as open as possible 
financial markets with essentially widespread equivalence regimes … what I was trying to 
get at in this session was if that turns out not to be possible, there are ways of working 
around it to ensure that the disadvantages are not in fact that great. …At the moment the 
City is quite understandably lobbying as hard as possible to get the least change and has a 
strong interest in not admitting that there are alternative solutions ... and therefore to say 
there are reasonably straightforward options is not in their interest because they want to 
try and persuade the government to prioritise them in negotiations against other important 
parts of the negotiation’. 
However, Andrew Procter, a financial services regulation partner at Herbert Smith 
Freehills, said reverse solicitation was ‘a shaky basis on which to build a business model. The 
approach would raise questions about how clients become aware of new products and 
services, and warned that EU countries also take different views on whether it is a 
permissible way of providing services to their citizens. Many of them have not said clearly, 
one way or another, whether they would permit it, in what circumstances and for what 
products and services. Even where it is clearly accepted, the other country could change its 
mind, with little warning, and prohibit the practice’. 
Barney Reynolds’s response was that ‘there are [legal] workarounds for many points. There 
are innovative uses of reverse solicitation which haven’t been fully explored so far. There 
are also US business models that rely in part on this exemption, which provides additional 
cover for particular interpretations. I think there are innovative answers which cushion the 
transition and minimise, further than has been identified hitherto, the amount of stuff that 
one might consider moving’. However, he conceded: ‘What is true to say is that reverse 
solicitation doesn't get you to exactly the same place as the passport. [But] it is one of the 
points that assists in reducing the amount needing to be considered for relocation’.296 
However, whatever model is chosen, Mr Reynolds is clear that the UK must ensure it 
continues to be a key centre for the trading and clearing of instruments denominated in any 
globally important currency, including the euro, and should robustly resist any compromises 
or offers to cease trading or clearing euros within the City: ‘There is no need to make any 
adjustments in this regard. The importance of maintaining full trading and clearing in euros 
in the City and the reasons why the EU does not have the power to take control of this 
business’, since the European Central Bank does not ‘own’ the euro.297   
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18. Transitional arrangements 
18.1 Is a transitional arrangement needed? 
The EU and UK must agree both the exit terms and the terms of their future relationship 
within two years of triggering Article 50 of the Treaty on EU. They have agreed a transitional 
or implementation period between 30 March 2019 and 31 December 2020. 
 
According to Pascal Lamy, the former EU trade commissioner and director-general World 
Trade Organisation: ‘A transition is unavoidable. It is a practical necessity. But it is 
impossible to imagine a transition without knowing where you are heading, the landing 
zone’.298  Another EU diplomat said it is not possible to have clarity before the end of the 
Article 50 process. This is because there will be hundreds of billions of euros in joint UK-EU 
liabilities to unwind as well as negotiations over the EU’s budget contributions in terms of 
amount and duration.299 Gideon Rachman argues that ‘the negotiations are too complicated 
to complete in the allotted time’.300 
However, the idea that ‘negotiations are too complicated to complete in the allotted time’ is 
simply not true according to Lawyers for Britain.301 The arrangements for leaving the EU will 
be similar to the ‘case of “state succession” where an existing state splits and the 
component parts wish to continue existing treaty relationships with other states.  For 
example, when Czechoslovakia split into the separate states of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia on 31 December 1992, both new states agreed to assume and continue to honour 
the treaty obligations of the former State of Czechoslovakia, and other States and 
international bodies accepted the succession as being effective, where necessary agreeing 
new machinery for the separate representation of the two new states…...  [I]nternational 
counterparties to the existing EU FTAs will almost certainly follow general state practice in 
state succession cases and accept the rolling over of FTA arrangements so that they 
continue to apply to the UK after Brexit’. So that leaves trading arrangements with the EU. 
As Lawyers for Britain argue there ought to be ‘mutual interest in preserving the continuity 
of existing treaty arrangements, particularly those which affect day-to-day existing trade, 
unless there is some good and concrete reason for changing those arrangements’.  
But if the EU does not accept this and does not agree a bilateral trading relationship with 
the UK, then the EU-UK trading relationship will, by default, be based on WTO rules, with 
each side imposing a set of standard tariffs on the other – in the case of the EU, this will be 
the Common External Tariff. The UK could, of course, continue with zero tariffs on imports 
from the EU, so long as it also set zero tariffs on imports from all other countries (under the 
WTO’s most favoured nation rules). 
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The City would like certainty of any transitional agreements as soon as possible. TheCityUK’s 
Miles Celic said: ‘What firms in the financial and related professional services industry will 
want to see as early as possible is an agreed and secured transitional period to help ensure 
financial stability and minimise disruption to their ability to provide products and services to 
customers’.302 
18.2 Types of transitional arrangements 
The Financial Times and BBC suggested five possible transitional models.303 
The accident: an almost immediate exit 
This would be an immediate hard Brexit with standard tariff rates set under WTO rules. In 
extremis, the position of cross-border companies and residents could be unclear. The UK 
would no longer be subject to more than 30 EU regulatory agencies and would have to 
introduce some of these itself, such as those dealing with chemical and medicine regulation. 
New customs arrangements would need to be put in place. EU officials believe this would be 
impossible to achieve in two years. Supporters of unilateral free trade, on the other hand, 
argue that the UK’s position could be considerably simplified if, when it exited the EU, it 
unilaterally removed all tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imports into the UK from both the 
EU and the rest of the world, even if these regions imposed tariffs or continued to maintain 
tariffs on exports from the UK. 
The status quo prolonged: lasting one to three years 
The UK retains access to the EU single market for between one and three years after formal 
exit from the EU. While this would provide increased certainty for businesses, there appears 
to be little appetite for this arrangement in Brussels, it being seen as too politically and 
legally cumbersome for a temporary deal. Also the European Parliament would want a firm 
cut-off date in order to force UK businesses to relocate to the EU. The idea is also not 
attractive to Whitehall as it would mean at the time of the next election in 2020, the 
government would have to explain to voters why the UK had left the EU but was still subject 
to its laws and making budget contributions. A particular problem would be financial 
services regulation. As Sam Woods of the Bank of England has said: ‘Running a leading 
global financial centre and a massive banking system with a set of rules over which you have 
no influence is not something you would easily choose to do’. 
The glide path: lasting into the mid-2020s 
This would involve an arrangement in which the UK and EU gradually diverge.  Some access 
rights to the single market would be tapered, while others would be prolonged through 
bespoke agreements. This model is attractive to Mark Boleat of the City of London 
Corporation: ‘Moving locations takes a long time, so businesses are having to take decisions 
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[now]. Without a transition, in three years' time they may say we did not need to do it’.  The 
City would, however, need to rely on equivalence arrangements holding and any move by 
the to deviate from EU law could put market access at risk during the transition. 
The basics: lasting into the mid-2020s 
This would involve the UK remaining in the customs union under a zero-tariff agreement 
until the final deal is signed. Any new trade deals negotiated with other countries would 
begin on the day the UK leaves the customs union. 
Remaining in the European Economic Area: lasting into the mid-2020s 
All EU member states are in the European Economic Area and it had been assumed that 
when the UK leaves the EU it would automatically leave the EEA as well. But some lawyers 
argue that leaving the EEA would not be automatic and would happen only if the UK 
formally withdraws by triggering Article 127 of the EEA agreement. The legal question is 
focused on whether the UK is a member of the EEA in its own right or because it is a 
member of the EU. If its negotiations with the EU went badly, and no deal looked likely, the 
UK could threaten to stay inside the EEA after Brexit. This would be politically hard for the 
government to sell as it would still involve EU workers moving freely within the UK. But it 
might be economically better than having to rely on WTO rules which could involve tariffs 
and barriers to trade. The ability to stay on in the single market means Britain could force 
the EU into accepting a transitional period for the UK to avoid an economic cliff edge. This 
would be a useful stick for UK negotiators to have up as there appears to be no mechanism 
for the EEA to force out one of its members. Professor George Yarrow, chairman of the 
Regulatory Policy Institute and emeritus professor at Hertford College, Oxford, said: ‘There 
is no provision in the EEA Agreement for UK membership to lapse if the UK withdraws from 
the EU. The only exit mechanism specified is Article 127, which would need to be 
triggered’.304 
18.3 How long should transitional arrangements last? 
Some commentators have argued that: ‘Two years clearly isn’t enough. American banks 
would need more than that to set up subsidiaries in the EU should that be needed, 
according to one senior investment banker. It will also take much longer than two years to 
devise a “third-country” equivalence regime that can replace the automatic right to operate 
in the EU, which Britain currently enjoys thanks to [the] financial services passport. It took 
three years for US and EU regulators to agree on such a regime for central clearing 
counterparties. The European Central Bank could be swamped with requests for regulatory 
approval’.305 Some diplomats believe a full deal might take up to 10 years to complete. 
A more immediate problem with a transition is that it adds to uncertainty and provides an 
opportunity for ‘international banks to get cold feet over losing “passporting” rights and 
start shifting operations from London to the eurozone… Senior EU diplomats admit the 
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timetable also reflects a cold calculation of interests: delaying agreement on a transition 
would spur companies to move some of their business to the EU to cope with the danger of 
a hard exit… Speaking at an EU summit in Brussels, Mario Draghi, European Central Bank 
president, repeated his assessment that Britain would “first and foremost” bear the 
economic pain of Brexit’.306 
However, John Mills, chair of the Labour Leave campaign, argues that ‘Brexit need not take 
more than 2 years, and when we joined the common market in 1973, it took less than two 
years. This was a result of political establishment wanting it to be a success and it is clear 
that the faster Brexit is concluded, the better. A permanent deal covering most aspects of 
Brexit is possible in 2 years, with smaller issues to be resolved later. When Norway didn't 
join the EU in 1972, it negotiated a trade deal within 8 months’.307 
Leaving the EU is in principle a straightforward process, as pointed out by Bernard Jenkin 
MP: ‘All the laws and regulations that apply by virtue of Britain’s membership can remain 
perfectly aligned with those of the rest of the EU until they may be changed at a later date. 
This is how the UK gave independence to the countries of the British empire’.  He continues: 
‘There are two crucial legal components of Brexit. The first is Article 50, the procedure laid 
down by the EU treaties by which we disapply these treaties to the UK in international law. 
This is implemented by an act of parliament, which is the second component. This need be 
no more than a few clauses, including one to repeal the European Communities Act of 1972, 
which currently implements EU law into our domestic law, and another to incorporate all 
the EU laws that apply directly in UK law into UK statute. That is what Brexit is; there is no 
“hard” or “soft” option’…Nor is it attractive to spend as long as six years in [an] invidious 
state of uncertainty, waiting for the EU to decide the outcome of triggering Article 50 while 
also remaining subject to all the obligations of EU membership. It would take only one of 
the other 27 member states to say non at the end of the process to wreck the whole 
agreement’.308 
David Davis, the Brexit secretary, supports this view: negotiations between the UK and the 
EU on their future relationship ‘will be unlike any before, since both sides will start from a 
point of exact equivalence’ and he added that ‘we should steer clear of protectionist 
measures that would damage both the UK and Europe. Because it’s in all of our interests to 
avoid barriers to trade’.309 
Nevertheless, some believe that a long transition period might be necessary because of the 
complexity of the regulatory arrangements in financial services that need to be agreed. Two 
years seems to be the minimum time it takes to agree such deals, as in the case of the 
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Swiss-EU insurance deal. Mark Carney, the governor of the Bank of England, says that 
typically it takes much longer: ‘When there is a financial reform it takes a period of time: the 
Basel reforms phased in over eight years. The Vickers reforms phased in over four to six 
years … Normally, it is in the range of four to seven years’. Enda Kenny, then Irish prime 
minister, has said that it would be impossible to agree everything in two years: ‘There’s a 
growing feeling in Europe that there should be a transition period, and that the transition 
period will be longer than those two years — I think it will be’.310 The City itself is looking at 
a transitional period involving three phases: the two-year Article 50 withdrawal phase, a 
two-year sequential period for discussing the new arrangements, and an implementation 
phase of three years.311 
The problem, of course, with a transition is that it can end up being indefinite.  The EU’s 
deals with Norway and Switzerland were intended to be temporary measures.  Leave Means 
Leave and other pro-Brexit groups oppose a long transition, arguing that ‘many vested 
interests seeking to water down or even halt the UK government’s commitment to deliver 
Brexit for the people’.  The European Commission says it would consider a transitional 
arrangement, but would expect freedom of movement of people, the powers of the ECJ and 
budget contributions to be maintained during this period.312 It also said it wanted the power 
to raid financial firms in the City under plans to closely police enforcement and regulation of 
the City.313 
In early December 2016, Philip Hammond and David Davis had their first joint meeting with 
City leaders, including those from Lloyd’s of London, the London Stock Exchange, Barclays, 
Santander, BlackRock, Goldman Sachs and the Association of British Insurers, to discuss the 
UK’s ‘smooth and orderly transition’ from the EU. The discussions included a deal that 
would allow current trading rules to continue for a limited period. Previously, Mr Davis had 
been sceptical of any transition arrangements. One participant said that ‘a transitional deal 
would be in the interests of Britain and the EU and necessary for the financial stability of 
both’. The meeting also discussed options for how the City would access to the single 
market after Brexit, including one based on regulatory equivalence between Britain and the 
rest of the EU.314 
19. Recommendations, challenges and bargaining chips 
19.1 Recommendations 
We have five recommendations. 
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1. The UK financial services industry’s future relationship with the EU 
Depending on the reaction of the rest of the EU in the Article 50 negotiations, we 
recommend one of two models for the UK financial services industry’s future relationship 
with the EU: 
• If the EU is willing to cooperate, then we recommend: 
o either a third-country enhanced equivalence model with guarantees about 
how equivalence will be granted and removed. This could be implemented in 
one of two ways, via: 
 sectoral agreements of which one would cover financial services. 
These would be under WTO rules and packaged up as a FTA. The EU’s 
existing trade agreements would be adopted by the UK and relabelled 
under WTO rules – a process called ‘rectification’ 
 a comprehensive free trade agreement. The UK financial services 
sector gets meaningful third-country access through a specific chapter 
of a comprehensive UK-EU free trade agreement;315 
o or mutual recognition of financial regulations with mutual market access. 
 
• But these trade agreement would require unanimity, unlike agreements made under 
Article 50 which require qualified majority voting (QMV). If the EU is not willing to 
cooperate, we recommend that the UK adopts a World Financial Centre model 
where the City ‘goes it alone’.316 
 
2. Work permits 
We recommend that the government introduces a flexible system of work permits for 
skilled workers – with proof of fluency in the English language – that covers workers who 
are offered a job in the UK and who are located in any country in the world outside the 
UK.317  A different system would be offered to entrepreneurs who wanted to set up a 
company in the UK. 
3. Transitional arrangements 
 
The City should make the most of the transitional or implementation period between 30 
March 2019 and 31 December 2020 to secure existing commercial relationships and initiate 
new ones, now that it will no longer be a rule taker from Brussels. 
 
The principal benefit of this is that having a fixed date for exit is necessary to prevent what 
the Remainers (on both sides of the English Channel) really want which is a ‘transitional’ 
deal of indefinite duration that keeps the UK inside the customs union, the single market 
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and subject to ECJ jurisdiction.  Further, such a transitional deal would simply prolong 
business uncertainty since it would be unclear when it ends and what would happen when it 
ends. It would be much better for business certainty to have exit on a defined day, even if 
there is no deal, since that can be planned for.  
 
4. Encourage the development of global standards in financial regulation that are free 
from political interference 
We recommend that the government encourages the development of regulatory standards 
at a global level – via institutions such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the International 
Monetary Fund and Financial Action Task Force – free from political interference.  The aim 
would be to promote global consistency and cooperation between regulatory authorities. 
To be effective, these global standards would have to be legally binding.318 
There has been far too much tendentious political interference in the setting of financial 
regulations in the EU, dressed up as a concern about systemic risk, whereas the real purpose 
is to protect national markets. The LSE’s Xavier Rolet has pointed out that political 
judgments in the EU may overwhelm any possible economic consequences to itself and that 
the EU has various ways of ‘effectively creating a disabling environment’ to London.319 On 
the other hand, the global principles established by the G20 in 2009 after the Global 
Financial Crisis to reduce the risk of another crisis recognised that the free flow of capital 
was the ‘oxygen of commerce’, according to Jes Staley, CEO of Barclays, and that this will 
‘keep London a major financial centre after Brexit.’320 
5. Encourage overseas expansion of financial services 
We recommend that the government encourages the overseas expansion of UK financial 
services. 
It is important to recognise that the bulk of today's financial business, even its offshore 
business, is no longer conducted in Europe, even though London remains the largest single 
centre for most offshore business. Tokyo has overtaken London for offshore banking 
business, Hong Kong is capturing more foreign exchange business – especially in Asian 
currencies – and Singapore is taking traders from London. Another crucial point to recognise 
is that the EU is becoming less and less important as an economic entity, both globally and 
to the UK. The European Commission accepts that 90% of future global growth will happen 
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outside Europe's borders.321 The UK’s share of exports to the EU has fallen from 54% in 2006 
to 44% in 2015;322 56% of the UK’s trade in goods and only 40% of its trade in services – 
which comprise 80% of its economic output – is with the EU.323 The total value of UK 
exports to the EU was £134bn in 2015 (compared with imports of £223bn), but US exports 
were £203bn324  – and the US is outside the single market and the customs union. 
The UK, outside the shackles of the EU, can be part of this growth area, but it needs 
government support.  This is the view of the Association of British Insurers which is urging 
the government to help the UK insurance sector gain access to overseas markets, 
particularly China and India, as part of overall efforts to boost global trade in financial 
services. The AIB’s members – who manage investments totalling £1.9trn – are keen to 
expand in the Asian tiger markets of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and 
South Korea. They are seeking the UK government’s support in reducing barriers including 
collateral requirements and the bureaucracy related to moving staff to these countries.325  
19.2 Challenges 
Andrew Tyrie cautions against unrealistic expectations concerning the UK’s ability to discard 
all EU regulations: ‘some Leave campaigners appeared to treat all EU regulation as if it were 
all a tangle of unnecessary red tape that could be burned at the point of Brexit. Much EU 
law has sought to facilitate trade by establishing common standards and procedures: it has 
been permissive, rather than restrictive. Far from liberating businesses, amending or 
repealing many such rules would inhibit trade and put UK exporters at a commercial 
disadvantage to their EU competitors. Brexit should enable beneficial alterations of the UK’s 
regulatory framework, such as the EU’s counterproductive “bonus cap”, and capital rules 
that disadvantage smaller challenger banks in favour of large incumbents (although even 
these may compromise single market access). There will also certainly be greater 
opportunities to influence standard-setting at an international level. But there will be no 
bonfire’.326  
However, this is not a real problem. As previously mentioned, many global standards in 
finance are set internationally, rather than in the EU. Further, it is what happens at the 
margin that matters and helps to tilt the balance in favour of one jurisdiction against 
another when it comes to firms deciding their location. As we have seen, the EU has an 
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inbuilt hostility to financial markets. This is especially true of France. In 2012, when François 
Hollande became president of France, he promised to fight against ‘financial speculation’.327 
Another challenge is that many in the City, as Danial Hannan has pointed out, actually like 
the protectionism and burdensome regulation that the EU offers  – and indeed have lobbied 
in Brussels over the years to increase the level of protectionism – and accordingly want to 
torpedo the implementation of Brexit through its special pleading.  This is amply illustrated 
by the comments above from the City institutions and trade associations.328 The City lobby 
is so powerful and well-funded it may also influence the position taken in other areas 
outside the financial markets. At the same time, it is important to recognise that the City is 
not united. The debate has moved on from  Remain vs Leave and is now between those who 
want access to EU financial markets, with attendant regulation (EMIR, AIFMD, MiFID II) and 
those with little interest in access to EU financial markets especially because of the 
attendant regulation. Big international banks want access, hedge funds want appropriate 
regulation and dislike AIFMD, asset managers have options already in place and the larger 
ones can live with regulation as is.  
A further challenge concerns ratification procedures in the EU. The ECJ has ruled that 
national parliaments should ratify EU trade deals. The European Commission had assumed 
that it could agree a trade deal which would then only need to be approved by QMV. But 
the ECJ has determined that the current trade deal with Singapore must be signed off on by 
each member state.  This, as previously mentioned, could make it more difficult for any deal 
with the UK to be approved.329   
The EU might, however, take a much stronger view on the freedom of movement of people 
and might demand this in exchange for access to the single market. Both Switzerland and 
Norway have, by joining the Schengen passport-free travel area, accepted free movement. 
Yet control of immigration was a red line for many Brexit supporters.  Further, an agreement 
reached between the UK and Brussels could be voided if just one of the other 27 member 
states rejects it.330 
Nevertheless, free movement is not just an issue in the UK. There is a lively debate in 
Germany over whether the EU should back down on free movement to prevent any 
emerging barriers to lucrative cross-border trade.331 The debate centres on whether there 
should be free movement of people (the original form of one of the free movements) or 
free movement of workers, which would exclude those going to another member state in 
order to look for work and claiming welfare benefits in the meantime.  Another issue that 
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has been raised is the language skills of migrants and whether free movement should 
exclude those with inadequate skills in the language of the host country. 
19.3 Bargaining chips 
A number of commentators pointed out that the UK had a very strong hand at the beginning 
of the EU negotiations.  For example, Alex Barker writing in the Financial Times says: ‘It is 
facing a 27-country bloc that remains economically fragile, worried about security, under 
populist assault and divided over the crisis of legitimacy facing its central EU 
institutions. Britain is the demander, but in its favour are the fruits of decades of economic 
integration and near-irreplaceable contributions to common European interests. It has 
leverage’.332 Similarly, James Forsyth writing in the Spectator believes the UK holds the aces 
in Brexit talks: ‘London is the de facto financial and banking capital of the eurozone. The 
more trouble the single currency gets into, the more dangerous it would be to erect barriers 
between the two. These could threaten the finances of some eurozone states by making it 
legally complicated for them to sell their sovereign debt on the London market. One of 
those intimately involved in preparing the UK’s negotiating strategy tells me that only the 
French appear oblivious to this. However, the UK does not want to publicly highlight so 
explosive an issue. It is often said that politics will trump economics in the Brexit 
negotiations. But the single currency’s stability is not just an economic issue — the euro is 
the ultimate expression of the European political project. So the financial services sector 
may get a significantly better Brexit deal than expected’.333 The euro has also come under 
attack from Peter Navarro, head of president Trump’s new National Trade Council, who 
claims that the currency is an ‘implicit Deutsche Mark’ that is ‘grossly undervalued’ and that, 
as a result, Germany has an unfair trade advantage and ‘continues to exploit other countries 
in the EU as well as the US’.334 Even Holland, one of the inner core members of the EU and 
the euro project, has announced a parliamentary inquiry into Dutch membership of the euro 
‘amid a growing chorus of scepticism about the single currency’.335 
Here are the principal areas in which the UK had significant leverage if it chose to exercise it. 
Economic self-interest and future trading relationships 
The UK’s strongest bargaining chip is its trade deficit with the EU as a whole and with key 
countries in particular. In Fig. 5, the blue bars show each country’s export/import ratio with 
the UK, with values above (below) 1 indicating that the country is a net exporter to 
(importer from) the UK. The red squares show each country's exports to the UK as a % of 
their total exports to EU28 countries. Germany, for example, sells to the UK more than €2 in 
goods for each €1 it buys from us, and more than 13% of its EU exports go to the UK.336  
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Germany is also a net exporter of services (including finance) to the UK with sales of €41bn, 
compared with purchases of €24bn in 2015. 
Figure 5: EU states’ reliance on trade with the UK (2015 data) 
 
Sources: Economic Research Council, European Commission, Eurostat 
The UK could offer the choice between continuing a zero-tariff preferential trade 
arrangement and accepting WTO MFN terms. Pro-Brexit MPs Peter Lilley and John Redwood 
have said that ‘the UK would recommend the former, but could live with the latter’.  The 
UK’s trade deficit with the EU and the cost of unwinding the deep cross-border supply 
chains in industries such as car making suggest it would be ‘insane’ for countries such as 
Germany to impose tariffs on the UK which buys 20% of all its cars, according to Boris 
Johnson, the foreign secretary.  Dominic Raab, another pro-Brexit MP, said: ‘The strength of 
our position is our economic weight. If we end up with a worst-case scenario, on WTO 
terms, it hits continental exports disproportionately hard, costing European companies 
profits and jobs. Their rational self-interest is to avoid that’.337 
A study by Civitas has concluded that if the UK leaves the EU without a free trade deal and 
trade is instead conducted under WTO rules, companies in the rest of the EU would pay 
£12.9bn p.a.in tariffs to export their goods into the UK, while UK companies exporting to the 
EU would pay £5.2bn p.a.’.338 
Wolfgang Münchau writing in the Financial Times argues: 
If a hard Brexit were to force the UK and the EU to impose quotas on traded goods 
and to suspend trade in most services, Germany would be harder hit than the UK…. 
The Germans have an interest in maintaining free trade in both goods and services. 
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Most other EU countries would come to a similar conclusion once they calculate the 
implications a hard Brexit would have for them. We just cannot get around the fact 
that the UK had a current account deficit of more than 5 per cent of gross domestic 
product last year. Having an unsustainable external position is a rare benefit when 
you want to negotiate a trade deal. 
It would be different if the EU had leaders who put the common interest before their 
own. The eurozone crisis taught us they do not. That is also true of Angela Merkel. 
The German chancellor vetoed debt relief for Greece, joint eurozone debt instruments 
and common deposit insurance for the eurozone. She may pretend that she wants to 
be tough on Britain — but once German jobs are at risk, I would expect her principled 
position to crumble. 
If the Brexit negotiations get stuck — as they undoubtedly will at some point — we 
may find that macroeconomic considerations become more important. A hard Brexit 
may knock a couple of percentage points off UK gross domestic product but would 
presage a crisis in the EU. The total effect on GDP in the eurozone would be smaller 
but the dynamics may be worse. Brexit, for example, would risk pushing Italy into a 
recession, and that could trigger another financial crisis. 
My conclusion is that both sides have an interest in a fair and square deal. The 
purpose of UK diplomacy in the next three years will be to remind the Europeans that 
the risks are more symmetrical than they think.339  
The Bavarian economy minister, Ilse Aigner, has come out strongly in support of a 
‘comprehensive’ trade deal with the UK after Brexit. She acknowledges that the UK is one of 
the ‘most important trading partners for Bavaria’ – 20% of all German cars, with most of 
them made in Bavaria, are sold to the UK – and she wants to avoid the ‘high risk’ to the 
economy of not getting a good deal with the UK: ‘We have to do everything to address the 
uncertainties that have arisen…we have to find ways to put economic relations with the UK 
on a new foundation without fractures’.340 This comes a month after the IW Cologne 
Institute for Economic Research predicted that the UK’s exit from the European Union 
would reduce German GDP by 0.25 percentage points and, that as a result of the weaker 
pound, German exports would fall by 9% in 2017.341 
The Bavarian economy minister’s concerns are recognised by Germany’s minister of 
European affairs, Michael Roth, who said: ‘Given Britain’s size, significance, and its long 
membership of the European Union, there will probably be a special status which only bears 
limited comparison to that of countries that have never belonged to the European Union’. 
They are also echoed by Germany’s vice-chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel, who said: ‘My personal 
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view is that we should do everything, as far as it is politically justifiable, to keep the British 
as close as possible to Europe. This will not be easy. But above all, it must be done quickly. 
The uncertainty is the biggest problem. In our estimation, the process is taking far too long’. 
The official line from Mrs Merkel is that the UK will not be allowed to ‘cherry pick’ in the 
negotiations, especially over accepting the EU’s four basic freedoms. However, supporters 
of a soft Brexit hope that Germany’s own economic interests will change Mrs Merkel’s mind  
and will be prepared to offer Britain a deal.342  Angela Merkel has even started to suggest 
that the EU needs to ‘discuss further’ the rules around freedom of movement of people and 
that the UK might be able to regain full control of its borders while still retaining access to 
the single market. Both she and Jean-Claude Juncker had previously said this would be 
impossible.343 
German Lawyer Gunnar Beck puts it much more starkly at the time:  
The passage of time is revealing how weak Germany’s and the EU’s negotiating 
position actually is. Politically, Mrs. Merkel is committed to “ever closer” integration 
within the EU and wants to transform Germany into a “moral superpower”. But these 
goals, which have manifested partly in a willingness to bail out bankrupt eurozone 
member states and partly in controversial policies, such as welcoming more than 1.5 
million migrants over the past 18 months, carry spiraling economic and social costs 
that German voters might not be prepared to bear. 
So Mrs. Merkel has sought to disguise the true costs of European union by shifting 
the book value of Germany’s total euro rescue loans and guarantee exposure to the 
Bundesbank, the European Central Bank and the European Stability Mechanism. But 
this strategy has turned those three institutions into “bad banks” holding 
nonperforming assets such as Greek sovereign debt. With taxpayers on the hook in 
the event of losses at those institutions, Berlin can’t afford many more financial 
shocks. 
Meanwhile, Germany has stood by while, for the sake of holding the euro together, 
the ECB has pursued policies that hurt Germans. German savers lost interest income 
worth €125 billion ($140 billion) between 2011 and 2015 as a result of the ECB’s 
ultralow rates and quantitative easing, according to a study from Germany’s 
Postbank. And the open door to migrants will cost €50 billion in 2016 and 2017 alone 
and nearly €400 billion over the next 20 years, assuming optimistically that most of 
these refugees eventually find work. If integration fails or many more refugees arrive, 
the costs will be significantly higher. 
Due to continuing euro crisis measures and the increasing costs of its refugee policy, 
Germany’s economy and public finances are likely to weaken, while German 
unemployment should start rising again beginning next year. With economic growth 
                                                     
342 Justin Huggler, (2016) EU should aim to keep 'close relationship' with post-Brexit Britain, says German 
economy minister, Daily Telegraph, Harry Winston9 December. 
343 Gren Manuel (2016) Merkel’s nuance on ‘free movement of people’: She’s not wobbling — but she is 
looking at definitions, Financial News, 16 November. 
108 
 
chronically sputtering, Berlin (and the EU overall) will have to depend on trade-
induced moderate growth to minimize the future costs of these various policies to 
taxpayers.  
Trade with the UK will be a crucial component. Nine EU member states send at least 
5% of their total exports to Britain, and in Germany that percentage is around 7.5. 
Germany’s trade surplus with the U.K. was €51 billion in 2015, around 20.5% of 
Germany’s entire trade surplus. 
Yet even these figures understate Germany’s economic dependence on Britain. 
Around 36% of Germany’s total exports in 2015 went to countries within the 
eurozone. However, under the so-called Target 2 payments system operated by the 
ECB, Germany’s balance-of-payments surplus with the eurozone is financed not by 
the transfer of foreign-currency reserves, gold or other near-liquid assets, but by an 
open-ended overdraft facility granted by the Bundesbank. 
Under this peculiar system, the exporter is paid not by the importing country but by 
Germany’s central bank, which itself never receives payment. Rather, a credit note is 
issued by the importing country’s central bank, which it has no obligation ever to pay. 
The Bundesbank’s Target 2 balance stood at more than €660 billion as of July. If 
Germany’s eurozone exports were paid for in the same way as its other exports, it 
would be a much richer country. 
That Germany is moderately prosperous at all under this system is owed in large 
measure to its trade surplus with partners outside the eurozone. This surplus is paid 
for in the traditional way, by transferring actual money to Germany. Germany and 
other export-driven eurozone economies thus depend on trade with Britain as a key 
partner outside the dysfunctional eurozone much more than is commonly realized.344 
The cost of not reaching a trade agreement will be high for both sides. When the UK leaves 
the EU, EU law requires EU member states to impose the Common External Tariff on the UK 
and this is also required by Article XXIV of GATT. The imposition by the EU of tariffs on its 
imports from the UK would cause major problems for EU manufacturers dependent on 
existing EU-UK supply chains, as supply chains are highly sensitive to tariffs.345 A case in 
point is the German car industry, which is already lobbying the EU for existing trade 
arrangements to continue.  The only permissible ways out under Article XXIV would be for 
there to be an EU-UK customs union agreement or a free trade agreement (FTA). This 
suggests that the appropriate UK negotiating strategy is to offer a zero-tariff trade deal with 
the EU.  
 
 
                                                     
344 Gunnar Beck (2016) Germany Discovers Some Home Truths About Brexit, Wall Street Journal, 14 
September. 
345 Peter Wells (2016) Written Evidence (FTG0013) – HOUSE OF LORDS: FUTURE TRADE EVIDENCE, 
AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR, 11 November. 
109 
 
The UK’s budget contributions and extant net liabilities 
The UK is the EU’s third biggest net budget contributor. It has paid £140bn since 1973 and is 
due to pay another net £60bn budget to 2020/21, which includes £26.4bn in the two years 
following the UK’s departure date of April 2019. This leaves a big hole in the budget and 
could raise tensions between remaining net contributors (Germany, France and the 
Netherlands) and recipients (mostly eastern European states).  
The UK has agreed to pay a share of the EU’s accrued liabilities (such as EU civil servants 
pensions) and to continue contributing to certain European-wide programmes (e.g., in 
science, education and culture) after formally leaving the EU. The total cost of this is 
estimated at between £35-39bn.346 
Defence and security  
Roger Boyes argued that the UK’s military muscle should be a key bargaining chip: ‘The 
divorce negotiations with the European union, if they follow the game plan of the European 
Commission, will fast degenerate however into a nightmarish battle over detail. Rather, 
what we should be seeking is a grand bargain whereby Britain’s over-the-odds military 
contribution is taken into account in return for access to the single market. It should be a 
deal that recognises a common interest in security and Britain’s disproportionately 
important role in fighting common enemies’.347 
This view is reinforced by developments in the US, according to James Forsyth: ‘The election 
of Donald Trump means that another card has fallen into the Prime Minister’s hand. First, 
his ambivalence about NATO has made Britain more important to Europe’s security than it 
has been for 60 years. Vladimir Putin clearly senses an opportunity. His plan to move 
nuclear-capable missiles to Russia’s western enclave, Kaliningrad, is a sign of how he intends 
to probe for weakness and exploit irresolution over the coming months. If Europe cannot 
rely absolutely on President Trump to defend eastern Europe from Russian aggression and 
subversion, then Britain and its military forces, intelligence services and nuclear deterrent 
become far more important. This should create a more mature and cooperative atmosphere 
for discussions. After all, Britain’s continuing security commitment to Europe is proof that 
this country is leaving the EU, not the continent itself’.348 
Failure to exercise leverage 
 
It is apparent from the joint report released on 8 December 2018 that the UK has not made 
maximum use of its leverage during the phase 1 negotiations on the withdrawal terms. 
Instead, it has been highly conciliatory in order to secure a good future relationship with the 
EU. But it is equally apparent that the EU is seeking to punish Britain in order to discourage 
other member states from leaving the EU too. Despite this, as the UK prime minister made 
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clear, the EU will have no choice but to agree a trade deal with Brexit Britain.349  This has 
been conceded by the Flemish Prime Minister, Geert Bourgeois: ‘It would be a fatal mistake 
to try to “punish” Britain… I can’t imagine a situation where we have more barriers on trade 
in both directions. You [Britain] are our fourth biggest export market. It is in our mutual 
interest to find a solution, and the majority of the EU now agrees that anything other than a 
“soft Brexit” would have a huge cost. We will be able to negotiate a trade agreement. It may 
be sui generis but it can be done’.350  
 
20. Conclusion 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Brexit negotiations is that the trading 
arrangements between individuals and companies in the UK and those in the other member 
states of the EU will be determined by unelected bureaucrats and lawyers. As John 
Longworth, the former head of the British Chambers of Commerce and co-chairman of the 
lobby group Leave Means Leave, argues: ‘Trade consists of a willing seller and a willing 
buyer. If the buyer wants a product and it is the right quality and price there will be trade. 
Governments do not trade, they only get in the way’.  The EU ‘government’ has, in 
particular, got in the way by failing to complete trade deals with the world’s largest 
economies – such as the US, China, Russia, Japan, India and Brazil – despite decades of 
trying.   
How should the UK respond? One solution would be to follow the strategy proposed by the 
pro-Brexit MP Peter Lilley: ‘We should simply announce that for the time being we will 
maintain our zero tariffs on imports from the EU — unless they choose to impose WTO 
tariffs on us, in which case we will reciprocate’. Even if the EU imposes WTO tariffs 
averaging 3.5%, then when the 10% devaluation of sterling is taken into account, the UK will 
still be 6.5% more competitive and the EU 13.5% less competitive than before the EU 
Referendum.351 However, Patrick Minford points out that, because under WTO rules, the UK 
would be obliged to impose the same import tariffs on all countries (with which the UK does 
not have a specific FTA), this strategy would still be costly to the UK if it did reciprocate: 
according to his model, it could reduce potential net UK GDP UK by 4% compared with the 
status quo and by 8% compared with unilateral free trade.352 Another solution would be to 
start immediate negotiations on bilateral free trade agreements with key overseas partners. 
According to Andrew Lilico, the average US trade deal takes just 18 months to agree.353 
Either way, ‘Brexit is’, as Suella Fernandes MP and vice chair of the European Research 
Group says: ‘a golden opportunity for Britain. We can lower barriers and encourage 
                                                     
349 James Slack (2016) You’ve got no choice but to do trade deals with us, May tells posturing EU leaders, Daily 
Mail, 19 September. 
350 Marian L. Tupy (2016) In Europe, National Interest Rules Supreme, CAPX, 26 August 26. 
351 Matt Ridley (2016) A golden opportunity for a free-trade bonanza, The Times, 3 October. 
352 Personal communication. 
353 Andrew Lilico (2017) Ignore EU complaints - we must start negotiating trade deals now, Daily Telegraph, 24 
January. 
111 
 
investment. We can be the first big country to entirely open our markets  – something so far 
only seen in smaller states like Hong Kong, Singapore and New Zealand. If we become the 
first country to have a completely open economy then we can truly make Brexit work for 
everyone’.354 Even the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Most Rev Justin Welby, is optimistic: 
‘I’m not in the slightest bit pessimistic – quite the reverse, I think there are huge 
opportunities. I see this is a moment of reimagination of what the country is about. It is a 
moment of choice for our future. We’ve got to move forward as a society that has 
reimagined what it is about, that is outward looking, that takes its place confidently in the 
world, not merely for self-protection, but as a force for good in the world’.355 Even some of 
the economic think tanks which predicted a recession before the Referendum are now 
saying that ‘Brexit is not that much of an issue if the government is successful in terms of a 
transition agreement and free trade agreement’.356 
It is also a golden opportunity for the City of London to escape the clutches of the EU as a 
World Financial Centre and take the lead in the new digital revolution of blockchain and 
fintech. Iain Martin believes that ‘the entire structure of global finance, of fixed, large 
regulatory blocs (of which the EU is one) looks ripe for disruption and dramatic change’, and 
asks: ‘Will the markets and innovators of the future really do business according to the 
strictures of slow-moving bureaucrats when technology is moving so fast?’. He concludes 
that there will be ‘an almighty struggle between central bankers who want to retain control 
of the financial system and the next generation of digital disruptors. Regulators addicted to 
the idea of standardised global rules will look for more power. But those self-same 
regulators, who rightly emphasised increased capital for banks, have also made regulation 
far too complex and unwieldy since the financial crisis. They have clogged up the arteries of 
the system. As hedge fund manager Crispin Odey put it in the summer: regulation, excessive 
cheap money and QE are killing capitalism. At some point there will be a rebellion against 
this post-crisis settlement, because there will be money to be made from disrupting a 
broken consensus. Technology will enable smart people and firms to do it’.357 The City 
needs to be at the heart of this revolution, not dragged down by Brussels bureaucracy. 
Our friends and trading partners overseas are supportive too. The Australian High 
Commissioner, Alexander Downer, says: ‘We are encouraging the UK and the EU quickly to 
establish a new, mutually beneficial relationship that sustains the economies and global 
influence of both. We are also keen to strike a free trade agreement with the UK. That 
shouldn’t be too hard to do because we are like-minded free traders who know that 
protectionism makes people poorer and costs jobs. Finally, we have another hope: that 
Britain will continue to recognise that it is a global power with global responsibilities, not 
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just a regional player. If it does so, this will mean Australia and the UK finding yet more ways 
to work together and promote the values and objectives we share’.358 China’s ambassador 
to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, states that: ‘Britain now is China’s major trading partner and 
investment destination in Europe. The Brexit Referendum has certainly not dampened the 
enthusiasm of Chinese businesses about investing in this country. On the contrary, it opens 
the door to the possibility of exploring a higher level of bilateral trade and investment 
arrangements…London's financial services sector stands to benefit from the ongoing 
internationalisation of the renminbi, if it continues to sell the City as an offshore centre for 
the currency. For China and the UK, renminbi internationalisation is an important part of our 
cooperation in [the] financial sectors. It is an area where we can dovetail respective 
strengths and produce mutual benefits’. He added that as the renminbi becomes a reserve 
currency, ‘that will give London a further advantage and allow offshore RMB business in 
London to grow at an even faster speed’.359 Similarly, the US ambassador, Woody Johnson, 
says: ‘It is in everyone’s interest that Brexit be transparent, smooth, and orderly. But 
whatever the outcome of the negotiations between the UK and the EU, Britain should know 
you will have a strong and reliable trade and investment partner in America. Our countries 
are among each other’s largest inward investors. Americans and Brits hold roughly one 
trillion dollars of investment and employ approximately one million people in each other’s 
countries — jobs that have increased prosperity and opportunity in all four countries of the 
United Kingdom and in every American state. As far as the president is concerned, the 
United Kingdom, our most enduring ally, is always at the head of the line’.360 
But to make the best of Brexit, the City needs to address the following issues:  
• It should recognise that its place is to service the real financial needs of businesses 
and individuals in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world and that this is best done 
outside the EU which, because of its protectionism, its excessive regulation and the 
folly of the euro, is destroying growth and innovation in the EU member states.  In 
order to do this, it needs to deal with the criticism made after the Global Financial 
Crisis by Lord Adair Turner, then chairman of the Financial Services Authority, 
namely that many of its activities – in particular those surrounding complex financial 
instruments – are ‘socially useless’.361 
 
• It should agree a ‘consistent and forward-looking Brexit strategy’ in order to secure a 
‘bold, bright, buccaneering post-Brexit future’, as demanded by the Lord Mayor of 
London, Jeffrey Mountevans, at the City Banquet at Mansion House on 26 October 
2016. He also said that Brexit is chance for the City to demonstrate its relevance to 
the rest of society: ‘We must conceive a vision of the UK’s place in the world, in five, 
ten, twenty years, covering everything from regulation to infrastructure. Not only for 
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our own use, not only to inform a government that already carries a heavy burden in 
the negotiations, but to further secure trust among a public that craves stability’.362  
 
• It should build on the protections afforded by international law – see Table 5. An 
unnamed close colleague of Michel Barnier was interviewed by Nick Watt, the 
political editor of BBC’s Newsnight on 5 January 2017.  He said that the UK was 
effectively coming to the negotiating table as a ‘supplicant’. And this is precisely how 
many in the City have reacted following the Referendum.  It is absurd for the EU to 
insist that a provider of financial services has to be physically located in a market to 
do business. It is just as absurd to expect that the City of London will have to move 
to Paris or Frankfurt after Brexit as it is to expect the French wine industry or the 
German car industry to move to the UK. As the financier Miles Morland points out, 
there is more investment banking expertise on the Isle of Dogs than in the whole of 
continental Europe put together.363  
 
• It should aim to quickly recover the competitive edge that it has lost in recent years.  
The WTO has estimated that the City’s share of China’s imports of financial services 
(mainly insurance) was 3% in 2015, unchanged since 2011. Over the same period, 
the US share increased from 11% to 28%.364 
 
 
Table 5 - What international law allows countries to do and not do in terms of 
international trade 
The arrangements for leaving the EU will, in practice, be similar to the case of ‘state 
succession’ where an existing state splits and the component parts wish to continue 
existing treaty relationships with other states.  
The UK can negotiate a two-way zero-tariff Free Trade Agreement with the EU. This might 
be better for both sides than the only alternative that gives zero tariffs on trade flows 
between the two regions which is a customs union agreement. 
Further, a FTA could be implemented within two years by virtue of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 which will incorporate all EU law into UK law, thereby creating a 
status quo ante situation at the point of departure. The argument that the EU makes that 
this would be impossible to achieve this in two years, because it takes an average of 7 
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years to negotiate a FTA and that the UK does not have sufficient trade negotiators, is a 
political one, not a legal or practical one.365 Lawyers for Britain dismiss the idea that 
negotiations are too complicated to complete in 2 years. They argue that an in-principle 
deal covering most aspects of Brexit is possible in 2 years, with smaller issues to be 
resolved later.366 
The UK can in practice roll-over all EU trade agreements with third countries by analogy 
with the ‘principle of continuity’ under international law, unless these countries positively 
object. The UK does not have to withdraw from those agreements and start negotiations 
again. 
The UK can negotiate FTAs with third countries before formally leaving the EU  – they just 
cannot come into force before Brexit.  
The Maastricht Treaty specifically promotes capital market integration, not only within 
the EU, but between the EU and third countries. The treaty, in particular, recognises the 
importance of free capital mobility in order to make the monetary union work. Any 
attempts by the EU to restrict UK-based financial services companies operating in the EU 
might, therefore, be incompatible with this treaty.  
EU laws, e.g., on ‘reverse solicitation exemptions’ or ‘overseas persons exemptions’, can 
be used to allow financial institutions to provide certain cross-border services. Similarly, 
EU laws allow cross-border dealings — ‘including multiple on-the-ground visits’ — without 
a local branch or licence. 
Property rights under both the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU’s own 
Charter of Fundamental Rights can be used to protect extant contracts which have an 
economic value on Brexit. 
The global principles established by the G20 in 2009 after the Global Financial Crisis to 
reduce systemic risk recognised that the free flow of capital was critical for the real 
economy. Any attempts by the EU to restrict UK-based financial services companies 
operating in the EU might, therefore, be incompatible with these principles.  
The European Central Bank, like the Bank of England, is a member of the Bank for 
International Settlements (i.e., the central bank to the world’s central banks) and this 
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supports a level playing field for all its members (implying that the EU cannot discriminate 
against UK-based companies). 
The EU has no jurisdiction outside its own borders. The EU cannot therefore prevent firms 
in third countries trading or clearing euro-denominated instruments. This has been 
confirmed by the ECJ, but, in any event, these activities are not legally classified as cross-
border activities, over which the EU can claim jurisdiction. However, the EU might 
attempt to regulate or prevent the participation of EU resident entities in euro clearing 
activities outside its borders. 
All major economies are locked into legally-binding commitments not to raise tariffs. They 
can only reverse these measures if they compensate other WTO members. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that ‘acquired rights’ cannot be 
taken away suddenly. The ability of one country to trade with another on the basis of zero 
tariffs could be interpreted as an ‘acquired right’ under this convention.  
The prime minister’s Lancaster House speech367 enables the UK to have a very ‘clean’ Brexit 
from the EU: the implications of this are given in Table 6. A golden post-Brexit era beckons 
for the City if it can return to its original roots of meeting the needs of the real economy 
both in the UK and globally. 
 Table 6 – Implications of the Lancaster House speech for a ‘clean’ Brexit 
On 23 June 2016, the British people voted to leave the EU. This is due to take place on 29 
March 2019. The prime minister’s Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017 made it 
clear that this meant also leaving the single market, the customs union and the European 
Economic Area, membership of which means accepting freedom of movement. 
This has powerful implications for the City: 
• It is unlikely that business with the EU27 will be conducted via passports in future. 
• Instead, and depending on the degree of cooperation from the EU27, the City 
should plan its future operations using either:   
o a third-country enhanced equivalence model with guarantees about how 
equivalence will be granted and removed,  
o mutual recognition of financial regulations with mutual market access, or 
o a World Financial Centre model where the City ‘goes it alone’. 
• The City should make the most of the transitional or implementation period 
between 30 March 2019 and 31 December 2020 to secure existing commercial 
relationships and initiate new ones, now that it will no longer be a rule taker from 
Brussels. 
• The City should encourage the government to support the development of legally 
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binding regulatory standards at a global level free from political interference. The 
aim would be to promote global consistency and cooperation between regulatory 
authorities. 
• The City should encourage the government to support the overseas expansion of 
UK financial services in the fastest growing regions of the global economy. 
• The City should encourage the government to introduce a flexible system of work 
permits for skilled workers that covers workers who are offered a job in the UK 
and who are located in any country in the world outside the UK. 
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Appendix 1: Economic Blocs in Europe 
Figure A1: Economic Blocs in Europe 
 
 
Source: Figure 1.B, HM Treasury analysis: the long-term economic impact of EU membership and the 
alternatives, Cm 9250 April 2016 
The European Union 
Figure A1 shows the member states of the European Union. 
There are three economic elements of EU membership: the customs union, the single 
market, and budget contributions.368 Net UK budget contributions equal 0.5% of GDP. 
The customs union 
Figure A1 shows that the customs union comprises the member states of the EU plus 
Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Turkey. 
There are three economic elements to the customs union: import tariffs, export tariffs and 
the ability (or otherwise) to negotiate free trade deals as a sovereign nation. 
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Members of the customs union have to impose a set of around 13,000 Common External 
Tariffs (CET) on goods imported from outside the customs union, under the EU’s common 
commercial policy. 
Goods exported from one member of the customs union to another have to satisfy ‘rules of 
origin’. Origin defines the 'economic' nationality of goods traded across borders. The 
nationality, the value and the tariff classification of goods must be determined in order to 
know which duties and charges apply to them, as well as any customs restrictions or special 
requirements. There are two different types of rules of origin:  
• Preferential – preferential rules of origin are the instruments used to determine if a 
product exported from a beneficiary or partner country may be considered as 
sufficiently linked to that country and therefore originating there to the purposes of 
receiving from the EU the tariff preference granted to that country. 
• Non-preferential - non-preferential rules of origin are used for establishing the origin 
of the good for tariff purposes.  
The main principles applicable for imports in the EU are that: 
• If a product is wholly obtained or produced in one country, it is considered to have 
origin in that country (and can be called an 'originating product').  
• If a product has been produced in more than one country, it is considered to have 
origin in the country where the last substantial transformation took place.369 
The single market 
The single (or internal) market comprises member states of the European Union, and has 
been extended, with exceptions, to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway through the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area and to Switzerland (which is a member of the 
European Free Trade Association, but not the EEA) through bilateral treaties.  
The single market is a trade agreement that allows participating countries to trade across 
borders with no extra tariffs, non-tariff barriers (such as additional regulations) or quotas.  
But it is more than that, it is also a single regulatory regime. To quote Dan Hannan:  'Most 
people understand “single market” to mean something like “free trade zone”. In fact, in the 
EU context, it means “single regulatory regime”. Membership of the single market doesn’t 
mean the right to buy and sell there (pretty much the entire world can do that); it means 
accepting EU jurisdiction over your domestic technical standards. … Only 6% of British 
companies do any business at all with the rest of the EU; yet 100% of our firms must apply 
100% of EU regulations'.370 Richard Patient, the former chairman of London Business for 
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Britain, agrees: ‘In truth, the single market was always a misnomer. It should have been 
called the Single Protectionist Zone or the Single Regulatory Regime. The single market was 
never about opening up markets. It was always about imposing rigid common, anti-
competitive standards’.371 
The four freedoms (goods, services, people and capital) and EU product and employment 
law generally apply across the whole economy of each member state of the single market – 
not just the traded goods and services sectors. However, if a good or service being traded 
compromises one member state’s national laws regarding public policy, security or health, 
the national rules take precedence. Otherwise, the EU will create a single market law with 
EU-wide rules - for example on the noise made by electrical devices. There are also 
minimum and maximum standards. A minimum standards EU law allows individual member 
states to add tougher rules on top. A maximum standards EU law means that the EU law 
takes precedence over national laws.372  
The European Economic Area 
The EEA was set up in the 1990s and comprises all EU member states plus Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein.  The non-EU members are not part of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
the Common Fisheries Policy or the customs union, but get barrier free trade with the single 
market in return for making some EU budget contributions and accepting the four 
freedoms, including the free movement of people. The UK is a member of the EEA. 
The European Free Trade Association 
The European Free Trade Association comprises Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland.  The UK left EFTA when it joined the European Economic Community (the 
predecessor to the EU) in 1973. 
Appendix 2: Treaties establishing the European Union 
The Maastricht Treaty  
The Maastricht Treaty (officially the Treaty on European Union or TEU) designed to lead to 
the economic integration of Europe was signed on 7 February 1992 by the members of the 
European Community (established by the Treaty of Rome373 in 1957) in Maastricht, 
Netherlands. On 9–10 December 1991, the same city hosted the European Council which 
drafted the treaty. Upon its entry into force on 1 November 1993, during the Delors 
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Commission, it created the European Union and led to the creation of the single European 
currency, the euro. The Treaty formalised the powers of the EU’s supra-national 
institutions—the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court 
of Justice. The Treaty has been amended by the treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon.374 
The Amsterdam Treaty  
The Amsterdam Treaty (officially the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the 
European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related 
acts) was signed on 2 October 1997, and entered into force on 1 May 1999; it made 
substantial changes to the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, member states agreed to devolve certain powers from 
national governments to the European Parliament across diverse areas, including legislating 
on immigration, adopting civil and criminal laws, and enacting a common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP), as well as implementing institutional changes for expansion as new 
member nations join the EU.375 
The Nice Treaty  
The Treaty of Nice was signed by European leaders on 26 February 2001 and came into 
force on 1 February 2003. 
It amended the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty of Nice reformed the 
institutional structure of the European Union to allow eastward expansion, a task which was 
originally intended to have been done by the Amsterdam Treaty, but failed to be addressed 
at the time.376 
The Lisbon Treaty 
The Treaty of Lisbon (initially known as the Reform Treaty) is an international agreement 
which amends the two treaties which form the constitutional basis of the European Union 
(EU). The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007, and 
entered into force on 1 December 2009. It amends the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of 
Rome (1957), known in updated form as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (2007) or TFEU. 
Key changes included the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) in at 
least 45 policy areas in the Council of Ministers, a change in calculating such a majority to a 
new double majority, a more powerful European Parliament forming a bicameral legislature 
alongside the Council of Ministers under the ordinary legislative procedure, a consolidated 
legal personality for the EU and the creation of a long-term President of the European 
Council and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The 
                                                     
374 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maastricht_Treaty 
375 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amsterdam_Treaty 
376 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Nice 
121 
 
Treaty also made the Union's bill of rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, legally 
binding. The Treaty for the first time gave member states the explicit legal right to leave the 
EU and the procedure to do so (Article 50).377 
Appendix 3: Treaties establishing the single (internal) market 
The Single European Act  
The Single European Act (SEA) was the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The 
Act set the European Community an objective of establishing a single (internal) market by 
31 December 1992. It was signed at Luxembourg on 17 February 1986, and at The Hague on 
28 February 1986. It came into effect on 1 July 1987, under the Delors Commission.378 The 
single market was conceived by Arthur Cockfield who was appointed a European 
commissioner by Margaret Thatcher in 1984. He soon realised that the ‘common market’ 
was not working well because each country set its own standards and regulations for 
products and services. These were, in effect, hidden barriers to trade and were reducing the 
effectiveness of an open European-wide market, despite the fact that formal trade barriers, 
such as import duties, had been abolished. His 1985 White Paper made 300 
recommendations for removing barriers to trade in goods and services and these were 
incorporated into the SEA.379 The single market is, in reality, a ‘common regulatory market’. 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007, TFEU) (which replaced the 
Treaty of Rome in 2009) formalised the freedom of movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital: Art. 26 (2) TFEU states that ‘the internal market shall comprise an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured…’ 
Art. 63 TFEU stipulates that ‘…all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member 
States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited’. The wording of 
the Treaty provision defines the fundamental features of this principle: 
• ‘…all restrictions…’ 
• ‘…between Member States…’/ ‘between Member States and third countries’: capital 
movement concerned must contain a cross-border element  
• ‘third countries’: this freedom also concerns third countries 
• ‘movement of capital’: the wording of Article 63 TFEU contains no limitation as to 
who has the right to invoke this freedom  
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• ‘…prohibited’: Art. 63 TFEU has direct effect; it does not need any implementing 
legislation at Member States’ level and it directly confers rights on individuals which 
they can rely on before national courts (see e.g. case C-101/05, Skatteverket v A, 
§21).  
• ‘…all restrictions... shall be prohibited’: Art. 63 TFEU prohibits all obstacles, not just 
discriminatory ones. It lays down a general prohibition, which goes beyond the mere 
elimination of unequal treatment on grounds of nationality (see case C-367/98, 
Commission / Portugal, §44).  
On payments, Art. 63(2) TFEU stipulates that ‘Within the framework of the provisions set 
out in this Chapter, all restrictions on payments between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited’.380 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)381 has established that the free 
movement of capital, as a fundamental principle of the Treaty, may be restricted only by 
national rules which are justified by reasons referred to in Art. 65(1) TFEU or by overriding 
requirements of the general interest (see e.g. cases C-463/00, Commission v Spain, §68 and 
C-174/04, Commission v Italy, §35, where the Court further notes that "…in order to be so 
justified, the national legislation must be suitable for securing the objective which it pursues 
and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it, so as to accord with the 
principle of proportionality"). 
Regarding third countries, the CJEU has established (see case C-101/05, Skatteverket v A, 
§37) that it may be ‘…that a Member State will be able to demonstrate that a restriction on 
the movement of capital to or from third countries is justified for a particular reason in 
circumstances where that reason would not constitute a valid justification for a restriction 
on capital movements between Member States…’.382 
Appendix 4: The UK’s legal position in respect of international trade 
agreements following Brexit 
Lawyers for Britain have clarified the UK’s legal position as follows:383 
One consequence of the UK’s membership of the EU is that many aspects of the UK’s 
external relations are now conducted partly or wholly through the EU. As a result of Brexit, 
the UK would be able to re-assume direct control of its external relations, including trade 
relations.  The pro-Remain camp suggested in the campaign that Brexit would result in years 
of uncertainty while the UK renegotiates its international trade arrangements. 
 
This contention is not supported by the facts and evidence.  The UK cannot currently decide 
the level of tariffs which we levy on imports, because these are set at a uniform level for the 
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EU as a whole under the EU's customs union. After exit, WTO rules would apply which would 
allow the UK to decide the level of our own tariffs on imports, provided that tariffs on 
average are no higher than under the EU customs union. 
Again, because of the EU customs union and 'common commercial policy', the UK is not able 
to negotiate its own trade agreements with non-member countries – we can only do so as 
part of the EU. The UK will be able to participate in new trade agreements with non-
member countries from the day after exit.  The process of negotiating new trade deals can 
be started during the 2-year notice period leading up to Brexit, with a view to bringing them 
into force on or soon after the date of exit. 
The EU has existing free trade agreements which currently apply to the UK as an EU 
member.  Most of these EU agreements are with micro-States or developing countries and 
only a small number represent significant export markets for the UK.  Both the EU and the 
member states (including the UK) are parties to these agreements. The UK could simply 
continue to apply the substantive terms of these agreements on a reciprocal basis after exit 
unless the counterparty State were actively to object. We can see no rational reason why 
the counterparty States would object to this course since that would subject their existing 
export trade into the UK market, which is currently tariff free, to new tariffs. There will be 
no need for complicated renegotiation of these existing agreements as was misleadingly 
claimed by pro-Remain propaganda. 
The UK was a founder member of EFTA but withdrew when we joined the EEC in 1973.  We 
could apply to re-join with effect from the day after Brexit. There is no reason why the four 
current EFTA countries would not welcome us back, given that the UK is one of EFTA's 
largest export markets.  EFTA membership would allow us to continue uninterrupted free 
trade relations with the four EFTA countries, and also to participate in EFTA's promotion of 
free trade deals with non-member countries around the world. 
The EU is seriously encumbered in trying to negotiate trade agreements by the large 
number of vociferous protectionist special interests within its borders.  After Brexit, the UK 
would be able to negotiate new trade deals unencumbered by these special interests much 
faster than the EU, and with a higher priority for faciliting access to markets for our own 
export industries including services. 
It is completely untrue that you need to be a member of a large bloc like the EU in order to 
strike trade deals.  The actual record of the EU compared to that (for example) of the EFTA 
countries demonstrates the direct opposite. 
The baseline of our trade relationship with the remaining EU states would be governed by 
WTO rules which provide for non-discrimination in tariffs, and outlaw discriminatory non-
tariff measures. From this baseline, and as the remaining EU's largest single export 
market, we would be in a strong position to negotiate a mutually beneficial deal providing 
for the continued free flow of goods and services in both directions. 
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The EU and the common commercial policy 
The EU is a customs union, not simply a free trade area.  The point of a customs union is that 
all its members operate a single unified system of customs tariffs so that any particular 
category of goods will be charged the same tariff whether it enters the EU via, say, 
Rotterdam or via Felixstowe.  
Because the external tariff wall is identical for all members, the members of a customs 
union need to operate as a bloc when they enter into trade agreements involving tariffs 
with other countries.  An agreement to reduce or get rid of tariffs on imports from another 
country necessarily involves the customs union as a whole.  For example, if one country in 
the customs union acting alone were to reduce tariffs on goods from an external country, 
those goods would then flow in through its ports and circulate around the whole customs 
union, by-passing the higher tariffs imposed at the ports of the other customs union 
members. 
 
For this reason, a common external trade policy was built into the Treaty of Rome from the 
inception of the EEC, as a necessary counterpart of the customs union created by that 
Treaty.  This was called the “common commercial policy”. Under that policy, the European 
Commission is entrusted with the primary responsibility for negotiating trade agreements, 
under the supervision of the Member States acting through the Council of Ministers.  Trade 
agreements may then be concluded by the EEC (now the EU) in its own name, which has so-
called “exclusive competence” to conclude agreements with non-member countries falling 
within the field of the common commercial policy.  The word “competence” here has the 
French legal meaning of the legal power to do something. 
The WTO Agreements and “mixed competence” 
In practice,  trade agreements almost always extend to cover broader subject matter than 
just tariffs and related matters falling within the scope of the EEC/EU common commercial 
policy.  Where an external agreement contains provisions which extend beyond the scope of 
the common commercial policy or the EU’s other powers to conclude external agreements 
in its own name, it is necessary for the Member States as well as the EU to be parties to the 
agreement.  This is called a “mixed” or “shared” competence agreement: where part of the 
competence to conclude the agreement belongs to the EU, but part of it remains with the 
Member States. 
One particularly important series of agreements which involved mixed competence were 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreements which were concluded in 1993 as a result 
of the Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  This linked series of Agreements 
forms the bedrock of global trade. 
Both the individual Member States including the UK, and the EU itself, are parties to the 
WTO Agreements. The respective legal powers of the EC (as it then was) and the Member 
States were ruled upon by the European Court of Justice in Op 1/94 Re the Uruguay Round 
Agreements [1994] ECR I-5267.  The Court rejected a contention by the European 
Commission that the EC had across-the-board competence to conclude the WTO 
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Agreements in its own name.  Although the core provisions of the WTO Agreements relating 
to trade in goods fell within the EC’s exclusive competence under the common commercial 
policy, the Court ruled that other areas covered by the WTO Agreements relating to services 
(parts of the General Agreement on Trade in Services - GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) were outside the EC’s competence or were 
areas where the EC’s competence was shared with the Member States. 
The upshot of this “mixed competence” scenario is that vis-a-vis other parties, the EC/EU is 
responsible for compliance with, and entitled to the benefit of, certain aspects of the WTO 
Agreements; while the Member States individually remain responsible for, and entitled to 
the benefit of, the remaining aspects.  The boundary between EC/EU and Member State 
competences is not stationary: under the ECJ’s Lugano doctrine, the EU acquires external 
competence in areas where internal EU harmonisation occurs, and a significant shift in 
competence took place under the Lisbon Treaty which made the trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property part of the EU’s commercial policy.  While this fluctuating boundary 
line may be confusing for other WTO members, it is in general accepted by them. 
However, the consequence of this after Brexit is straightforward.  The EU will cease to have 
any competence in respect of the UK’s trade or other external relations, and the UK will 
automatically assume rights and responsibilities in respect of 100% of its relationship with 
other members under the WTO Agreements.  In addition, trade relations between the UK 
and the remaining EU (“the r-EU”) will cease to be governed by the EU treaties, and will 
automatically be governed by the framework of the WTO Agreements - unless of course a 
replacement trade agreement is negotiated between the UK and the r-EU which comes into 
force on exit. 
There is no question of the UK having to leave the WTO or to re-apply for membership. The 
UK is one of the original founding members of the WTO, as laid down by Article XI(1) of the 
WTO Agreement:  
Article XI 
Original Membership 
1. The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, 
and the European Communities, which accept this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and Commitments are annexed to GATT 
1994 and for which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall become 
original Members of the WTO. 
Rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements 
The WTO Agreements provide the present-day framework for global trade and contain a 
number of very important principles and rules, as well as a mechanism for the adjudication 
of disputes under the World Trade Organisation.  Resort to the WTO disputes mechanism is 
at present precluded to the UK in any disagreement with the EU or other Member States by 
Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which states 
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that: “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for 
therein.” 
One of the key principles of the WTO Agreements is non-discrimination in trade 
relations.  This means that WTO members are not allowed, for example, to charge different 
tariffs on goods imported from different countries except in clearly defined and limited 
circumstances.  Thus, following Brexit and assuming for the sake of argument that no trade 
agreement were reached between the UK and the r-EU, the r-EU would apply its standard 
external tariff rates to imports from the UK but would not be allowed to discriminate by 
charging higher rates to the UK than to other non-EU countries.  Similarly, the UK would 
apply its standard external tariffs to imports from the r-EU.  
However, the UK would not be obliged to charge tariffs on its imports at the same rates as it 
is obliged to charge while it is a member of the EU customs union, and would certainly have 
the legal right to reduce them as it sees fit.  The EU has given a large number of 
commitments in multilateral trade talks not to increase its tariffs above certain levels (so-
called "bound tariffs").  Because, as explained above, these commitments were given by the 
EU itself on a matter falling within its exclusive competence and not by the individual 
Member States, it is probable as a matter of legal theory that the UK after exit would not be 
bound by these commitments and therefore could in theory raise its tariffs above the levels 
of the EU's bound tariffs.  
But it is in practice very unlikely that the UK would wish to raise tariffs after exit, except 
perhaps in some narrow and exceptional circumstances.  As a global trading nation, the UK 
has a strong interest in the general reduction of tariff levels around the world and would 
certainly not wish to act in way which would be against the spirit if not the letter of the WTO 
Agreements. Under Article XXIV of GATT 1994, when a customs union is formed its overall 
weighted average of tariffs needs to be the same as or lower than the weighted average of 
tariffs of its component states,  and the UK would certainly wish to apply a  similar principle 
when it leaves; i.e. to keep its average tariffs the same as or lower than under the EU’s 
current tariff regime. 
This is an important point.  The UK would be under no obligation to maintain its tariffs at the 
same level as it is currently obliged to impose under the EU customs union. In many cases 
EU tariffs are set at high levels in order to protect industries in other parts of the EU where 
the UK has little or no domestic industry to protect,  such as textiles and clothing, shoes and 
many kinds of heavily protected agricultural produce. In these cases the UK receives no 
benefit but pays twice over for the privilege of protecting foreign industries from lower cost 
competition in the world market:  our consumers pay higher prices than they need for the 
products concerned, and on top of that and to add insult to injury, we have to hand over the 
tariffs collected at our ports to the EU as part of its so-called "own resources". 
One astonishing aspect of the May 2016 Treasury study purporting to demonstrate the 
economic disadvantages of leaving the EU is its assumption that the UK post Brexit would 
continue to levy tariffs on imports at the same levels as those imposed under the EU 
customs union, so needlessly punishing our own consumers by forcing them to pay higher 
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prices than available on world markets.  It would be a clear and unequivocal benefit of 
leaving the EU to have the right to set tariffs at levels which suit our own circumstances and 
probably, as a nation with a bias to free trade, reducing them in many cases. 
As a lawyers' group, we do not feel qualified to attempt to quantify this potential benefit in 
money terms but point to the study published by Prof Patrick Minford and others which 
suggests that leaving the EU and adopting a liberal tariff and trade policy will decrease 
prices and boost GDP. 
Under Article XXIV paragraph 5 of GATT 1994, members of the WTO are entitled to form 
customs unions or free trade areas and to abolish tariffs between themselves without this 
being regarded as discriminatory against other countries.  The EU is a customs union.  After 
Brexit, the UK could therefore maintain a zero tariff regime in both directions between itself 
and the r-EU either by continuing to belong to the EU customs union or by entering into a 
free trade agreement. 
According to the latest figures (2015, ONS “Pink Book”) the UK exported £134.3bn worth of 
goods to the r-EU but imported £223.0bn.  This indicates that the imposition of tariffs on 
bilateral trade between the UK and the r-EU after Brexit would be very substantially more 
painful for r-EU exporters than for UK exporters, were it allowed to occur. 
 
We deal with the likely terms of a UK-EU post-Brexit trade agreement,  in a later section.  In 
this section we concentrate on the UK's post-Brexit trade relations with non-EU states. 
The EU’s Free Trade Agreements and the UK 
The EU has concluded a number of free trade agreements with non-member States.  These 
provide for the elimination of tariffs on trade in most goods, and typically also seek to 
eliminate or at least reduce non-tariff barriers.  A number of these agreements provide for 
free trade in services as well as goods. 
For the reasons explained above about ‘mixed competence’, the EU Member States 
(including the UK) are normally parties to these free trade agreements as well as the EU 
itself.  This has important implications when it comes to Brexit, as we shall explain. 
Taking for example the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement concluded in 2011, both the EU 
itself and the Member States are parties to the treaty with the Republic of Korea.  The 
definition of the Parties in Article 1.2 refers to the “mixed competence” explained 
above:  the ‘EU Party’ is defined as ‘the European Union or its Member States or the 
European Union and its Member States within their respective areas of competence as 
derived from’ the EU Treaties.  
The substantive obligations in the agreement are expressed to apply between the 
Parties.  Thus, for example, the obligation in Article 2.5 to eliminate customs duties states 
that “each Party shall eliminate its customs duties on originating goods of the other Party in 
accordance with its Schedule included in Annex 2-A.”  The FTA also contains mutual 
obligations regarding freedom to provide services, intellectual property and other matters. 
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There would be no difficulty in the UK continuing to comply with the substantive obligations 
of this FTA after Brexit; and Korea on a reciprocal basis would have no difficulty continuing 
to apply these substantive provisions both to the UK and the r-EU.  This step would not 
require any renegotiation of the substantive provisions of the FTA:  all that would be needed 
would be a statement by the UK that it intended after Brexit to continue to operate the 
terms of the FTA between itself and Korea, and an acknowledgement by Korea that it would 
likewise continue to do so.  
There are also procedural provisions in the FTA which involve bilateral joint committees or 
bilateral disputes and arbitration procedures between the EU and Korea.  Clearly it would 
not be appropriate for the UK to continue to be represented by the European Commission 
or other EU organs in its relations with Korea after Brexit, so these would need to be 
operated on a bilateral UK/Korea basis in respect of the UK’s obligations under the FTA. 
In order to provide for the smooth and continued flow of trade in both directions on Brexit, 
no new FTA or renegotiation of the substantive terms of the EU-Korea FTA would be 
necessary.  All that would be required would be a simple acknowledgement by the UK and 
Korea that they would continue to operate its substantive terms on a mutual basis until 
further notice, and to set up bilateral UK/Korea machinery to mirror the bilateral EU/Korea 
machinery of the FTA.  It is likely that after Brexit the UK would wish to go further and both 
strengthen and deepen existing FTAs such as the one with Korea and negotiate new FTAs 
with other parties; but this longer term process would in no way prevent the rolling over of 
the terms of the existing EU FTAs into UK FTAs. 
Korea could in theory object to the rolling over of the FTA in this way, but it is impossible to 
see what conceivable reason it would have to do so.  If Korea were to bring to an end the 
existing free trade relationship between itself and the UK as an EU Member State, it would 
result in the renewed imposition of tariffs on Korea’s goods exports to the UK, which are 
substantial and include cars and electronic goods. 
We have taken the EU-Korea FTA as an example, but very much the same points would 
apply to the EU’s other FTAs (which normally include the UK and Member States as treaty 
parties as well as the EU for the reasons explained above).  In fact, this kind of “rolling over” 
of treaty obligations is a familiar process in international law.  It happens in cases of “State 
succession” where an existing State splits and the component parts wish to continue 
existing treaty relationships with other States.  For example, when Czechoslovakia split into 
the separate states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia on 31 December 1992, both new 
States agreed to assume and continue to honour the treaty obligations of the former State 
of Czechoslovakia, and other States and international bodies accepted the succession as 
being effective, where necessary agreeing new machinery for the separate representation 
of the two new States. 
The exit of the UK from the EU is not legally a case of State succession. As explained above, 
the UK will reassume the full powers of its existing Statehood by re-assuming rights and 
responsibilities for its own international relations in areas at present where its interests are 
represented via the EU.  However, the practical issues involved are very similar and there is 
a similar mutual interest in preserving the continuity of existing treaty arrangements, 
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particularly those which affect day-to-day existing trade, unless there is some good and 
concrete reason for changing those arrangements.  It follows that the international 
counterparties to the existing EU FTAs will almost certainly follow general State practice in 
State succession cases and accept the rolling over of FTA arrangements so that they 
continue to apply to the UK after Brexit. 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
The UK was a founder member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) when it was 
formed in 1960.  EFTA operated as a free trade area in Europe alongside the EEC and 
contained, in addition to the UK, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, and 
Portugal.  In 1973, the UK and Denmark joined the EEC and as a result withdrew from EFTA. 
As explained above, the EEC is a customs union and it is not possible for individual member 
states who are within a customs union to belong to a free trade area with external 
countries: it is necessary for the customs union as a bloc to belong to a free trade area.  It 
was clearly not desired for the UK and Denmark to terminate their free trade relationship 
with the other EFTA states when they joined the EEC in 1973, and the solution adopted was 
for the EEC as a whole to enter into free trade agreements with the remaining EFTA 
states.  This preserved the free-trade relationship between the UK and Denmark and the 
other EFTA states, and indeed expanded it so the EFTA members also came into free trade 
relations with the other EEC Members (the original Six). 
Sweden, Austria and Portugal also subsequently joined the EEC and as a result withdrew 
from EFTA, although preserving their free trade relationships with the EFTA states as a result 
of the bilateral free trade agreements between the EEC and the remaining EFTA 
countries.  EFTA now consists of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.  As regards 
3 of those States, the European Economic Area Agreement (to which the EU and the EU 
Member States are parties) now largely regulates free trade relations between those three 
states and between them and the EU.  However, Switzerland declined to join the EEA and as 
a result the trade relations  between itself and the other EFTA States are still governed by 
the EFTA agreement (now revised and known as the Vaduz Convention). 
In the event of a Brexit decision, it would be logical for the UK to apply for readmission to 
EFTA in advance of Brexit, with a view to its membership taking effect immediately upon EU 
exit.  There seems no reason why the four current EFTA states should not welcome such an 
application. The EU and its Member States are not parties to the EFTA convention and 
would have no say over such an application for membership.  The immediate effect of the 
UK joining EFTA upon Brexit would be to preserve the existing free trade relations between 
the UK and the EFTA states, avoiding the risk of, say, Swiss exports into the UK being 
subjected to tariffs (and vice versa).  Notably, in 2013, the UK was Switzerland’s fifth most 
important export market in the world (Swiss official website), while the UK was Norway’s 
single most important trading partner receiving 25% of Norway’s total exports in that year 
(Norway official website). 
The revised EFTA convention (the Vaduz Convention) extends beyond free trade in goods, 
and includes provisions on free trade in services and the free movement of capital and of 
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persons. None of these should be problematical to the UK given that the Vaduz Convention 
only applies between its members and so would not act as a gateway for the free 
movement of persons from the r-EU or elsewhere.  All four EFTA states have standards of 
living comparable to or even higher than the UK so do not present any mass migration risk. 
(The last occasion on which uncontrolled migration from Norway was problematical was 
when the invading Norwegian army under King Harald Hardrada was defeated by King 
Harold Godwinson of England at the Battle of Stamford Bridge on 25 September 1066). 
Rejoining EFTA would have an importance beyond direct trade relations between the UK 
and the EFTA states.  This is because in addition to facilitating and deepening free trade 
between its own members, EFTA also facilitates free trade relations between itself and 
other countries. In this regard, EFTA has been notably more successful than the EU, contrary 
to pro-Remain mythology peddled in the campaign which claimed, contrary to the facts and 
objective evidence, that it is beneficial to belong to a large bloc like the EU in order to forge 
trade agreements with other countries. 
In fact, it is a positive barrier to the successful conclusion of free trade agreements to 
belong to the EU.  As recently as 26 April 2016, El Pais reported that France and a group of 
other EU Member States pressed the EU Commission to delay the restart of the already 
heavily delayed free trade talks between the EU and Mercosur, the Latin American bloc 
which includes Brazil and Argentina.  Their concern is the potentially harmful effects of free 
trade on some sectors of EU agricultural producers who would be exposed to competition 
from South American producers. 
More recently, the coming into force of the long awaited Canada-EU trade agreement has 
been delayed by the refusal of Romania to ratify the agreement because of a visa dispute 
with Canada. 
Similarly,  the long drawn out EU-USA attempts to negotiate a Trans Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) have been severely hampered by France's requirement that 
the EU should insist on the French film industry being shielded from open competition from 
Hollywood.  Since Hollywood is one of the USA's most important export industries,  this and 
other protectionist demands have caused severe problems in progressing the talks and it is 
far from clear that the EU will ever be able actually to conclude a free trade agreement with 
the USA. 
As a consequence of the EU's lack of success in negotiating free trade agreements with 
major export markets, the EU’s trade agreements are heavily skewed towards agreements 
with less developed countries, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and a large number of 
micro-states (Map of EU FTAs).  These agreements may be worthwhile for reasons other 
than trading self interest, for example to assist in the development and political stabilisation 
of these countries, and for those reasons the UK may well wish to continue these free trade 
arrangements after exit.  But as regards significant export markets, the EU has only 
concluded its agreement with Korea in 2011 and has only just reached an agreement with 
Canada after years of negotiation. 
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By contrast, EFTA has been notably successful in reaching agreements with large and 
growing export markets around the world (EFTA Free Trade Map), and has ongoing 
negotiations with major and growing export markets such as India, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
By rejoining EFTA, the UK would be able to seek the extension of existing EFTA FTAs to itself, 
and also to give a large positive impetus in collaboration with its EFTA partners to forging 
new agreements and extending existing free trade agreements particularly in the area of 
trade in services. 
Negotiating trade deals with with non-EU countries before exit 
The machinery of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union means that there is likely to be 
a period of 2 years between the UK's formal notification of its decision to leave the EU and 
the actual exit date when the EU Treaties cease to apply to the UK and it ceases to be a 
member state. Although claims have been made to the contrary, it is clear that the UK is 
legally entitled to negotiate and conclude, during the period before exit, trade agreements 
which will come into force from and after the date of exit. 
 
Appendix 5: EU directives and regulations relating to the financial services 
industry 
Banking 
MiFID II384 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is the framework of European Union 
(EU) legislation for: 
• investment intermediaries that provide services to clients around shares, bonds, 
units in collective investment schemes and derivatives (collectively known as 
‘financial instruments’) and 
• the organised trading of financial instruments 
MiFID was applied in the UK from November 2007, but was revised to improve the 
functioning of financial markets in light of the financial crisis and to strengthen investor 
protection (by taking notes of discussions with clients; having an ‘appropriateness test’ for 
investments in complex financial instruments; separating research and transactions costs; 
ensuring the best execution of client orders; improved the reporting of transactions; 
reporting transactions costs in both percentage terms and ‘pounds and pence’; notifying 
clients if their portfolio falls by 10% or more; identifying the nationality of clients via a 
‘national client identifier’, such as a national insurance number; identifying those engaged in 
financial transactions via a ‘legal entity identifier’). 
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The revisions came into effect on 3 January 2018, with the new legislation being known as 
MiFID II – this includes a revised MiFID and a new Markets in Financial Instruments 
Regulation (MiFIR). 
MiFIR 
On 20th October 2011, the European Commission published two proposals: the revised 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) along with Markets in Financial 
Investments Regulation (MiFIR). Both the Directive and Regulation aim to establish a safer 
and more transparent financial system by enhancing regulatory requirements, market 
transparency and investor protection. The Regulation sets out to: 
• Strengthen investor protection 
• Reduce the risk of market disorder 
• Reduce systemic risk 
• Increase the efficiency of financial markets 
MiFIR sets out a number of reporting requirements in relation to the disclosure of trade 
data to the public and competent authorities. 
The new MiFIR reporting requirements will replace the build on the existing MiFID 
transaction reporting requirements, but will be more difficult in terms of scope and 
reporting content. 
The MiFIR reporting obligations were introduced in January 2018.385 
CRD IV 
The Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) is an EU legislative package that contains 
prudential rules for banks, building societies and investment firms. Most of the rules in the 
legislation have applied since 1 January 2014. 
CRD IV is made up of the: 
• Capital Requirements Directive (2013/36/EU) (CRD), which must be implemented 
through national law, and 
• Capital Requirements Regulation (575/2013) (CRR), which applies to firms across the 
EU 
CRD IV is intended to implement the Basel III agreement in the EU. This includes enhanced 
requirements for: 
• The quality and quantity of capital 
• A basis for new liquidity and leverage requirements 
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• Rules for counterparty risk 
• Macroprudential standards including a countercyclical capital buffer and capital 
buffers for systemically important institutions. 
CRD IV also: 
• Makes changes to rules on corporate governance, including remuneration 
• Introduces standardised EU regulatory reporting, referred to as COREP and FINREP 
• These reporting requirements will specify the information firms must report to 
supervisors in areas such as own funds, large exposures and financial information. 
CRD IV strengthens the prudential framework for individual institutions and responds to 
financial stability concerns that arose during the latest banking crisis.386  
Asset Management 
AIFMD 
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) is a regulatory framework for 
alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs), including managers of hedge funds, private 
equity firms and investment trusts. 
The AIFMD was implemented in the UK on 22 July 2013. Its scope is broad and, with a few 
exceptions, covers the management, administration and marketing of alternative 
investment funds (AIFs). Its focus is on regulating the AIFM rather than the AIF.   
An AIF is a 'collective investment undertaking' that is not subject to the UCITS regime, and 
includes hedge funds, private equity funds, retail investment funds, investment companies 
and real estate funds, among others. 
The AIFMD establishes an EU-wide harmonised framework for monitoring and supervising 
risks posed by AIFMs and the AIFs they manage, and for strengthening the internal market 
in alternative funds. It also includes new requirements for firms acting as a depositary for an 
AIF. 
AIFMD has the following aims: 
• To enhance supervisory practices among EEA competent authorities to support 
timely and pre-emptive action to prevent market instability and the build-up of 
systemic risk in the European financial system 
• To improve investor protection by imposing new depositary standards and enhanced 
transparency through new investor disclosure rules and mandatory reporting to 
competent authorities 
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• To foster efficiency and cross-border competition by deregulating national barriers 
and creating level playing fields through harmonised rules on an EEA-wide passport 
for full-scope EEA AIFMs to market and manage AIFs from 22 July 2013. 
The following requirements are included in the AIFMD: 
• The authorisation of the fund manager (full scope AIFM) or, alternatively, 
registration subject to a lighter regime for AIFMs managing AIFs with 'assets under 
management' below certain thresholds. Sub-threshold AIFMs may not benefit from 
the AIFMD's marketing and management passports; however, they have the right to 
opt-in to full authorisation to access AIFMD passports 
• Conduct of business (fair treatment of investors, conflicts of interest, remuneration, 
risk management, valuation, disclosure to investors and regulators) 
• Regulatory capital – initial capital, 'own funds' and professional indemnity insurance 
requirements 
• The safekeeping of investments (via the mandatory appointment of depositaries and 
custodians) 
• Controls over delegation of certain tasks, including portfolio management and risk 
management 
• The marketing of AIFs to professional investors within the EEA 
• The use of leverage by AIFMs for all AIFs under management. EEA regulators will 
have new powers to intervene, placing restrictions on leverage and other 
supervisory restrictions where needed to avoid the build-up of systemic risk. 
AIFMD is currently being revised as follows: 
• A number of fund managers in the UK hold a permission to manage investments. It is 
likely that some of these firms, dependent on business models, will need to be re-
authorised under the AIFMD to operate as AIF managers. These may include:  
o MiFID firms carrying out portfolio management and/or risk management for 
EEA funds that are not UCITS funds or funds located offshore in third-country 
jurisdictions, such as the US and Cayman Islands, and 
o operators of collective investment schemes that are not UCITS funds carrying 
out portfolio management and/or risk management in-house 
• The AIFMD will mean certain fund managers are being regulated for the first time. 
For example, investment companies that do not employ an external manager will 
need to be authorised or registered with us under the AIFMD 
• Depositaries of AIFs will have to comply with new requirements 
• The AIFMD brings in significant changes to the management/administration of AIFs 
in the EU and introduces new EU-wide passports for authorised full-scope AIFMs to 
market and manage AIFs from 22 July 2013 
• Marketing and management passports will not be available to non-EEA managers of 
AIFs or to EEA managers in respect of their non-EEA AIFs (this may be adopted from 
2015 subject to ESMA reports and Commission delegated acts). Marketing of such 
funds to professional investors is allowed under national private placement regimes. 
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It is envisaged that existing NPP regimes will be phased out after the non-EEA 
passport regime becomes operational, although not before 2018.387 
UCITS V 
Undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) are regulated 
investment funds that can be sold to the general public throughout the EU, and they have 
common standards of investor protection. 
UCITS V aims to increase the level of protection already offered to investors in UCITS and to 
improve investor confidence in UCITS. It aims to do so by enhancing the rules on the 
responsibilities of depositaries and by introducing remuneration policy requirements for 
UCITS fund managers. 
UCITS V also aims to ensure that all EU regulators responsible for the supervision of UCITS 
funds and their managers have a common minimum set of powers available to investigate 
infringements of national laws transposing the UCITS Directives and to sanction any 
breaches. 
The changes introduced by UCITS V include: 
• A requirement to appoint a single depositary for each UCITS, disallowing the 
appointment of multiple depositaries 
• An exhaustive list of entities eligible to act as a depositary of a UCITS 
• The harmonisation of the duties of a depositary to keep the assets of the UCITS safe, 
monitor cash movements to and from the fund, and oversee the fund manager’s 
performance of its key functions 
• Specific safe-keeping requirements that a depositary needs to comply with in respect 
of financial instruments that may be held in custody as well as for other assets, 
including segregation requirements for assets that are held in custody 
• A requirement on Member States to ensure that assets held in custody by a 
depositary or its delegate are protected in the event of the depositary or its delegate 
becoming insolvent 
• A strict liability regime making the depositary liable for the avoidable loss of a 
financial instrument held in custody 
• A requirement for UCITS management companies to have remuneration policies, 
complying with certain remuneration principles, covering their key staff and a 
requirement to make those policies transparent 
• The harmonisation of the administrative sanctions that must be available to EU 
regulators for breaches of the UCITS Directive. 
The Directive setting out the UCITS V changes was published in the Official Journal of the EU 
on 18 August 2014. Member States will have to implement it into national law by 18 March 
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2016. Unlike the UCITS IV Directive, the UCITS V Directive does not recast the UCITS 
Directive. Instead, it amends and stands alongside the UCITS IV Directive. 
The Financial Conduct Authority is working with HM Treasury on the implementation of 
UCITS V in the UK. In CP15/27, published on 3 September 2015, the FCA consulted on the 
relevant proposed changes to the Handbook. In PS16/2, published on 2 February 2016, the 
FCA set out our final rules and guidance. These took effect on 18 March 2016. 
The Directive provides for many of the detailed measures to be implemented through 
further delegated EU legislation (delegated acts, also referred to as level II measures).388 
Insurance 
Solvency II 
Solvency II was implemented in all 28 Member States, including the UK, on 1 January 2016. 
It introduces a new, harmonised EU-wide insurance regulatory regime. The legislation 
replaces 14 EU insurance directives.389 
The key objectives of Solvency II are as follows: 
• Improved consumer protection. It will ensure a uniform and enhanced level of 
policyholder protection across the EU. A more robust system will give policyholders 
greater confidence in the products of insurers 
• Modernised supervision. The “Supervisory Review Process” will shift supervisors’ 
focus from compliance monitoring and capital to evaluating insurers’ risk profiles 
and the quality of their risk management and governance systems.  
• Deepened EU market integration: Through the harmonisation of supervisory 
regimes.     
• Increased international competitiveness of EU insurers.  
Solvency II is not just about capital. It is a comprehensive programme of regulatory 
requirements for insurers, covering authorisation, corporate governance, supervisory 
reporting, public disclosure and risk assessment and management, as well as solvency and 
reserving.  
• The Solvency II programme is divided into three areas, known as pillars – see Table 
A1. 
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Table A1: Solvency II pillars 
Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 
Financial Requirements Governance & Supervision Reporting & Disclosure 
Two thresholds:  
- Solvency Capital 
Requirement (SCR)  
- Minimum Capital 
Requirement (MCR)  
SCR is calculated using either a 
standard formula or, with 
regulatory approval, an 
internal model.  
MCR is calculated as a linear 
function of specified variables: 
it cannot fall below 25%, or 
exceed 45% of an insurer's 
SCR.  
There are also harmonised 
standards for the valuation of 
assets and liabilities. 
Effective risk management 
system.  
 Own Risk & Solvency 
Assessment (ORSA)  
Supervisory review & 
intervention. 
Insurers required to publish 
details of the risks facing 
them, capital adequacy and 
risk management.  
Transparency and open 
information are intended to 
assist market forces in 
imposing greater discipline on 
the industry. 
  
IDD 
The Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) came into force on 22 February 2016 and updates 
the 2002 Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD), which set out a framework for regulating EU 
insurance brokers, agents and other intermediaries. Member states have two years to 
transpose the IDD into national laws and regulations, i.e., before 23 February 2018 on which 
date it will repeal the IMD. 
Like its predecessor, the IDD  is a 'minimum harmonising' directive and member states will 
be able to 'gold-plate' it by adding extra requirements to it when implementing it. The IDD is 
intended to significantly raise the minimum standards of the IMD. On cross-border trade, in 
particular, the introductory wording to the IDD refers to the fact that the European 
insurance market remains very fragmented despite the existing single 'passport' systems for 
insurers and intermediaries.390 
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Market infrastructure 
PSD II 
The Payment Services Directive is an EU Directive, administered by the European 
Commission (Directorate General Internal Market) to regulate payment services and 
payment service providers throughout the EU and EEA. 
PSD was published in late 2007 and was designed to:  
• Help develop the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) 
• Set common standards for terms and conditions 
• Regulate payment institutions (to encourage non-banks to enter the market) 
• Provide increased consumer protection and transparency 
• Establish maximum processing times for payments in euro and other EU currencies 
including sterling. 
The PSD was implemented in the UK through the Payment Services Regulations 2009 (PSRs) 
and was the first European law to affect sterling payments. 
After reviewing the PSD in 2012, the EC proposed revised legislation, widely known as the 
Payment Services Directive II (PSD II), in July 2013. The agreed final text of PSD2 was 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union in December 2015 and entered into 
force in January 2016. PSD II will introduce further changes to the legislative framework 
governing payments and crucially in 2018 will force banks to open up their infrastructure to 
regulated fintech companies.391 
EMIR 
The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) came into force in 2014 and covers 
derivatives markets and their clearing houses (also known as central counterparties) which 
guarantee the trades executed between buyers and sellers in these markets. Europe’s key 
clearing houses are LCH.Clearnet (owned by the London Stock Exchange) and ICE Clear 
Europe (owned by Intercontinental Exchange) are based in London. EMIR was introduced in 
response to the global financial crisis with the aim of reducing systemic risk in over-the-
counter derivatives through greater clearing, reporting and electronic trading of 
derivatives.392 
CSDR 
A central securities depository (CSD) is an institution that holds financial instruments, 
including equities, bonds, money market instruments and mutual funds. It allows ownership 
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of those instruments to be transferred in electronic form through updating electronic 
records which are often known as ‘book-entry records’. 
The UK CSD is Euroclear UK and Ireland (EUI). The Bank of England is the competent 
authority for the authorisation, supervision and policy for EUI. 
The Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSDR) is EU legislation that aims to 
harmonise the authorisation and supervision of EU CSDs and certain settlement aspects, 
such as dematerialisation of financial instruments. This means that the securities will be 
held in electronic form, much like cash is held in a bank account. 
CSDR introduces a mandatory buying-in and cash penalty securities settlement discipline to 
tackle failed settlement transactions. It also reduced the standard securities settlement 
cycle to T+2 (with ‘T’ meaning the date of trade and the settlement of this trade being two 
days after the trade). This has been effective in the UK since 6 October 2014.393 
MAR 
The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) took effect across the EU on 3 July 2016.  
Certain types of behaviour, such as insider dealing and market manipulation, can amount to 
market abuse. Firms must have safeguards in place to identify and reduce the risk of market 
abuse and other financial crime.  
Preventing, detecting and punishing market abuse is a high priority for us. It is important in 
fulfilling our statutory objectives of protecting consumers, enhancing market integrity and 
promoting competition. 
Criminal insider dealing is an offence under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, and 
criminal market manipulation is an offence under sections 89-91 of the Financial Services 
Act 2012. The FCA works closely with the financial services industry, law enforcement 
agencies and other regulators to combat market abuse and other related financial crime. It 
also educates market participants. 
The FCA undertakes surveillance of financial markets and has systems for identifying insider 
dealing and market manipulation in various financial markets. This includes analysing 
transaction reporting data, order book data, benchmark submission and other market data. 
Firms and operators of a trading venue must identify and reduce the risk of market abuse 
and report it to the FCA under the suspicious transaction and order reporting (STOR) 
regime.  
The FCA takes enforcement action against market abuse and can impose significant 
penalties, such as order injunctions and prohibition of regulated firms or approved persons. 
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Criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation can incur custodial 
sentences of up to 7 years and unlimited fines.394 
Appendix 6: Full memo of David Davis meeting with the City, Financial Times, 
9 December 2016 
The memo 
This is a memo taken by a City of London Corporation representative after meeting David 
Davis, the minister for Brexit, on 15 November 2016. It was circulated within the City and 
leaked to the Financial Times. It will, in due course, be interesting to see how this compares 
with the eventual outcome. 
Overview 
David Davis is bullish and not receptive to negative special pleading. He sees Brexit as a 
positive opportunity. But he is not close-minded. Well-constructed, factual solutions to 
problems can be made to him and he will be receptive. He is enjoying his role and appears 
to have a decent relationship with the Prime Minister. If anything he sees himself as a more 
flexible-minded problem solver than her. We can engage him but it needs to be in a way 
that he responds to positively. 
Meeting Notes — 
Impact on the City — Stated his desire for “facts and evidence” — would like to have clear, 
supported statistics and research about the impact on jobs and organisations as a result of 
not having access or adequate arrangements for different forms of trading or financial 
services activity. 
With such evidence he plans to gauge how negotiations can be pitched and what negatives 
or positive effects would result from trade-offs being made or certain models being 
adopted. Viewed the City, in part, as not yet having moved on from the Referendum and 
accepting the outcome. 
Relocation of banks — Commented that financial services PR firms are the most vocal 
groups warning of extreme negative consequences for financial services. Also queried 
whether the employees of US banks warning of relocating in Europe would actually relocate, 
given the unattractiveness of Frankfurt and other cities in the EU, in comparison with 
London. As a result, jobs will go back to New York not Europe. 
Possible transitional arrangements — Stated that he was “not really interested” in the 
discussion around the arrangements, did not foresee any benefits and could be perceived as 
a delay to the process that is not something the Government can abide. 
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However, expressed concern that there is an argument that the stability of the EU could be 
compromised by the UK’s “sudden” departure from the EU — the regulatory upheaval and 
potential for systemic risk could result in serious negative consequences for the whole of 
the EU. Davis emphasised the PM’s conference speech, in which it was stated that the UK 
Government wants a strong UK and a strong EU. He went on to say that if the EU, rather 
than UK stakeholders, want to have transitional arrangements he would be “more in favour. 
I will be kind”. 
Trump — Recognised the fear in the EU Member States that a “wave of nationalism” would 
sweep across Europe.  
Negotiations — Speculating on the positioning of certain countries, he thought that Spain 
would not, ultimately, pose a problem in the negotiations, neither would Germany but 
believed France would be the most hostile and difficult to compromise with.  
Querying what might happen if there is a desire for a punishing or hard negotiation and 
settlement for the UK, Davis said they would then need to switch to his “alternative 
strategy” that the UK Government will have to take a position of competing with other EU 
Member States for business — lower tax, softer regulation and other strong business 
incentives. 
Opined that the EU Member States, such as France had “no faith” in their economic models 
and ability to compete with an “Anglo-Saxon approach”. 
Immigration — Emphatic that UK will “take back control of its borders” but in the national 
interest. Speculated that a bespoke solution of permits and points style system would be 
used to determine entry to the UK. 
Very much understood that the UK would not benefit from a labour shortage. Emphasised 
that new apprenticeships, vocational and training programmes would be implemented “in 
step” with immigration changes, to ensure that domestic workers are best placed to fill UK 
vacancies and there is not an unnecessary skills shortage. 
Appreciated that the “up and coming” entrepreneur with little capital and poorly paid young 
scientific researcher would pose an issue in ensuring rising talent got through immigration 
control — did not currently have an answer but were looking at solutions. 
Access to the single market — In light of the position on immigration and the EU’s inflexible 
approach to the ‘four freedoms’, it is unlikely that the UK will achieve access. However, 
stated that if a trade deal such as CETA could be agreed, it would be unlikely to pose a 
significant problem as “most advantages” would be gained. 
A deal of this nature and the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ would actually mean that a lot of common 
standards would already be in place to trade.  
Equivalence — Addressing fears that the French would “pull out the rug”, Davis understood 
concerns but indicated a mechanism “to stop that happening quickly” could be found. More 
widely on regulation, speculated that the US is about to liberalise their regulation and this 
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would make it much tougher to penalise the UK for not having appropriate regulation — as 
they would then also need to penalise trading partners such as the US. 
Passporting — Does not believe that business leaders actually understand when Passporting 
is actually required and is not as vital as many suggest. 
Exports — Did not see logic for pharmaceuticals to relocate. Believed it can be more 
beneficial to be outside and trading in to the EU.  
Trading models — Big spectrum of models, looking at somewhere in the middle of the 
models for Turkey, Switzerland and Norway.  
Clearing — Referencing the ECJ decision on clearing, commented that US reserves the right 
for it to step in if an issue in trading arises, UK may have to allow EU to do the same in euro 
clearing. 
Article 50 — Liked the fact it acts as a deadline and requires a resolution to be found. Court 
case means it will likely now be triggered in very late March. Will use an expedited process 
and allow five days for the Bill to pass. Hinted that he would allow longer than necessary to 
proceed through Parliament, as “they would run out of speakers” to oppose the Bill and the 
Lords would start to “tie itself up” and not make a coherent argument. Will trigger Article 50 
with an opening approach of open access on all services and goods without tariffs in the UK.  
[ECJ — PM emphatic that ECJ must not have a say in UK affairs.] 
EU officials’ reaction to the memo395 
Brussels aghast at suggestion interim plan would be considered only to ‘be kind’ to EU 
David Davis, Britain’s Brexit secretary, said he was “not really interested” in a transitional 
deal to cushion Britain from the effects of Brexit and that he would consider one only in 
order to “be kind” to the EU.  
Financial companies have pressed the government to agree a transition period after Britain 
leaves the bloc and before new trade terms are finalised, during which current 
arrangements remain in place.  
But speaking in mid-November, Mr Davis told a private meeting with the City of London 
Corporation that negotiating a transition, as recently championed by Mark Carney, the Bank 
of England governor, would not benefit the UK and could delay the Brexit process.  
Mr Davis accepted, however, that Britain’s “sudden” departure could compromise the EU’s 
financial stability and said he would be “more in favour” if the EU asked Britain for a 
transition. “I will be kind,” he said, according to the CLC’s account of the meeting.  
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One senior EU official involved in Brexit preparations expressed astonishment at the idea 
that it would be the EU playing the role of demandeur on transition, calling it “deluded”. 
“There is a denial of reality in London,” the official said. Another EU representative who met 
Mr Davis said: “I’m fed up with British politicians . . . they have no clue.” 
Mr Davis’s bullish views were aired during a meeting with the CLC on November 15, an 
internal note of which was leaked to the Financial Times. His reservations about a transition 
were repeated in meetings in Brussels and Strasbourg in late November, according to senior 
European figures. 
Over the past week, however, Mr Davis has given more positive signals about potential 
arrangements to support a Brexit soft landing and he is working more closely with Philip 
Hammond, the chancellor and strong advocate of a smooth, gradual exit. Senior London 
bankers see the position of the government evolving. 
Even so, the report of Mr Davis’s candid opinions — on groundless whingeing from the City, 
Britain’s upper hand in talks and “the unattractiveness of Frankfurt” for bankers — will risk 
adding to growing EU-UK tensions over Brexit.  
Berlin and Paris are likely to be especially annoyed by Mr Davis warning that if the EU 
pushed for a punishing settlement, Britain would switch to a tougher “alternative strategy”, 
looking to fight for business with “lower tax, softer regulation and other strong business 
incentives”. 
Mr Davis “opined that EU member states such as France had ‘no faith’ in their economic 
models and ability to compete with an ‘Anglo-Saxon approach’,” the CLC meeting note said. 
The department to exit the EU said the government was “engaging widely” with businesses 
about the “challenges and opportunities” of Brexit. “These are two-way discussions about a 
whole range of issues and potential outcomes,” it said. “This account does not properly 
reflect government policy or [Mr Davis’s] view. 
“He has made clear that the UK wants a smooth and orderly exit from the EU, a new 
partnership that works in the interests of both parties, and is looking at all options to deliver 
that.”  
Mr Davis’s private views offer a window on the debate within the government not only over 
the goals of the Brexit negotiation, but the tactics for achieving them.  
Part of his scepticism over a transition stems from his confidence in the possibility of 
agreeing a full fast-tracked trade deal by late 2018 that would negate the need for an 
interim deal after Brexit. The Treasury and Brussels see that timetable as almost impossible.  
He told the City representatives that the EU’s “inflexible approach” on immigration in 
particular meant it was unlikely the UK would achieve access to the single market. But he 
said a trade deal such as the Canada-EU agreement would be relatively easy to secure and 
would not pose a significant problem for the UK because “most advantages” would be 
gained. 
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Mr Davis is also more confident about the balance of interests and the cost to Europe of 
abruptly cutting off corporate access to the City, the continent’s main financial centre. It 
echoes a concerted effort across government in recent weeks to emphasise that Brexit is a 
shared problem for Europe, with costly spillover effects.  
Speaking in Brussels on Monday, Mr Hammond stressed a smooth process was needed that 
“minimises the threat to European financial stability”. He noted the “very many complex 
relationships that exist between European manufacturing businesses and their financial 
backers . . . in London”.  
Mr Carney has called London “the investment banker for Europe”, pointing out that over 
half of the equity and debt raised by eurozone companies was issued “in the UK, by firms 
based in the UK, quite often to investors in the UK”.  
“It’s absolutely in the interests of the EU that there is an orderly transition and that there is 
continual access to those services,” he said. 
The CLC said: “This note was the City’s interpretation of our meeting with the secretary of 
state for Exiting the EU last month. It was a constructive discussion on the opportunities and 
challenges that leaving the EU presents to the financial services industry and how the City 
can work closely and positively with the government.” 
 
Appendix 7: We can have our Brexit cake and eat it 
Joseph Hackett, research executive at Get Britain Out, argues that we can have our Brexit 
cake and eat it.396 
EU leaders continue to insist on the inseparability of the much-vaunted “four freedoms” of 
the single market – free trade in goods, services, and capital, as well as free movement of 
people. 
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, for instance, told Britain: “There is only the 
whole menu or none.” According to Schäuble and his fellow Eurocrats, if Britain wants to 
maintain, for instance, passporting rights for financial services, then it must also accept free 
movement and the entire range of EU trading standards. 
This would seemingly leave Britain in a quandary: stuck between two options which, though 
vastly preferable to EU membership, are far from perfect. 
Becoming a non-EU single market member, like Norway or Iceland, would not give us full 
control over our laws and borders, and would offer our businesses no relief from EU red 
tape. 
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However, some aspects of the single market – such as the mutual recognition of standards – 
are economically beneficial, and retaining them would help Britain fully achieve its post-
Brexit potential. 
Fortunately, when it comes to the Single Market, the EU does not exactly practice what it 
preaches. It is quick to dispense with ideology when one of its failing flagship policies is at 
stake. 
Take the notoriously inefficient Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy, 
which both involve the application of tariffs to agricultural and fisheries produce from the 
rest of the world – even from single market members like Norway. 
There is no way the CAP and CFP can be considered anything other than flagrant violations 
of the principle of free trade in goods. 
The single market in goods is further compromised for non-EU members by the EU’s 
Customs Union. Being outside this bloc, Norway and Iceland find their exports to the EU 
subject to time-consuming “rules of origin” checks on their export goods, in order to ensure 
countries such as China are not using, say, Iceland as a middleman to avoid paying EU tariffs. 
These customs checks are exactly the sort of irritating non-tariff barrier the single market 
was created to eliminate. 
It is not only the EU which can break these supposedly unimpeachable rules. Even single 
market members are able to unilaterally impose an “emergency brake” on any of these four 
freedoms. 
Little Liechtenstein has exploited this right to impose an effectively permanent limit on free 
movement. Liechtenstein might be small, but it has blown a big hole in EU leaders’ 
insistence that all four freedoms must go hand-in-hand and must either be implemented 
wholesale or not at all. 
Britain is not as small as Liechtenstein, but, then, we are not asking for single market 
membership. Britain should take heart from Switzerland, a country which has extensive 
access to the single market without being a member. 
Although it currently accepts free movement, it is exempt from other aspects of the Single 
Market, such as the onerous requirement to make all its products abide by EU regulations, 
even if they are not being exported to the EU. 
If Liechtenstein blows a hole in the Eurocrats’ narrative, then Switzerland turns it into a slice 
of that country’s famous cheese. Though Britain would not want to adopt the terms of the 
Swiss bilateral deals wholesale, it would do well to take inspiration from their path. 
The all-or-nothing choice is a red herring. Especially considering how the “all” option does 
not actually exist for non-EU countries – except, of course, where it relates to free 
movement. 
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The single market in goods is compromised for non-EU states by customs checks, the CAP, 
and the CFP. 
The single market in services is compromised for everybody, and it always has been. Though 
EU leaders are quick to congratulate themselves on their supposed progress in this regard, 
there is little evidence the single market in services is actually taking shape on the ground – 
or that service providers are actually benefiting. 
The sheer diversity of the service sector means it is highly unlikely to ever be “completed”, 
even if EU countries somehow mustered the political motivation to try. 
So, as the triggering of Article 50 draws closer, it is time for the Government to challenge 
the EU’s hypocritical narrative. The four freedoms are not inseparable – not even single 
market members have all aspects of all four freedoms. 
The EU itself will not let the four freedoms get in the way of the CAP or CFP. And there is a 
fundamental inequality between the them – while the single market in services is nowhere 
near complete, free movement is virtually unregulated. 
It is both unfair and inaccurate for Eurocrats to tell Britain the single market is an all-or-
nothing choice. As we get Britain out of the EU, we should press for access to the aspects of 
the single market which are mutually beneficial to us and them alike, while rejecting aspects 
which are not. 
This is not some unreasonable “have your cake and eat it” request. It’s what’s best for us 
and it’s what’s best for them. 
 
Appendix 8: The prime minister’s Lancaster House speech and reactions to it 
The speech 
On 17 January 2017, the prime minister Theresa May set out for the first time her plan to 
leave the EU at a speech delivered at Lancaster House attended by EU ambassadors.397 She 
said she wants: 
a bold and ambitious free trade agreement with the European Union. This agreement 
should allow for the freest possible trade in goods and services between Britain and 
the EU’s member states. It should give British companies the maximum freedom to 
trade with and operate within European markets – and let European businesses do 
the same in Britain. But I want to be clear. What I am proposing cannot mean 
membership of the single market. European leaders have said many times that 
membership means accepting the ‘4 freedoms’ of goods, capital, services and people. 
                                                     
397 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-
pm-speech 
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And being out of the EU but a member of the single market would mean complying 
with the EU’s rules and regulations that implement those freedoms, without having a 
vote on what those rules and regulations are. It would mean accepting a role for the 
European Court of Justice that would see it still having direct legal authority in our 
country. 
….[An] important part of the new strategic partnership we seek with the EU will be 
the pursuit of the greatest possible access to the single market, on a fully reciprocal 
basis, through a comprehensive free trade agreement. And because we will no longer 
be members of the single market, we will not be required to contribute huge sums to 
the EU budget. There may be some specific European programmes in which we might 
want to participate. If so, and this will be for us to decide, it is reasonable that we 
should make an appropriate contribution. But the principle is clear: the days of 
Britain making vast contributions to the European Union every year will end. 
… But there is one further objective we are setting,…it is in no one’s interests for there 
to be a cliff-edge for business or a threat to stability, as we change from our existing 
relationship to a new partnership with the EU. By this, I do not mean that we will 
seek some form of unlimited transitional status, in which we find ourselves stuck 
forever in some kind of permanent political purgatory. That would not be good for 
Britain, but nor do I believe it would be good for the EU. Instead, I want us to have 
reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the 2-year Article 50 
process has concluded. From that point onwards, we believe a phased process of 
implementation, in which both Britain and the EU institutions and member states 
prepare for the new arrangements that will exist between us will be in our mutual 
self-interest. This will give businesses enough time to plan and prepare for those new 
arrangements. 
… I believe the framework I have outlined today is in Britain’s interests. It is in 
Europe’s interests. And it is in the interests of the wider world. 
She ended with this warning: 
But I must be clear. Britain wants to remain a good friend and neighbour to Europe. 
Yet I know there are some voices calling for a punitive deal that punishes Britain and 
discourages other countries from taking the same path. 
That would be an act of calamitous self-harm for the countries of Europe. And it 
would not be the act of a friend. Britain would not – indeed we could not – accept 
such an approach. And while I am confident that this scenario need never arise – 
while I am sure a positive agreement can be reached – I am equally clear that no deal 
for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain. 
Because we would still be able to trade with Europe. We would be free to strike trade 
deals across the world. And we would have the freedom to set the competitive tax 
rates and embrace the policies that would attract the world’s best companies and 
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biggest investors to Britain. And – if we were excluded from accessing the single 
market – we would be free to change the basis of Britain’s economic model. 
But for the EU, it would mean new barriers to trade with one of the biggest 
economies in the world. It would jeopardise investments in Britain by EU companies 
worth more than half a trillion pounds. It would mean a loss of access for European 
firms to the financial services of the City of London. It would risk exports from the EU 
to Britain worth around £290 billion every year. And it would disrupt the 
sophisticated and integrated supply chains upon which many EU companies rely. 
Important sectors of the EU economy would also suffer. We are a crucial – profitable 
– export market for Europe’s automotive industry, as well as sectors including 
energy, food and drink, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture. These sectors 
employ millions of people around Europe. And I do not believe that the EU’s leaders 
will seriously tell German exporters, French farmers, Spanish fishermen, the young 
unemployed of the eurozone, and millions of others, that they want to make them 
poorer, just to punish Britain and make a political point. 
For all these reasons – and because of our shared values and the spirit of goodwill 
that exists on both sides – I am confident that we will follow a better path. I am 
confident that a positive agreement can be reached. It is right that the government 
should prepare for every eventuality – but to do so in the knowledge that a 
constructive and optimistic approach to the negotiations to come is in the best 
interests of Europe and the best interests of Britain. 
The chancellor, Philip Hammond, subsequently added flesh to the PM’s comment that she 
would ‘change the basis of Britain’s economic model’. He said that the UK must remain ‘one 
of the most open economies in the world’ and ‘nobody wants to see Britain pulling up the 
drawbridge’. But he indicated that he is prepared to lower corporation tax if the EU does 
not agree to a suitable exit deal for the UK: ‘If somehow, despite our best efforts, political 
retribution were to triumph over economic logic and we don't get a fair deal providing the 
reasonable access to each other's markets… we will have to do whatever is necessary to 
ensure the continued competitiveness of our economy in those circumstances’.398  
On 2 February 2017, the government released a White Paper setting out its plans for Brexit 
and said it would aim for the ‘freest possible trade in financial services between the UK and 
EU member states… In highly-integrated sectors, such as financial services, there will be a 
legitimate interest in mutual cooperation arrangements that recognise the 
interconnectedness of markets, as so clearly demonstrated by the financial crisis. Since that 
time, the EU has taken a number of steps to strengthen collective oversight of the sector...  
As the UK leaves the EU, we will seek to establish strong cooperative oversight 
                                                     
398 Szu Ping Chan, Ben Marlow and Ben Wright (2017) Hammond: I guarantee the UK will be competitive, Daily 
Telegraph, 20 January. 
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arrangements with the EU and will continue to support and implement international 
standards to continue to safely serve the UK, European and global economy’.399 
Reactions from the UK 
The prime minister’s speech was strongly supported by leading Brexiteers, such as Liam 
Halligan, the Sunday Telegraph columnist, and Gerard Lyons who had published a paper 
with Policy Exchange a few days before the speech.400 They said it was essential for the UK 
to have a ‘clean Brexit’ outside the single market and the customs union, even if no trade 
deal with the EU had been agreed before Brexit. Instead, they argued that the UK should 
settle for WTO rules and ‘less ambitious, sector-based agreements’ – covering automobiles, 
pharmaceuticals and financial services  – where possible. Lord Nigel Lawson, in a forward to 
the report, agrees that the UK should go for a ‘clean Brexit’ that avoids ‘an acrimonious 
renegotiation’ over the UK's single market and customs union memberships, as well as 
freedom of movement. But he questions the feasibility of the EU agreeing any free trade 
deal with the UK: ‘We must accept that our free-trade offer will be rejected and that no 
remotely acceptable post-Brexit trade agreement between the UK and the EU is negotiable’. 
Mr Halligan agrees with this: ‘“Clean Brexit" works - avoiding “cliff-edge" chaos. So we 
should declare now we'll be outside SM and CU, spending the two-year Article 50 period 
negotiating our own trade deals with the wider world, while preparing for a knowable 
Brexit. Better that than tearing UK-EU relations to pieces, for extremely dubious economic 
gains’.401 
 
Martin Howe QC, chair of Lawyers for Britain, also welcomed the PM’s speech: ‘This speech 
is excellent for charting the course for our future relationship with the world and with the 
EU after exit. It has cleared away a number of damaging suggestions which have been 
coming from diehards who still want effectively to stay in the EU and be subject to EU law 
despite the Referendum result…. Most importantly, she has said that “no deal is better than 
a bad deal” and that the UK is willing to walk away from negotiations with the EU rather 
than accept a bad deal. This is absolutely critical to our ability to negotiate a good 
agreement with the EU’.402 
 
Trade specialists warned that there would be a range of difficulties that the UK would have 
in negotiating a trade deal with the EU within two years:403 
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• The UK is asking the EU to do something it has never done before, at a pace it has 
never managed before. It would also require a legion of trade negotiators that the 
UK simply does not have. 
 
• The laws of economics say the EU is likely to remain the UK’s biggest export market 
after Brexit, not least for geographical reasons. According to Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, 
a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington: 
‘We know that in trade, distance matters. You can negotiate all you want with 
Australia or New Zealand and even the US. But we know that in the end the most 
important trade relationship will always be with your neighbours’. The US, for 
example, exports twice as much to both Canada and Mexico as it does to China. 
 
• It is likely to take years to replicate the various EU trade agreements from which the 
UK economy now benefits, unless it is seen as an undemanding negotiator that is not 
interested in protecting sectors such as agriculture or key manufacturing industries. 
Most modern trade deals are complicated affairs and the UK would quickly have to 
establish its priorities, and how all-encompassing it wants its trade agreements to 
be. Would they tackle issues related to ecommerce and data privacy? Would they 
address topics such as labour and environmental rules? Or include what in other 
trade deals have been controversial arbitration provisions to allow disgruntled 
foreign investors to get around local courts?  
 
• Not to pin too much hope on Donald Trump. Mr Trump is a dealmaker, but even a 
quick deal could take years to conclude. Mr Kirkegaard argues that ‘Theresa May will 
be desperate beyond belief to get a deal with the US because it’s the only deal that 
will get her some kind of economic meat for her vision of a ‘Global Britain’. And 
Trump will know that. Let’s see what kind of deal they can get. But I suspect it will be 
a deal that is beneficial to the US and may not be so beneficial to the UK. She seems 
to have an awful lot of eggs in Donald Trump’s basket and that strikes me as pretty 
dangerous’. 
 
• The UK still needs to negotiate the terms of its fallback option — membership of the 
WTO. The UK’s current membership in the WTO is governed by EU-wide tariffs and 
other trade provisions. So it still needs to negotiate its own tariff schedule with the 
WTO’s 163 other members. Some of that process could be relatively straightforward 
if it chooses to copy and paste the WTO-approved EU tariffs now in place for 
thousands of categories of goods and services. But there are other complexities, 
such as agricultural quotas, that could cause difficult negotiations. 
 
• Lawyers have pointed out that there need to be clear rules governing how customs 
officials operate at ports, otherwise there might be ‘chaos at the border’. 
The City’s response was much calmer than in the days after the Referendum. Gerard Lyons 
explained this as follows: ‘A lot of the City wasn't fully prepared for the Brexit vote, or at 
least had not thought through a strategy if the country was to vote to leave. But as time has 
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gone on more and more firms have started to develop their plan, and they have started to 
see things in a new way’.404  
Here are some reactions:405 
• Rob Boardman, European CEO of equities broker ITG: ‘The EU should resist the 
temptation to punish the City, following Theresa May’s confirmation that the UK will 
be outside the single market. While certain things remain unclear, such as the 
timetable for leaving, the truth is that the City is key to a healthy European financial 
system. Eurozone banks are still not strong enough to fund a new Marshall Plan for 
European business from their own balance sheets. They need global investors with 
risk appetite to invest, and London’s expertise at financing, both listed and private 
equity, is essential. May's plan is clearly to develop other global trade alliances, but it 
is still unclear what trade deal if any will be made with EU. This is why, now clarity 
has finally been provided on the UK’s objectives, both May and Brussels negotiators 
should plan specific measures to strengthen trade ties and promote financing for 
economic growth and prosperity’. 
• Graham Vidler, director of external affairs, Pensions and Lifetime Savings 
Association: ‘We welcome Theresa May's commitment to set up transitional 
arrangements to reduce any economic disruption due to leaving the single market. 
While it is not yet clear whether EU regulation, as a result of establishing equivalent 
rules for financial services, will encompass pension funds, we will be arguing strongly 
that EU rules on solvency requirements for DB pension funds should not apply to 
pension funds that only operate within the UK’. 
• Anthony Browne then of the BBA: ‘The Prime Minister has provided important clarity 
today on the kind of relationship the UK will seek with the EU and we welcome the 
government’s commitment to free trade with the EU and the rest of the world. All 
existing EU member states have a mutual interest in ensuring that there’s a smooth 
exit. The government’s support for interim arrangements is essential to ensure there 
are no cliff-edge effects when the UK leaves the EU’. 
• Chris Cummings, now CEO of the Investment Association: ‘We welcome the Prime 
Minister's speech on Brexit, setting out the importance of avoiding a cliff-edge for 
financial services being provided to clients in the EU, and ensuring a pragmatic 
implementation period for the new trade deal with the EU. Much work is needed to 
ensure that the terms of the future relationship with the EU safeguard the interests 
of savers and investors throughout the world who make use of Europe's pre-eminent 
asset management centre in the UK. The prime minister also emphasised the 
urgency of providing certainty for EU workers in the UK - who make up 11% of 
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workers in the asset management sector. The asset management industry relies on 
the UK remaining open and attractive to global talent. We look forward to working 
with government to deliver the vision of the UK as the world's leading investment 
hub’. 
• In a striking about-turn, TheCityUK declared that it is now ‘a strong believer in the 
potential opportunities that the UK’s departure from the European Union will offer… 
It reflects the fact that there was a vote to leave the EU and as a result there are a 
whole range of challenges and opportunities, [such as] the opportunity for first time 
in 40-plus years to have an independent trade and investment policy. In many ways, 
global rules on services trade have lagged behind those on manufactured goods and 
agriculture. [There needs to be] a concerted effort led by UK and other like-minded 
countries to modernise, update and ensure the rules that govern services trade 
reflect the way services trade is done today. We will be absolutely freer to do it 
outside the EU. [While the UK exports financial services to the EU very successfully], 
over the next 10 to 15 years, 90% of global economic growth is expected to be 
generated outside Europe and these markets – developed and emerging – must be a 
priority focus for the country post-Brexit… [And while foreign direct investment into 
the UK has traditionally come from large, rich countries], the rise of the BRICS, 
notably China and India as exporters of capital means that the UK will need to 
develop an investment regime that will take account of a wider spread of sources of 
inbound FDI’. TheCityUK wants the government to liberalise trade on a unilateral 
basis, as well as striking bilateral trade deals and regional agreements. 
Reactions from the EU 
The immediate reactions from the EU were quite disparaging. While welcoming the ‘clear 
impression’ given by the prime minister about what she wanted from the exit negotiations, 
European leaders were critical of the speech in four dimensions: the perceived implausibility 
of reaching a UK-EU trade deal before Brexit in 2019; unrealistic expectations of Britain’s 
‘frictionless’ trade with the EU, while also able to set independent tariffs; the request for a 
smooth ‘phased’ exit without making significant budget contributions or accepting the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ; and the threat to walk away and pursue a low tax model if Britain is 
unable to secure a good, fast-track trade deal.  
All this was regarded as attempts by Britain to ‘cherry pick’ a deal. German chancellor 
Angela Merkel said she would block any attempts at British ‘cherry picking’ during the 
negotiations: ‘The be-all and end-all is that Europe doesn’t let itself be divided, and we will 
ensure this through very intensive contacts’. Donald Tusk, the European Council president, 
wanted to continue a ‘close partnership’ with the UK, but warned that there ‘will be no 
cherry-picking’ and that the Brexit deal must leave everyone in ‘no doubt’ about the 
153 
 
benefits of EU membership. Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president, said 
that Brexit talks would be ‘very, very, very’ difficult.406  
Michel Barnier, the EU’s lead Brexit negotiator, responded by reiterating his declared 
bargaining strategy: divorce first, trade talks after. He said that talks on a trade deal would 
be contingent on the divorce settlement — and the UK paying a €60bn exit bill. He tweeted: 
‘Agreement on orderly exit is prerequisite for future partnership. My priority is to get the 
right deal for EU27 [which would clearly demonstrate that] it is much better to show 
solidarity than stand alone’.407 Despite this, Mr. Barnier said he wanted to maintain a 
‘special’ relationship with the London and the UK's financial markets, according to leaked 
European parliament minutes.408 
Joseph Muscat, the Maltese prime minister and the current EU rotating president, also 
repeated that the divorce terms would be prioritised over trade after Britain invokes the 
Article 50 exit clause in March. Trade talks would start only after Britain’s departure from 
the EU was settled and the UK had agreed to pay the €60bn exit bill.409 Cecilia Malmström, 
the EU trade commissioner, said the UK would have to withdraw from all of the EU's 38 
trade agreements with other countries, and can only begin fresh talks once it has actually 
left the union. The UK would then start at 18th place down the list of countries trying to 
negotiate a trade deal with the EU and will face a series of extremely difficult negotiations 
after Brexit: ‘We are negotiating 15-16 trade deals at the moment, so we are busy. It will 
take a couple of years for sure. It will not be done overnight. There will be some sort of 
transition period’.410  
The idea of the UK exercising the ‘freedom to set the competitive tax rates’ attracted the ire 
of the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble who warned the UK to stick to a 2015 
agreement reached by the G20 in Turkey on tax cooperation and ‘not use the taxation of 
companies as an instrument for competition’. He said if the UK wanted to be ‘taken 
seriously’ after it left the EU, it should ‘stick to what has been agreed’.411  
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Sigmar Gabriel, the German vice-chancellor, said Mrs May was right to say those who 
wanted to be part of the single market must accept a political union. 412 And Guy 
Verhofstadt MEP, the chief Brexit negotiator of the European parliament and a former 
prime minister of Belgium, said that the solution for Europe is ‘more union’. He wants 
Europe to ‘abandon the artificial divisions of nation-states and instead embrace a unified 
democracy on a continental scale, a United States of Europe, …so that Europe remains 
secure, influential, and prosperous into the future’. However, he does acknowledge that 
European integration has not been entirely successful to date: ‘Never – not in all my years 
as Belgium's prime minister and later on as a leader within the European parliament – have I 
seen Europe standing so close to the brink’.413 
A different view was taken by Marine Le Pen, leader of France's National Front, who warned 
that imposing a punitive divorce settlement on the UK would be proof that Europe can only 
advance by ‘threats, intimidation and blackmail’: ‘The way the EU has reacted to Brexit has 
put paid to the few in Europe who still believe that there is an ounce of democracy in this 
structure, that is the EU. Europe would be showing its true face, as it already has done so in 
Greece and tried to do with Britain. This EU doesn't move forward by consent because it 
knows its people no longer adhere to this political structure, it advances via threats, 
intimidation and blackmail… Brexit marks the great return of the nation. It is the notion that 
the nation wants to be independent, sovereign that only the nation can decide about its 
destiny, its future. It is this call for freedom that the British people launched by voting for 
Brexit’. This view was supported by Vincenzo Scarpetta, a senior policy analyst with Open 
Europe: ‘An excessively punitive attitude in the Brexit negotiations could backfire by 
providing extra ammunition to the various anti-establishment parties across Europe. They 
would be able to claim that the EU is an undemocratic club where a sovereign nation gets 
punished for merely exercising a right enshrined in the Treaties’. A senior British official 
warned Brussels not to overplay it's hand: ‘It hardly makes the EU look like a club you'd 
want to be a member in if they try and shoot the first member who decides to leave of their 
own accord’.414 
Within a matter of days, however, European leaders were striking a much more conciliatory 
note. For example, Mr Schäuble accepted that: ‘We have to minimize the damage for the 
United Kingdom and Europe. The German government will work in the negotiations always 
in this direction, to minimize any risk for both of us. A sudden rupture at the end of the two-
year talks - after Article 50 is invoked - must be avoided at all costs. We are very concerned 
that it will not happen, and we will be engaged. It would be a disaster for all of us. We will 
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do whatever we can to avoid such a situation’.415  Similarly, a leaked report from the 
European parliament’s committee on economic and monetary affairs recognised that ‘The 
exclusion of the main European financial centre from the internal market could have 
consequences in terms of jobs and growth in the EU… It is in the interest of EU 27 and the 
UK to have an open discussion on this point.. [It says the EU should seek a] workable deal 
with the UK. If financial services companies choose to leave the UK as a result of Brexit, the 
consequences should be carefully evaluated. A badly designed final deal would damage 
both the UK and the other 27 EU member states’.416  
According to Ambrose Evans-Pritchard: ‘[There was] relief … after the UK promises to stand 
by Europe as a close ally and some of the most vocal former sceptics seek to minimise fall-
out. The Brexit drama has taken an unexpected twist. Britain's strategy of full withdrawal 
from the single market and from the EU institutions has been remarkably well-received. 
Contrary to fears in some quarters in Britain, the pursuit of a "clean and hard" Brexit has, if 
anything, helped to clear the air, and been greeted with a degree of relief by political and 
business leaders in Europe. What has changed the mood, apart from the passage of time, is 
the parallel pledge by Britain's leaders to stand beside Europe as a close strategic and 
military ally, playing its full part in upholding a rules-based global architecture. There [are 
now] signs …. that the anger of recent months is slowly draining away, replaced by an 
acknowledgement of Britain's distinctive history and character. The imperative now is to 
limit the damage for all sides and find a way to make the new arrangement work. Not all 
divorces end in hostility’.417 
 
Appendix 9: How much damage does the EU want to do to itself? 
The EU has done precious little to make itself popular with its voters. Indeed, it has 
systematically ignored their concerns as expressed in various referenda over many years.  In 
terms of the UK Referendum, it offered David Cameron no concessions prior to the vote and 
has done a lot of finger wagging after the vote and repeatedly pointed to the inviolability of 
the ‘four freedoms’ when it comes to access to the single market. Further, the EC has 
threatened the following: no trade deals until exit terms have been negotiated, no 
transitional arrangements considered until the terms of trade have been agreed, with 
everything having to be ratified in all member states within two years of triggering Article 
50, leading to concerns about a ‘cliff edge’ departure from the EU in April 2019.418 
Not only has the EU proved itself to be incapable of reforming itself, it also seems incapable 
of recognising the economic damage it is doing to Europe and its citizens by its actions – the 
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most egregious of which was the introduction of the euro in 1999. So when it comes to 
Article 50 negotiations over financial services, we first ask how much damage does the EU 
want to do to itself?  We then look at the existential crisis facing the EU itself. 
The European financial services industry 
There is growing concern amongst financial service practitioners that if handled badly, Brexit 
will threaten European capital market integration: 
• The ICMA’s October 2016 working paper entitled European Capital Market 
Integration Post-Brexit states that maintaining European capital market integration 
after the UK leaves the EU would be of ‘mutual benefit’ to both parties. All sides 
should act to ‘minimise uncertainty’ and ‘maximise continuity’ so as to limit any 
disruption to the markets and any damage to the real economy in the UK and 
Europe.419 
• Mark Carney has argued that the EU would do itself economic harm if it stopped 
European companies from accessing London’s ‘crucial’ financial services. He said 
that London was the ‘investment banker for Europe’, with over half of the equity 
and debt raised by eurozone companies being issued ‘in the UK, by firms based in 
the UK, quite often to investors in the UK…These activities are crucial for firms in the 
European real economy and it’s absolutely in the interests of the EU that there is an 
orderly transition and that there is continual access to those services’.  He said that 
costs would rise for European companies if the EU forced activities to take place 
within the eurozone.420 
 
• Robert Rooney, CEO of executive of Morgan Stanley International, says: ‘Anything 
that causes London to fragment, such as a loss of passporting, will result in higher 
costs, lower liquidity, more trapped capital and less-efficient capital markets. 
Ultimately that’s not just bad for the UK, it’s bad for Europe and the global financial 
system’.421   
• David Harding, CEO of Winton argues: ‘It may be that the regulatory agency in 
Europe, denuded of British influence, and the financial regulators may begin to take 
Europe in a much less market-driven direction. I don’t think that is Angela Merkel’s 
intention, but with the British out of the EU, the French and German tradition is 
different’.422 
• David Folkerts-Landau, Deutsche Bank’s group chief economist, also agrees that 
plans for a capital markets union in Europe will be ‘seriously hurt by the UK’s 
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absence’, arguing that ‘the Anglo-Saxon view of markets has been brought to bear 
in those negotiations’ and that without it participants will become ‘hopelessly 
bogged down in Franco-German discussions’ about issues such as insolvency laws. 
He also said: ‘The idea somehow that you can move a large chunk of [the financial 
services industry] onto the continent seems foolhardy – or, if you do it, you’re going 
to destroy it. The key element of a good financial centre is proximity, You need 
people close together… it doesn’t work if you move CCPs to Paris, move the 
accountants to Rome and move IT to Frankfurt. The efficiency and the price 
discovery and the stability and security London provides is going to suffer if we see a 
significant claim by Europeans to want to bring in that business….[It is more likely 
that] New York will be a net beneficiary’.423 
There are widespread economies of both scale and scope in the provision of financial 
services – and for historical reasons London has exploited them both.  London has a clear 
comparative advantage in providing financial services to the EU.  Yet various European  
cities are vying to take over parts of the City of London’s business – Frankfurt, Paris, Dublin, 
Amsterdam, Madrid and Warsaw.  If an acceptable equivalence arrangement cannot be 
negotiated, then firms will be under pressure to move to one of these cities. But there will 
be enormous problems with this. 
For a start, space is limited in all these centres.  More significantly, the financial regulators 
for these financial centres will need to approve and then supervise the operations of these 
firms.  Not only do they have limited capacity to do this, they are likely to be very selective 
in who they will let in. All these centres have said that they really want only prestige 
international names and will still focus on their own national institutions.  One executive has 
reported that the German regulator is being very picky and his bank would not make the 
grade.424 This suggests that it would be far better for the financial institutions in London to 
stick together and say that they are going to stay in London and accordingly expect the EU 
to offer a suitable equivalence deal that allows these institutions to serve their EU clients 
from London. Further, there is a danger that some markets might close rather than move 
simply because they are not profitable – an example being some primary bond markets.  
The EU claims it wants capital markets that are as deep and liquid as those in the US (in line 
with its programme for capital market integration). More generally, it claims it wants the EU 
to be a leading centre for financial services. Yet EU regulations tend to be protectionist, 
excessive or not effective. Here are some examples:  
• Implementation of the Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) rules. The European 
Commission has plans to increase EU oversight of foreign banks. Foreign banks with 
significant activities in Europe would be required to operate via ‘intermediate 
holding companies’. These would have to meet additional capital requirements, to 
meet an internationally agreed rule, known as TLAC, and other minimum 
                                                     
423 Tim Burke (2016) Deutsche economist- Brexit could 'seriously hurt' EU’s capital markets, Financial News, 20 
October.  
424 David Wighton (2016) Brexit's passporting debate stamped through with confusion, Financial News, 23 
September. 
158 
 
internationally agreed standards to ensure that they could be wound down safely if 
they fail. The banks would have to issue equity and junior debt that would be written 
off in the event of a crisis. Yet when, in 2014, the US revealed similar proposals, 
known as the foreign banking organisation rule, Michel Barnier, then the EU’s 
financial services commissioner, said they were protectionist and threatened 
retaliation. However, the current commissioner, Valdis Dombrovskis, argues that the 
EU’s proposals are different: supervisors would not be allowed to set TLAC rules that 
are tougher than the minimum agreed standards unless these can be shown to be 
‘necessary and proportionate’. Nevertheless, Philip Hammond has described the 
proposals as anti-competitive and could harm the City after the UK leaves the EU. 
They could also ‘constrain prudential authorities in a way that could have an impact 
on financial stability’. 425 
• MiFID II. Jeff Sprecher, CEO of Intercontinental Exchange, has described MiFID II – 
which came into effect in January 2018 and introduces new trading and transparency 
rules – as ‘a terrible piece of legislation that imposes tremendous costs on the 
industry’. MiFID II grew out of the G20 financial regulation principles established in 
2009 to reduce systemic risk following the GFC, but has been criticised as being 
excessively complexity and its implementation has been delayed by a year. One 
particular issue is the unbundling of investment research and transaction costs.426 
MiFID II, in order to achieve full cost transparency for end customers, will end the 
standard industry practice of brokerage firms providing investment research free of 
charge in return for execution business. VAT would also be chargeable on paid 
research. McKinsey has estimated that the profits of European asset managers that 
pay for research in full could be reduced by 15-20%. Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, 
expressed concern that MiFID II could lead to a dearth of research coverage focused 
on smaller listed companies.427 Crispin Odey, of Odey Asset Management, believes 
that MiFID II will lead to fewer trades, reduced price discovery and less efficient 
markets.428 Another issue is the reporting of trades to regulators within a specified 
time – the cost of which has encouraged some hedge funds, such as Brevan Howard 
and Tudor, to register under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
rather than under MiFID II.429 The total cost to the finance industry of implementing 
MiFID II has been estimated at more than €2.5bn.430 Within months of its 
introduction, trading in a number of futures and options contracts was being shifted 
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from London to the US and European investment banks were losing business to their 
US rivals.431 
• The Capital Requirements Directive IV is damaging for EU financial markets in terms 
of restrictions such as the proposed bankers bonus cap and financial transactions 
tax.  
• Solvency II. The Treasury select committee has announced an inquiry into the 
‘manifest shortcomings’ of the Solvency II directive dealing with insurance 
companies.  Andrew Tyrie said: ‘Brexit provides an opportunity for the UK to assume 
greater control of insurance regulation to see what improvements can be made in 
the interests of the consumer’. The inquiry’s report was published in October 2017. 
While the evidence submitted to the committee highlighted problems with the 
legislation as drafted (e.g., in respect of the risk of procyclicality and market 
distortion, the calibration of the Risk Margin, the approval of Internal Models and 
subsequent model change, and the volume and complexity of data required from 
firms), the report was concerned with the way it has been implemented in the UK by 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA): ‘An excessively strict interpretation of the 
requirements of Solvency II, and of its own obligations, has limited the PRA’s thinking 
in a way which could be detrimental to UK plc’. The report also ‘strongly encourages 
the insurance industry and the PRA to come to an understanding on what aspects of 
Solvency II can be changed unilaterally while the UK remains an EU member 
state’.432 
As another protectionist measure, the EU wants to ring fence certain euro-related activities, 
a key example being euro clearing (i.e., the clearing of euro-denominated derivatives).433 
The French government, in particular, are proposing legislative changes that will force euro 
clearing to be conducted in the eurozone. 434 Xavier Rolet, CEO of the London Stock 
Exchange said: ‘Any attempt to take [euro clearing] away will only hurt the EU. It is in the 
interest, of the European Union, the 27 states left, and the UK to ensure that a positive, 
constructive framework remains here in London’.435 An Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) 
report published in December 2016 warned that forcing euro clearing out of the UK could 
lead to a significant increase in costs for European banks. The UK clears 75% of euro 
derivative transactions with an average daily value of £458.9bn. ICE sees ‘no reason why this 
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should change’. The report argues that clearing needs a critical mass and any fragmentation 
would damage Europe’s financial markets. The EU wants to move euro clearing into the 
eurozone after the UK leaves. However, such a ‘protectionist move could severely damage 
confidence in the currency within the global economy’.436  
Similar sentiments were expressed in a Financial Services Negotiation Forum (FSNForum) 
report published in January 2017: ‘any ill-thought through attempts by the ECB to snatch 
euro clearing out of the UK might wind up damaging Europe’s markets. A clampdown by the 
ECB could make it look like it's trying to build “fortress Europe”, potentially provoking “tit 
for tat” retaliation from other markets’. Anthony Belchambers, chair of the advisory council 
of the FSNForum, said : ‘The EU should not rush to make a decision on this topic as a 
political backlash to Brexit. Yes, the ECB's systemic risk concerns, following the global 
financial crisis, are understandable, but relocation of euro clearing to the Eurozone also 
carries potential risks for market economics and the international standing of the euro’.437 
Further, it is not clear how practicable ring fencing is.  Markets are adept at creating 
synthetics that circumvent constraints.  An example is American depositary receipts (ADRs) 
which are in effect UK shares traded in the US in a way that avoids UK stamp duty.438 A 
House of Lords report also published in December 2016 gave this warning: ‘The question is 
whether any eurozone location could provide the same benefits to the wider economy as 
London and New York, and whether a politically-driven attempt to repatriate euro clearing 
to the eurozone would invite retaliation by other non-eurozone states, leading to the 
breakdown of the system of multicurrency clearing’.439 
Jonathan Ford nicely sums up the EU’s problems with financial services in the Financial 
Times: ‘while some frictional costs may, of course, be inevitable, …[t]he worry is that this 
process will not be minimised. Out of some desire to punish Britain, or perhaps a hope that 
their own financial centres may benefit from fragmentation, the EU and its member states 
might pursue measures that serve little purpose other than to carve business out of the UK, 
even at a cost to the wider European economy….. Applying a location policy would do little 
to achieve its ostensible purpose, which is to ensure the systemic resilience of Europe’s 
clearing infrastructure. Meanwhile, repatriation would raise costs for banks (and, ultimately, 
their customers) by fragmenting liquidity and making it harder to pool multicurrency swaps 
in one clearing pool as presently happens in London. The industry has estimated that these 
changes could force participants to put up an additional €77bn in margin just to back the 
same volume of trades….But the point of the whole exercise would principally be political. It 
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would — to employ the words of French president François Hollande — provide “an 
example to those who would seek the end of Europe”’.440 
In addition to excessive regulation, there is another important factor that is limiting the 
growth of Europe’s capital markets and that, according to Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, is 
Europe’s ‘excessive reliance’ (around 70%) on borrowing from banks and insurers to fund 
growth. He claimed that the problems European companies face when accessing bond and 
equity markets had ‘stifled economic recovery’ on the continent: ‘In the years since the 
crisis, much of Europe’s economic potential has been locked up. Strengthening capital 
markets and retirement systems can help unlock that potential, and doing so will be vital to 
Europe’s economic future’. He also said that European bond markets are also complicated 
by different insolvency laws across member states: ‘The lack of a unified European 
corporate bond market raises costs for companies, deters investors and holds down 
liquidity’. He praised the European Commission’s efforts to unify European capital markets, 
under the Capital Markets Union project, but he also warned that the EU was ‘pulling itself 
in two directions’, claiming that other initiatives, such as new capital rules for insurers under 
Solvency II, could ‘severely restrict a key source of funding for European companies. While a 
long-term objective is greater funding from capital markets, limiting insurance companies’ 
capacity for investment before capital markets are fully developed could significantly 
damage growth’.441   
While all this is happening in the EU, the US, under president Donald Trump, is de-regulating 
its financial services industry by scrapping significant parts of the Dodd-Frank Act which was 
introduced in 2010 following the Global Financial Crisis. A report from consultancy Opimas 
estimated that US banks could save more than $27 billion, with the ‘easiest part of Dodd-
Frank to eliminate’ being the Volcker Rule forbidding proprietary trading, the removal of 
which could result in gains of $6 billion from trading activities. JP Morgan’s CEO Jamie 
Dimon agrees that ‘over-regulation has been holding growth back’. On the other hand, 
there are dangers if there is a divergence of standards between different regulatory 
regimes.  As Simon Gleeson from lawyer Clifford Chance points out: ‘The reason for 
international standards is to facilitate the globalisation of regulation, and any retreat from 
those standards by a major player makes regulating international banks harder, and harms 
the ability of those regulators to cooperate’. Similarly, Slaughter and May lawyer Jan Putnis 
said there was a ‘risk to the ability of financial centres to reach mutual recognition and other 
deals on financial regulation if the international consensus set by the G20 begins to 
fragment’.442 
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Can the EU survive? 
The apparent determination of the EU to punish the UK even if it also involves itself in 
significant self-harm, raises the question about whether the EU has much chance of 
surviving long term.  According to George Greenwood, ‘our exit risks being perceived as a 
direct attack on an already embattled Brussels’. John Mills, of the Labour Leave campaign, 
warns of the systemic issues that the EU will now have to face and highlights, in particular, 
the growing disparities between European haves and have nots: ‘I think you are likely to see 
more and more protest movements and anti-austerity. Part of the problem is that a third of 
the population in the EU are actually doing very well. Globalisation, internationalism, trade, 
it really suits them. You then have another section of the population…who have seen blue 
collar jobs disappearing, who are left in very insecure positions, compounded in Europe by 
very high unemployment. Sooner or later, this national disparity will have to be addressed, 
or Europe will start to seize up. It seems to me that this is a pretty dangerous political 
cocktail. You are moving to a position where a majority of people think they are really not 
doing well. Eight years down the track, people don’t feel the establishment parties have 
dealt with the aftermath of the financial crisis. They may start to look for alternatives. This 
engine of political instability could be the undoing of the EU if it’s not very careful’.  
Some other leave campaigners go further. Sir Bill Cash MP, chair of the European Scrutiny 
Committee, says the EU is ‘doomed. The monetary union system is full of internal 
contradictions and it can’t work. There’s no such thing as a one size fits all policy. You only 
need to look at the rows between [then Italian prime minister] Renzi, [German finance 
minister] Schäuble and Merkel to realise how serious this is. Schäuble and Merkel will not 
allow any wiggle room on the Stability and Growth Pact. And yet back in 2004, Germany 
completely ignored the rules and nobody said boo to a goose. On any issue of any 
substance, Germany calls the shots. [But], just going along with the German consensus 
within the EU will soon cease to be attractive, especially if it is Germany that benefits most. 
Other states may decide sooner or later they want to get out as well. I don’t think they will 
accept effective control…I attend meetings of COSAC,443 the assembly of European affairs 
committees of national parliaments, about once a month. At the last meeting, about two 
weeks ago, there was an enormous row between the French and the Eastern European 
countries, and some of the Mediterranean countries, to the point at which they were 
clamouring around the platform besieging the Slovakian presidency chairman, and literally it 
was a shouting match. That was all about the refugee crisis.444 That Germany has torn up 
the regulations to admit young Syrians, to the despair of other European nations and many 
within Germany itself, is yet another example of the costs of integration, felt unevenly 
throughout the union. In other words, Britain has got out just in time. Collapse is nearer 
than people think. The Greeks are a basket case, the Italians are in dire straits, the French 
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economy is also in tatters, and Germany faces massive internal pressure from the AfD 
[Alternative for Germany]’.445 
Even those at the heart of the European project are beginning to recognise the risks. 
Professor Otmar Issing, the European Central Bank's first chief economist and one of the 
founding fathers of monetary union, admits that the ECB is becoming dangerously over-
extended and the whole euro project is unworkable in its current form:  
‘One day, the house of cards will collapse. The euro has been betrayed by politics, the 
experiment went wrong from the beginning and has since degenerated into a fiscal 
free-for-all that once again masks the festering pathologies. Realistically, it will be a 
case of muddling through, struggling from one crisis to the next. It is difficult to 
forecast how long this will continue for, but it cannot go on endlessly…The Stability 
and Growth Pact has more or less failed. The moral hazard is overwhelming. Market 
discipline is done away with by ECB interventions. There is no fiscal control 
mechanism from markets or politics. This has all the elements to bring disaster for 
monetary union. The no-bailout clause is violated every day and the European Court's 
approval for bailout measures as simple-minded and ideological.…The ECB has 
crossed the Rubicon and is now in an untenable position, trying to reconcile 
conflicting roles as banking regulator, Troika enforcer in rescue missions and agent of 
monetary policy. Its own financial integrity is increasingly in jeopardy. 
The venture began to go off the rails immediately, though the structural damage was 
disguised by the financial boom. There was no speed-up of convergence after 1999 – 
rather, the opposite. From day one, quite a number of countries started working in 
the wrong direction. A string of states let rip with wage rises, brushing aside 
warnings that this would prove fatal in an irrevocable currency union. During the first 
eight years, unit labour costs in Portugal rose by 30% versus Germany. In the past, 
the escudo would have devalued by 30%, and things more or less would be back to 
where they were. Quite a few countries – including Ireland, Italy and Greece – 
behaved as though they could still devalue their currencies. The elemental problem is 
that once a high-debt state has lost 30% in competitiveness within a fixed exchange 
system, it is almost impossible to claw back the ground in the sort of deflationary 
world we face today. It has become a trap. The whole eurozone structure has 
acquired a contractionary bias. The deflation is now self-fulling. The first Greek 
rescue in 2010 was little more than a bailout for German and French banks. It would 
have been far better to eject Greece from the euro as a salutary lesson for all. The 
Greeks should have been offered generous support, but only after it had restored 
exchange rate viability by returning to the drachma. [The fear was a chain-reaction 
reaching Spain and Italy, detonating an uncontrollable financial collapse. This nearly 
happened on two occasions, and remained a risk until Berlin switched tack and 
agreed to let the ECB shore up the Spanish and Italian debt markets in 2012.] 
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Cloaking it all is obfuscation, political mendacity and endemic denial.  Leaders of the 
heavily indebted states have misled their voters with soothing bromides, falsely 
suggesting that some form of fiscal union or debt mutualisation is just around the 
corner. Yet there is no chance of political union or the creation of an EU treasury in 
the forseeable future, which would in any case require a sweeping change to the 
German constitution – an impossible proposition in the current political climate. The 
European project must therefore function as a union of sovereign states, or fail’.446 
The European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme is also failing, according to 
economist Andrew Hunt in a report published for OMFIF447 The programme has so far 
pumped €1.2 trillion of liquidity into the banking system through the purchase of both 
government and corporate bonds. The corporate bonds are close to junk, and the haircuts 
can barely deal with a one-notch credit downgrade.448 In return, the banks were supposed 
to increase corporate lending and hence stimulate the economy. But, no more than 30% of 
the additional liquidity has been used for this purpose. Some of the remainder has been 
absorbed into the banking system itself.  For example, over the last year, the Italian central 
bank has bought €100bn of Italian government bonds on behalf of the ECB. This is five times 
the normal rate of issuance and helps the Italian government circumvent EU rules on 
monetising its debt. The rest has been used by investors to buy assets in the stronger 
European economies, especially Germany and Luxembourg. The money passes through the 
EU’s off-balance sheet money transfer system Target 2. The ECB is therefore funding capital 
flight from Europe’s weaker economies.  
All this is a direct consequence of Germany’s long-running strategy of maintaining the euro 
at a level that suits its own economic policies, at the expense of making it difficult for 
peripheral European economies to compete both internally and externally. Germany will 
record the world’s largest current account surplus in 2016 at around 9% of GDP and this is 
needed to bridge a huge funding gap in its state pension system, according to Hunt. History, 
of course, repeats itself – precisely the same problems emerged when the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism was set up a quarter of a century ago. It is a great pity that this important lesson 
has been lost on the current generation of European leaders. Michael Hintze, CEO of the 
CSQ hedge fund, argues: ‘EU peripheral countries face economic and fiscal challenges as 
well as possible referenda on EU membership. Further instability and a potential break-up of 
the euro cannot be discounted as a zero probability and would, in my view, represent 
material risk’.449 As Allister Heath notes, there's nothing the UK can do to save the eurozone 
from its own folly.450 
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Marie-Hélène Caillol (President of LEAP - Laboratoire Européen d’Anticipation Politique) is a 
strong supporter of the EU, yet argues: 
 ‘The current crisis of the EU is multiple; the integration of the Eastern countries was 
rather a failure. In the Southern Europe, the “magic” of the European dream has also 
disappeared; the EU no longer means “democracy and prosperity”, but the opposite: 
austerity and imposition. The Franco-German couple is, unofficially, divorcing….  
There is no need to destroy the EU. It has already been done. Thirty years of complete 
diversion from the original European construction project in favour of so many 
exclusively economic interests, disconnected from that of the European citizens; all 
this has resulted in the Brexit affair, which signed the death of the EU as we knew it; 
isn’t it ironic, from a historical point of view, that it is the British who put an end to 
the Europe they wanted? Indeed the drifts summarised above are essentially linked 
to the vision of an economic Europe conveyed mainly by the UK and its American 
sponsor. In any case, the end of the EU as we knew it does not mean the end of the 
European construction project; the latter is actually being liberated, for better or for 
worse, from the EU model implemented in 1992 within the Treaty of Maastricht. 
In 1992, it was the Treaty of Maastricht that was supposed to finalise the process of 
economic integration and should therefore have opened the era of political and 
democratic integration. Total failure! Maastricht was the Treaty which greatly 
increased the budget and the areas of competence of Europe and should have 
imposed a complete change of method of governance based on the assertion of the 
following principles: transparency, efficiency and democratisation. Failure! Along 
with the increasing responsibilities, there is the change of project name: from 
“European Community” to “European Union”.451 
The Brexit Referendum has opened the eyes of European citizens to the possibility of having 
their own Referendum on the EU. The cases of France and Germany have been long-
standing, but there is now pressure in Germany which has been the biggest economic 
beneficiary of the EU. A poll conducted in November 2016 found that 42% of Germans 
wanted a Referendum on EU membership and that 62% think the EU is ‘heading in the 
wrong direction’. Around 67% want the bureaucratic superstate to change its political 
direction and just 39% believe EU membership is exclusively positive. As many as 96% want 
the EU to be become ‘more transparent and closer to the people’.452 As if to illustrate the 
distance between itself and its citizens and the folly of its overweening ambitions, Federica 
Mogherini, the EU foreign policy head, is preparing plans for a European Army ‘to act 
autonomously’ from NATO.453 
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Edward Lucas goes so far as to argue that: ‘From Putin to the euro, every aspect of the 
European order is under threat…Timid, deluded and divided, Europe’s different entities are 
facing disaster. Yet the European ruling elites have missed countless chances to avert it. And 
they are so convinced of their own rightness, and of their right to rule, that they show no 
sign of changing course – or of listening to the rumble of the approaching tumbrils. 
Everything is not going to be fine’.454 As Roger Bootle notes, it's not too early to start 
planning for the end of the EU.455 This view is supported by Professor Ted Malloch in an 
interview with the BBC and who at the time was expected to be appointed president 
Trump’s ambassador to the EU: ‘I am not certain there will be a European Union in which to 
have negotiations… The one thing I would do in 2017 is short the euro. I think it is a currency 
that is not only in demise, but has a real problem and could in fact collapse in the coming 
year or year and a half’.456 
 
Appendix 10: Alternatives to the EU, the single market, the customs union 
and the EEA 
There are some influential supporters in the UK of the EU, the single market, the customs 
union and the EEA. Typical is the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) which points to the huge 
difference between 'membership' and 'access' to the single market. It described the latter as 
a ‘meaningless concept’: ‘Any country in the World Trade Organisation – from Afghanistan 
to Zimbabwe – has ‘access’ to the EU as an export destination’. In contrast, membership 
involves the elimination of barriers to trade in a way that no existing trade deal, customs 
union or free trade area achieves: ‘In particular it means reducing “non-tariff” barriers like 
licensing and other regulatory constraints to supplying goods or services. These sorts of 
barriers have become relatively more important to trade than tariffs (taxes on trade), and 
especially so for services’. The IFS estimates that single market membership adds 4% to UK 
GDP and argues that no new individual trade deals will have the capacity to compensate 
fully for any loss of EU trade: ‘The EU accounts for 44% of our exports and 39% of our 
service exports…. China and India together account for 4.6% of all exports and 2.6% on 
services. Even small proportionate losses in trade (or lost growth in trade) with the EU 
would require quite dramatic - and probably implausible - increases in trade with such 
countries’. However, the report recognises that ‘outside the EU, single market membership 
also comes at the cost of accepting future regulations designed in the EU without UK input. 
This may be seriously problematic for some parts of the financial services sector’.457 
Ryan Bourne, then head of public policy at the Institute for Economic Affairs, on the other 
hand, has a very different view of the single market: 
It has all the hallmarks of a last stand. Having abandoned resisting the Referendum 
result itself, Remainers rally to the cause of staying in ‘the single market’. Re-using 
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the Referendum hymn sheet, the exact same politicians, businesses and pressure 
groups who predicted doom and gloom from the decision to vote Brexit are now 
forecasting postponed doom and gloom if we opt to choose a ‘hard Brexit’ or ‘closed 
Britain’ – leaving the EU’s single regulatory zone and trading under WTO rules. 
Of course, established businesses who do well under the status quo are always afraid 
of even minor changes to the trading and regulatory environment. But politicians 
have a duty to set conditions for the general good of the whole economy in the long-
term. On this the Remainers are severely overestimating the gains from single market 
membership whilst underestimating both the gains from leaving and the huge risks 
of remaining in. This facilitates their bizarre assertion that being outside somehow 
need lead to a more closed Britain. 
… The Treasury of course believes that… leaving the single market could somehow 
cost up to 6% of GDP in the long-term. But this is based on huge dynamic gains, for 
which there is little to no historical evidence. Indeed, in future we expect EU trade to 
become relatively less important. Yet despite the hope of a flexible economy able to 
adjust to the changing pattern of global demand, single market membership would 
mean that 100% of the economy would continue to be bound by the often damaging 
regulation emanating from Brussels. This should be of particular worry to the City, 
given the EU’s frequent attacks on so-called ‘Anglo-Saxon’ finance. Indeed, as 
Remainers helpfully pointed out during the campaign, the single market solution is 
undesirable because we could no longer vote against new regulation imposed upon 
us. 
This is not the only risk. Staying in the single market too would mean a continuation 
of budget payments to the EU (net 0.5% of per GDP), something only likely to expand 
given the centralising ambitions of Brussels. The need for the eurozone to integrate 
further to solve the eurozone crisis also risks the institutions of the EU increasingly 
being dominated by a eurozone block, potentially to the detriment of the UK. 
Of course, what business might fear is a big bang – a changed tariff and regulatory 
environment all in one go. But steps can be taken to mitigate that transition from the 
single market. The depreciation of the pound already vastly outweighs any adverse 
tariff effect on exporters to the EU. Last week’s announcement that existing EU 
workers have a right to remain within the UK negates risks for businesses employing 
EU workers. And the government’s Great Repeal Bill, through repatriating the body 
of EU law and regulation, means that any changes to the regulatory environment 
would be incremental. It also means that the EU should be willing to agree to an 
equivalence tariff-free arrangement on the point of exit – given the mutually 
beneficial nature of free trade. 
Whether we become a ‘more open’ or ‘more closed’ economy has nothing per se to 
do with the single market. Indeed, whilst the common regulatory zone prevents 
damaging government action in certain areas, the most significant upside gains from 
leaving the EU come from leaving the single market and customs union altogether. 
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Being willing to leave both and trade under WTO rules would at a stroke end the 
uncertainty that protracted negotiations would bring. The UK could declare unilateral 
free trade, slashing tariffs which would lead to more specialisation and an effective 
tax cut for consumers. We would repatriate our gross contributions, be able to 
deregulate or reassess regulation in areas where it was beneficial incrementally and 
kill stone dead the ratchet of more EU centralisation. This would not only fulfil the 
electorate’s instruction to ‘take back control’, but could, alongside a programme of 
agricultural reform, leave the UK more ‘open’ not less.458 
Lord Anthony Bamford, chairman of JCB, also believes that the cost of EU regulations for 
companies means that the UK is better off leaving the single market: ‘Hidden barriers to 
businesses caused by red tape and regulations proves that this single market has not 
created a level playing field. I want British business to get behind the government. We need 
the government to secure an exit deal that is in Britain’s best interests. A deal that will allow 
us to become a truly global trading nation. If tariffs are the price we have to pay to leave the 
EU, well so be it. British business people are very adaptable. They adjust very quickly to 
changes in the trading environment. So rest assured they would take tariffs in their stride. If 
tariffs are the price we have to pay to secure free trade agreements with the rest of the 
world, I think it’s a price worth paying’.459 
Ryan Bourne – now in a new role as the R. Evan Scharf Chair in the Public Understanding of 
Economics at the Cato Institute in Washington DC – also wants the UK to leave the customs 
union, describing it as a ‘protectionist racket’: 
Bizarrely, the front-line debate on the economics of leaving the EU now centres on 
whether Britain should stay or remain within the EU’s customs union. This is bizarre 
because, unlike with the single market, Brexiteers of all stripes took the departure 
from this customs union as given and a boon. 
By definition, a customs union is an agreement between countries to embrace tariff-
free trade between members but impose common tariffs on goods imported from 
non-members. At an EU-level, this means a Common External Tariff (CET), a dizzying 
array of over 12,651 different taxes (and some quotas to boot) imposed on goods 
from the rest of the world. The long and short of it is that the EU is internally trade 
liberating but outwardly protectionist. 
The argument for remaining a member of this block (as articulated by the UK 
chancellor Philip Hammond) seems to be concern at the impact leaving might have 
on “complex pan-European supply chains where often components and self-
assemblies move backwards and forwards across European borders several times”. 
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That’s because outside of the customs union, and in the absence of a bilateral free-
trade deal with the EU, UK exporters would face the EU’s Common External Tariff and 
importers would face the UK’s decided tariff rates under WTO rules (applied equally 
to EU imports). In other words, businesses could face two-way tariffs if they import 
and export simultaneously. 
This is certainly a possibility. But the degree of disruption is dependent on the 
government’s own policy decision on tariff rates. In my view, the case for remaining 
in the customs union is overwhelmed by the advantages and opportunities from 
leaving. 
After leaving, the UK would be able to set its own import tariffs to prevent the hike in 
input prices. Most UK Brexiteers desire a free-trade agreement with the EU. In the 
absence of such a thing, the UK would set its own tariff structures, applied to all 
countries as per WTO rules.  
…Remaining within the block would mean the UK had no say on tariff rates, despite 
suffering the consequences of their imposition. 
Finally, remaining a member of the EU customs union would severely hamper the 
ability to sign free trade deals with other countries too. Contrary to popular belief, 
the customs union in itself does not preclude Britain signing free trade deals (the EU’s 
Common Commercial Policy does). But without being able to offer up tariff-free deals 
to third parties, continued membership would in reality severely limit the UK’s 
leverage and attractiveness for trade agreements. 
…All this is not to say that leaving the customs union will not lead to some costs for 
certain firms and industries, or disruption. There will be more in the way of customs 
checks (though these would likely quickly become routinised). But the aggregate 
benefits of a UK controlling its own trade and tariff policy, particularly for consumers, 
are likely to be much greater.460 
Shanker Singham (then at the Legatum Institute Special Trade Commission) argues that if 
the UK leaves the EU, it cannot also remain in the EEA: ‘Since services form 80% of the UK 
economy – an unusually high proportion – we will need them to be part of any trade deals 
we strike. But in order to persuade other countries to open up their service sectors to ours, 
we need to be able to put our domestic regulatory agenda on the table for negotiation, so 
that they can gain access and benefits of their own. Under the EEA rules, this is 
impossible’.461 
The entire economy of the UK is being distorted by its membership of the EU and the EEA. 
Only 15% of our economy (and 6% of our companies)462 involves trade with the EU/EEA, but 
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100% of our laws are determined or at least influenced by the EU. Yet the EU has since its 
foundation involved in some of the most serious misallocations of economic resources of 
any institution in recorded history – recall the wine lakes and the butter mountains. Add to 
that the failure of the euro – which has resulted in permanent recession outside core 
Europe (‘Kerneuropa’) and the fundamentally undemocratic nature of EU institutions. Add 
also the hubris of the EU leaders – they have been warned many times that the EU is like the 
Titanic with an iceberg just ahead of them, but they have ignored these warnings, believing 
that political will is strong enough to pass through iceberg. And you have before you all the 
ingredients of an economic catastrophe – if not a failed state.  
So what are the alternatives that the UK might embrace outside the EU? 
Global free trade 
A free trade agreement is designed to have zero import tariffs and quotas on an agreed 
range of goods and services that are traded between the counterparties to the FTA, and to 
reduce as much as possible non-tariff barriers, such as customs and regulatory procedures, 
that add to the cost of cross-border trade. However, standard FTAs focus on goods and tend 
to have much weaker coverage of services and especially financial services, and would 
certainly not include the same automatic market access afforded by passporting. 
The prime minister, Theresa May, has said: ‘I want the UK to be the global leader in free 
trade. I think that’s important. I think there genuinely is a real opportunity for us. We should 
be around the world, promoting that message of free trade. Seeing what we can do outside 
[the EU]’.463 A useful example of a recent FTA is the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement which has been described as a ‘high quality agreement that uses a 
superior “negative list” approach to services liberalisation and includes significant provisions 
on domestic regulation, mutual recognition and electronic commerce, and chapters on 
telecommunications and financial services… CETA gives Canadian service suppliers the best 
market access the EU has ever conceded in an FTA and in most sectors Canadian suppliers 
“will be on an equal footing with EU service providers.” …Since Brussels has been willing to 
open services markets to Canada, without the conditions of free movement and EU budget 
contributions it previously demanded of Norway and Switzerland, the UK should be able to 
negotiate a high-quality services agreement with the EU, including reciprocal passporting 
arrangements if the UK government wanted to keep them’.464 
More general than this is the Heritage Foundation’s idea of a Global Free Trade Association 
(GFTA) of free economies. GFTA member countries would commit to free market economic 
policies, such as low tariffs and few non-tariff barriers, openness to foreign investment, 
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strong adherence to property rights, and regulations that are not overly burdensome on 
businesses.465 
Further, the UK would be free to negotiate a FTA before leaving the EU, since as Lawyers for 
Britain argue: ‘Since the United Kingdom’s Referendum vote to leave the European Union, it 
has been suggested that the UK may not negotiate future FTAs with countries outside the 
EU while it remains a member state. [However], this view has no support from the EU 
Treaties or the ECJ; and that the EU has no competence to prevent the UK negotiating and 
entering into FTAs with third countries providing that they may not come into force until the 
UK withdraws from the EU’.466 
Another opportunity, according to Alan Oxley, former ambassador to and chairman of the 
GATT, predecessor to the WTO, is for the UK to ‘lead action in reconstructing the WTO, 
transforming it into a fresh global platform that liberalises global trade in services and 
investment. Taking such a role does not depend on the terms of Brexit. The UK is already an 
independent member of the WTO. Regardless of when and how it settles with Brussels, it 
has a place to speak now in the WTO. And an active, influential and independent UK voice 
on global trade and investment is sorely needed there. It has become fashionable to opine 
that the era of globalisation is ending and a retreat to protectionism looms. What such 
commentators overlook is the institutional impediment to a global resort to protectionism – 
and that is the WTO. All major economies are locked into legally-binding commitments not 
to raise tariffs. They can only reverse these measures if they compensate other WTO 
members. The worst that can occur is that further liberalisation stalls’.467  
 
New Prosperity Zone 
This is a proposal of the Legatum Institute Special Trade Commission’s Shanker Singham:468 
What if, instead of making deals on a country-by-country basis, we were to lay the 
foundations for a new Prosperity Zone, bringing together countries around the world 
that believe in free trade and competition? 
…The lesson of the [stalled] TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] is that the more countries 
[that] are around the table, the harder a deal is to do. So the founding principle of the 
Prosperity Zone should be that it will not sacrifice quality for quantity. 
We should start with countries such as New Zealand, Singapore and Australia, who 
are all committed to free trade and have jettisoned agricultural protectionism 
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(assuming in the UK’s case that it will have come out of the Common Agricultural 
Policy and Common Fisheries Policy when it leaves the EU). 
This small group could maintain an alignment around the core concepts of economic 
development, open trade, competition and property rights protection. It could also go 
further than TPP by dealing with distortions inside borders – what are termed Anti-
Competitive Market Distortions or ACMDs. 
This… would be done not via traditional remedies, such as anti-dumping measures, 
which are damaging to trade and competition, but by disciplining countries that used 
government privileges or benefits to confer a cost advantage on their companies that 
could then increase their market share overseas. 
Such rules would be needed because distortions inside borders are inevitably 
exported – as happened in Port Talbot or Redcar, where local producers went bust as 
a result of distortions in the Chinese steel market. 
The initial grouping of countries would have the advantage of being largely open 
economies – the UK, New Zealand, Australia and Singapore can boast the least 
distorted markets in the world. But the platform would be open: other countries, such 
as Switzerland or the members of NAFTA, could be added in future. The ultimate goal 
– even if you started with the most likely partners – would be to include all like-
minded countries. 
Under this vision, the UK would still need to negotiate bilateral FTAs with other major 
trading partners such as India, China and the EU itself. But in each of these cases, we 
must be realistic about what we can achieve. 
There are many things that could derail this vision.  Since it depends on the 
negotiation of agreements with a range of countries in goods and services and over 
domestic regulatory issues, remaining within any part of the EU customs union, or 
even remaining a member of the European Economic Area, will prevent its 
realisation. 
Far better to negotiate a comprehensive FTA that does not leave our hands tied 
elsewhere – which is why the recent suggestion that the UK would be seeking a 
“CETA-plus” deal modelled on arrangements with Canada was so encouraging. 
Viewed in this light, the entire Brexit process should be regarded as part of a wide-
ranging exercise – government departments must work together so that we can exit 
the EU in such a fashion that the high-level vision of growth, prosperity and hope can 
remain intact in our negotiations with other countries. 
We must also use this opportunity to embrace a regulatory reform agenda at home 
which will eliminate our own domestic distortions and lead to the lowering of prices 
for key staples, such as food and energy. 
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This is, as we are all aware, a time of uncertainty. But if the process is handled 
correctly, the prospects for the British people are bright indeed.469 
Variations on this are the Anglosphere countries trade deal proposed by Graeme Leach470 
and the CANZUK (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and UK) trade deal proposed by Andrew 
Lilico.471   
New Atlantic Growth Pact  
This is a proposal from Kristen Silverberg – who served as US ambassador to the EU from 
2008-09 – and Phil Levy – who was senior economist for trade at the Council of Economic 
Advisers during the George W. Bush administration.472  
 
The New Atlantic Growth Pact would involve the US, the UK and the EU. It would be: 
 
an agreement to remove regulatory barriers to trade, including those in financial 
services, and to spur cross-border investment could help invigorate all three 
economies…. A relaunched trilateral deal [following the stalling of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks] would spur growth. It would also 
provide a framework to address the EU’s qualms about appearing to reward Brexit 
and encouraging other exits. With a new trade deal in place or on the near horizon, 
other countries contemplating an exit would now be choosing to leave both the 
single market and a trading bloc with the US. The British could not conclude a trade 
deal before departing the EU, but they can begin negotiations as soon as they invoke 
Article 50, the formal mechanism for leaving. On the American side, efforts to launch 
a new trans-Atlantic agreement would show that the US remains serious about 
defending its role in setting standards for global trade. In this presidential campaign, 
both candidates have sent signals that the US is no longer prepared to lead on trade. 
Yet the candidates also have said they support trade in principle but want to 
negotiate better deals. A pro-growth trade pact with developed economies offers a 
good opportunity for the next administration to do this, and a process to address key 
Brexit risks to the UK may enjoy stronger support in Congress.  
The Atlantic Growth Pact could eventually serve as the anchor to bring in other 
countries—though with Brexit looming the US should start with a three-party deal. 
The US could spur the new talks by offering a significant new concession—the 
willingness to tackle financial services in the negotiations. This would meet a major 
European demand from the TTIP negotiations. It would also provide a unique 
opportunity to address one of the core questions surrounding Brexit—how to avoid a 
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costly disruption of the City of London’s role as a centre for international finance. 
Trilateral negotiations would be challenging. In contrast, it would be relatively easy 
for the US and the UK to reach a bilateral agreement, and the US should be prepared 
to pursue bilateral talks if the three-party negotiations fail. But economically and 
diplomatically, a trilateral trans-Atlantic deal has more to offer. The potential costs 
to the US of a Europe left fractured and faltering are very high. The next president 
should seize the opportunity to take a new approach. 
 
US-UK free trade deal 
How the deal might work 
Iain Murray, vice president of strategy at the Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington 
DC argues that: 
A US-UK trade deal could set the stage for a major rethink of trade policy that could 
set the stage for productive liberalisation in the future. [This is because American 
trade deals began to go wrong from the early 1990s:] non-tariff barriers such as 
regulatory requirements became the big issue, so American trade deals started to 
concentrate on those. The way they went about it, however, was very European. It 
was similar, in fact, to the European Union’s “harmonisation” scheme, which aims for 
every EU member country to regulate in more or less the same way. That, of course, 
resulted in a significant increase in the regulatory burden on British business. 
America’s approach was to require similar regulatory reforms from every country 
with which it negotiated trade deals, especially in the areas of environmental and 
labour standards. As these requirements came to dominate trade deals, negotiators 
dropped “free trade” from the deals’ monikers and came to call them “partnerships,” 
all of them hundreds of pages long…  
[I]nstead of “harmonisation,” [a] new-style trade deal would include Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRAs), which allow the free flow across borders of goods 
manufactured in accordance with member countries’ different regulatory standards. 
An example is the MRA between Germany and its EU partners that allows the sale in 
Germany of beer not brewed in accordance with the Reinheitsgebot, the country’s 
centuries-old Beer Purity Law. As it happens, Germans quite like the law, so foreign 
beers have not diluted the market noticeably. For German brewers, however, the 
MRA means they can produce beers for export not subject to the law, allowing them 
to cater to different consumer tastes across Europe. MRAs would also lead to 
regulatory competition. If one country’s regulations proved to be clearly superior to 
another’s, then the latter country would have an incentive to change its regulations 
for the better, whether to reduce costs or enhance consumer safety. 
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The first step towards that arrangement is with informal trade talks between 
America and Britain.473  
Shanker Singham adds:474 
The UK and the US are by far the largest investors in each other’s economies (the US 
accounts for 41 per cent of all foreign direct investment in the UK). They have 
maintained a strong trading relationship for more than two centuries. They have the 
strongest ties of any two countries in defence and intelligence. The UK and the US 
share a foundation in English common law. They have the same economics-based 
approaches to regulation and to competition. 
The UK was the birthplace of the modern free trade movement in the nineteenth 
century and carried the torch for free trade until it was extinguished by protectionism 
in the rest of Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century. When free trade was 
again embraced after the Second World War, it was the UK and the US that rebuilt 
the global trading system in the form of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
This shared approach to the centrality of open trade, competition on merit as an 
organising economic principle, and property rights protection as the key tools to 
create wealth and grow economies is what has bound the nations together, and 
could be the foundation of a high level trade agreement that removes existing tariff 
barriers, eliminates government regulations that damage competition in markets, 
and better protects investors and other property owners’ rights.  
James Forsyth of the Spectator argues that, while Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) –  the proposed free-trade deal between the US and the EU – is dead, it 
would be relatively straightforward for a simple US-UK deal to be negotiated with the 
Trump administration and for Congress to ratify.475  Of particular importance to the City 
would be a deal that made it simpler for a firm authorised in one country to operate in 
another and for there to be closer co-ordination over future regulation.476 
Attitude of Donald Trump 
The feasibility of a US-UK FTA would depend on the attitude of the new US president, 
Donald Trump. He won the US election based on a campaign of isolationism and anti-trade 
rhetoric that was critical of both NATO and the WTO. According to Thomas Raines, of 
Chatham House: ‘The twin pillars of UK foreign policy for 40 years has been the special 
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relationship with Atlanticist US and active membership of the EU. Both are in tatters’.477  
Patrick Wintour argues that: ‘There will … be concern for Britain’s Brexit talks. Trump is a 
Brexit supporter, but…. the Trump victory could drive the EU to one of two Brexit responses. 
The union could circle the wagons and try to prevent Marine Le Pen from winning the 
French presidential election by driving a harder bargain with the UK. Alternatively, it could 
conclude that the wider geopolitical stakes, including dealing with Russia and terrorism, are 
so high that a quick and dirty deal with the UK is a necessity’.  He goes on to say that ‘No 10 
policymakers viewed the Trump triumph through the same prism as Brexit, and May will 
probably offer herself as the western leader who shares lead responsibility with Trump in 
responding to the populist revolt. The head of the No 10 policy board, George Freeman, saw 
Trump’s victory in that context, tweeting: “At its heart this is about a broken contract 
through the failure of globalised market economics to serve the interests of domestic 
workers”’.478   
Some believe that Trump’s isolationism will help the UK. According to James Forsyth, there 
is: ‘keenness of those around him to cut a quick trade deal with the UK. His team views an 
Anglo-American agreement as a way of showing that they are not anti-trade per se — just 
against deals with low-wage economies that they believe cost American jobs. No one would 
think that a deal with Britain would lead to workers being undercut in Ohio, Michigan and 
Pennsylvania — three manufacturing-heavy states that swung from the Democrats to 
Trump. The incoming administration’s enthusiasm for a deal with the UK, in stark contrast to 
Barack Obama’s “back of the queue” approach, makes it less easy to claim that Brexit will 
leave Britain isolated and alone’.479 A similar point was made by Daniel McCarthy, editor at 
large of The American Conservative: ‘In trade, Mr Trump’s populism and conservatism come 
together in surprising ways. While he scrapped the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership looks similarly doomed, new bilateral 
trade agreements may be in the offing, not least in the UK. Multilateral “free trade” 
agreements in recent years have been as much about environmental, labour and other 
regulations. Free-market conservatism provides good reason to look askance at many of 
these agreements’.480  
Some believe that Trump’s protectionist stance will also help the City. Saker Nusseibeh, CEO 
of Hermes Investment Management, points out that London's emergence as the world's 
financial centre came after the US tightened its immigration controls in the early 2000s: ‘The 
reason London became number one is not because we were brilliant – people found it 
difficult to travel to New York to do deals. London rose to number one because it was easier 
for Russians, Chinese and Indonesians and such businessman to come to see their banks in 
London. Maybe this is good for the City of London. Until last night, the City was sinking to 
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number two in the world and New York looked likely to grab the title of number one that we 
grabbed in 2002-03’.481   
On the other hand, leading UK fund manager Neil Woodford is concerned about contagion 
in Europe in response to the Trump victory: ‘If we get a Brexit or Trump-like situation, if we 
get Marine Le Pen [elected in France] or a far-right movement gaining votes in 
Germany...then lots of things can happen that will destablise the equilibrium that Europe 
currently enjoys. If anything, I am more concerned about the political risk in Europe than 
what is likely to happen under a Trump presidency. I am watching very carefully what may 
happen [in Europe]. If investors start to doubt the sustainability of the euro then that will be 
quite a moment for markets’.482 
David Wighton argues that European investment banks ‘fear is that an administration 
headed by an unabashed protectionist will use financial regulation to discriminate against 
foreign banks operating in the US market. Many European bank leaders believe that US 
financial regulation and enforcement is already skewed against overseas banks. How much 
worse could it get under a President determined to “put America first”’.483  
In his first interview with a UK newspaper since being elected president, Donald Trump said 
he would offer the UK a quick and fair trade deal with the US within weeks of taking office 
to help make Brexit a ‘great thing’: ‘I’m a big fan of the UK, we’re gonna work very hard to 
get it done quickly and done properly. Good for both sides’. He also predicted that other 
countries would follow Britain’s lead in leaving the EU, claiming it had been deeply damaged 
by the migration crisis: ‘I think it’s very tough.  People, countries want their own identity and 
the UK wanted its own identity. [The EU] is basically a vehicle for Germany and Germany’s 
dominance is why the UK was so smart in getting out’. He continued to criticise NATO as an 
‘obsolete’ organisation that has not defended itself against terror attack and he was also 
critical of member states that were not paying their fair share, although he acknowledged 
that the organisation is still ‘very important to him’.484 
The UK is hoping to sign a ‘statement of intent’ with the US within months of Trump’s 
inauguration to work on reducing trade US-UK barriers.485 Donald Trump’s commerce 
secretary, Wilbur Ross, confirmed that one of his top priorities will be to secure a free trade 
deal between the US and UK. He has extensive business and social links to the UK after 
decades as an investor and wants to embolden the ‘special relationship’ by lowering barriers 
between the two countries.486  
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Continental Partnership 
This is a proposal from Bruegel which involves a new form of collaboration that is 
‘considerably less deep than EU membership but rather closer than a simple free-trade 
agreement’:487 
The UK will want to have some control over labour mobility, as well as leaving behind 
the EU’s supranational decision-making. The proposed continental partnership would 
consist in participating in goods, services, capital mobility and some temporary 
labour mobility as well as in a new system of inter-governmental decision making 
and enforcement of common rules to protect the homogeneity of the deeply 
integrated market. The UK would have a say on EU policies but ultimate formal 
authority would remain with the EU. This results in a Europe with an inner circle, the 
EU, with deep and political integration, and an outer circle with less integration. Over 
the long-run this could also serve as a vision for structuring relations with Turkey, 
Ukraine and other countries. 
The CP would involve: 
• Participation in a series of selected common policies consistent with access to 
the single market 
• Participation in a new CP system of inter-governmental decision making and 
enforcement 
• Contribution to the EU budget 
• Close cooperation on foreign policy, security and, possibly, defence matters. 
The CP would build a wider circle around the EU without sharing the EU’s 
supranational character, except where common enforcement mechanisms were 
needed to protect the homogeneity of the single market. Members of the CP would 
be the EU, all EU-countries, the UK together with any other countries that 
participated. 
The obvious challenge for EU-CP cooperation will be to preserve the processes and 
structures of the EU as a supranational entity and at the same time to ensure that CP 
members that are not part of the EU have a say in common matters. Two basic cases 
must be distinguished. The first concerns matters for which the EU already has an 
intergovernmental decision-making process. Here, the issue of cooperation can be 
relatively easily solved as the CP by its very nature is intergovernmental. Politically, 
this area of intergovernmental cooperation is important. In particular, the activity of 
the CP in the fields of foreign, security and defence policy – the areas in which Europe 
has to face a range of complex, persistent and existential threats – would be 
included. 
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The second, and arguably more difficult case, concerns areas in which the EU acts as 
a supranational body with (partial) sovereignty, including in particular all single 
market matters. Cooperation in this area means that although a CP member is not a 
member of the EU, it would get full access to the respective parts of the single market 
with all rights, opportunities and obligations other than freedom of movement for 
workers.  
One issue concerns the law making itself: We propose that CP countries would meet 
in a CP council, in which EU institutions would participate. At the level of the CP 
council, the UK would thus continue to participate in the numerous different 
formations where the details of single market regulation and other policies in which 
it would continue participating are discussed and negotiated. Obviously, the CP 
council could not pass EU legislation but CP partners would be involved in CP council 
readings of draft EU legislation and they would have a right to propose amendments. 
EU law on the single market would, however, continue to be adopted through the 
normal EU legislative process. In practice, in the areas that concern the CP, the CP 
council would deliberate the legislative proposals before they are formally passed in 
the council of the European Union and the European Parliament, so that positions 
expressed by non-EU members could be taken into account throughout the legislative 
process and in the final decision. 
Formally, it would be a political – not legal – commitment by EU member states to 
take into account the positions and deliberations in the CP council. Our CP council 
would therefore deal with this major political task. If the EU and its partners disagree 
within the CP council, the final say would formally remain with the EU. The non-EU CP 
members would then still have to implement the single market legislation in their 
national legislation or face restrictions on participation in the single market. The CP 
partners therefore would not have veto rights over the EU decisions but they would 
be closely involved in law-making at the intergovernmental level of the CP council.  
Conversely, CP members would have to accept the enforcement measures and 
jurisprudence that safeguards the relevant freedoms of the single market. Otherwise 
the integrity and coherence of the single market would erode. The key challenge will 
be to balance fairness with the necessity of homogeneity in application. In the case of 
EEA countries, an EFTA court is responsible. It consists of judges from the three EEA 
countries. However, rules ensure that the court follows the relevant case law of the 
ECJ. Whether such a mechanism would be sufficiently strong in the case of the CP 
with a major country as the UK is for political and legal debate. We think that it may 
be necessary to contemplate instead an extended ECJ court composition involving 
judges from all CP countries. However, this court would still be bound by ECJ case 
law. 
Another important question is competition policy enforcement and state aid control. 
In the case of EEA/EFTA countries, the European Commission is largely in charge for 
any cases that have repercussions beyond borders. Whether this is a feasible model 
for the CP should be for political debate. 
180 
 
Participation in the EU budget would also be vital. While many spending items of the 
EU budget might look outdated, the budget still constitutes an essential element of 
the integrated economic space. It is indispensable in the area of agricultural policy 
but, with its aim of structural convergence, is also important for opening up 
economic opportunities for less-developed parts of the EU. The EU budget also 
provides support for ‘catch-up’ countries. While the effectiveness of Structural Funds 
is a matter for debate, they serve as a quid pro quo for the adoption by cohesion 
countries of demanding single market legislation that might exceed what would be 
appropriate at their development level. Participation in the budget is therefore the 
necessary counterpart to participation in the single market. The UK would need to 
make a budgetary contribution. 
From a political point of view, our proposal would constitute a significant concession 
by the EU to the UK on the free movement of workers. Politically, there may be a 
tendency in continental Europe to demand limits in other areas of the single market 
such as financial services. We would note, however, that under our proposal there is 
already a political ‘price’ to be paid by the UK, as CP membership entails significantly 
less political influence compared to EU membership. Whether that price is 
appropriate is a matter for political judgement. 
If David Cameron had returned from his renegotiation exercise with this type of proposal for 
a new relationship between the UK and a ‘reformed’ EU, the Referendum result might well 
have been different. But is now too late. The EU has proved itself to be incapable of reform.  
It is therefore unlikely that it would now accept such a proposal.   
Further, as John Redwood argues, without the UK, EU27 can go ahead with their aim of full 
political union: 
More interesting and in a way more important are the aims of the rest of the EU. We 
should question the European Commission’s sometimes expressed view that it wants 
to punish the UK. Other EU luminaries have said they want a smooth transition, as 
anyone sensible would. 
The member states are what matters in this case. None of them have stated they 
want to be charged tariffs on their exports to the UK, implying they are nervous 
about suggesting damaging the current trading arrangements which help them more 
than the UK. The rest of the EU has a far bigger export trade with the UK than the 
other way round, and sells far more goods that could be subject to tariffs if we fall 
back on World Trade Organisation rules. 
Nor have any of the member states expressed a wish to lose their financial passports 
to London or to set back their access to the largest and most liquid financial market 
in Europe. We start from a position where both the UK and the rest of the EU have 
the same regulations, so it should be possible to carry on trading one way or another 
by keeping the passports or going over to the doctrine of equivalence. Services are 
tariff free anyway under WTO rules. 
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The aims of the rest of the EU must be to ensure a smooth transition without loss of 
trade and jobs for them through exporting to the UK. They will want to keep access 
to the London financial markets. They will probably want to use the exit of the UK to 
speed up their work on their full political, monetary and economic union. The UK has 
been a brake on progress, a country urging caution or seeking opt outs from many 
centralising proposals. 
A smooth and relatively rapid exit of the UK will help them get on with the hugely 
important task of providing the proper political and governmental backing to the 
euro, which is the most important part of the EU scheme so far. It is now being tested 
by political movements in various EU countries by electors impatient with slow 
growth or no growth, with high unemployment and stagnant wages. 
In single country currency unions far more money is transferred as grants between 
the richer and poorer parts of the zone. The euro area has found this difficult, in part 
because the UK is a large member state which did not want to pay for any euro 
transfers. Instead, in the euro area the money has been transferred as loans, using 
the mechanism of the European Central Bank. 
In the case of Greece this has produced extreme stresses in the financial system, with 
the need to write off or ease the terms of loans made to the country. There are still 
substantial strains on the commercial banking systems of other weaker eurozone 
members. 
Germany, as a major paymaster of the zone will want further disciplines and 
reassurances. There has to be more control centrally over budget deficits and total 
zone borrowing, as in a single country system. In return Germany will need to allow 
suitable spending of money on investment and improvement in those parts of the 
zone that are struggling to keep up and have high unemployment. 
Travellers from the continent regularly say that Brexit is not the main item on their 
agenda. They need to help get Brexit out of the way, smoothly, without damage to 
their economies. They have a much bigger agenda to pursue, to put the tax capacity 
and the government power behind the euro which all successful currencies need. 
That should be so much easier without the UK in the EU.488 
Challenges 
We should not forget the significant challenges involved in attempts to increase trade. In 
particular, the world as a whole is becoming considerably more protectionist. According to 
Mark Field, MP for the Cities of London and Westminster: ‘Between 1990 and the onset of 
the crisis, global trade expanded at twice the rate of world GDP growth; since then, these 
two indices have risen more or less in tandem. The effect of the global economy hitting the 
buffers was that ailing governments found it ever more difficult to resist domestic pressure 
to shield their own companies and workers from the recessionary tailwinds’. Global Trade 
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Alert estimated in 2010 that protectionist measures introduced after the crash led to a 10% 
reduction in global trade. Protectionist measures increased by 50% between 2014 and 2015. 
Even if free trade deals can be negotiated, there will always be the potential for 
governments – even members of the WTO – to impose non-tariff barriers to protect 
domestic suppliers.489 Further, Brexit and Trump could put a dampener on post-crisis 
attempts to harmonise global financial regulation.490 
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